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Abstract.
This dissertation attempts to explain how the Commission o f the European Union 
became such an active player in the policy-making o f the Union the last twenty years. 
In doing so, it provides a micro-founded theoretical framework o f involvement o f  the 
Commission as an institution carrying out public policies. The basic premise is to 
understand the policy-making process as an interaction o f the top-officials o f  the 
Commission with other purposeful societal actors at the micro-level. This interaction 
constitutes a multi-level game where top-officials as policy-makers contend with their 
own policy preferences over the policy outcomes that could be obtained, and try to 
maximize their utility function subject to what other players in the game pursue. 
Departing from corporatist and elite theories, it is argued that policy innovation can be 
a purposeful output pursued by bureaucrats in their attempt to reshape their policy 
competence (bureaucratic politics). This attempt takes part within the pattern of 
interaction between the various involved administrative departments and their policy 
clients and external suppliers. Then, in order to understand the dynamics o f  the 
innovative activity o f the administration, in our case the Commission, it is needed to 
see how this activity is influenced by the development o f  the structure o f interaction. 
Which are the strategies followed by the administrative departments and which are 
their possibilities o f success for policy innovators under a well developed structure 
and an underdeveloped structure o f  interaction. For this reason, the capability o f  top- 
officials for policy innovation is tested under the case o f  maritime industries (a well 
developed structure) and the case o f  tourism (underdeveloped structure).
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation attempts to explain how the European Commission has become such 
an active player in the policy-making of the Community during the last twenty years. 
The Commission appears to be at the heart of the policy-making mainly o f the 
Community pillar but with also significant role in the rest o f the pillars o f the Union. 
The responsibilities o f the Commission derive directly from the Treaty o f the Union 
that announces it as the exclusive agenda setter in the law-making process o f the 
Community. However, this mandate is not enough to explain the large number of 
initiatives for policy innovation at the Community level which the Commission 
undertakes sometimes beyond the will o f the member states and the preferences o f the 
various socio-economic interests. In many occasions, using its institutional role, the 
Commission acts as a genuine policy entrepreneur in the Community’s policy-making. 
Since the Commission is not an elected but an appointed body, the extensive use o f its 
innovative power in policy-making makes its role even more controversial in terms o f 
both input and output legitimacy, to use Scharpf s terms.
The striking element which led me to study the Commission as policy entrepreneur is 
its motivation. What makes it such an active player? Obviously, looking at the policy 
preferences o f the organized societal actors and also at the agenda o f the member 
states we do not obtain the observed attempts o f  the Commission for policy 
innovation. There are cases where the policy innovation undertaken by the 
Commission can be attributed to the policy preferences o f  the state or specific socio­
economic interests, but there are also attempts to put forward policies which are 
against that which the above interests pursue. Thus, there is another interesting point
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to understand: which are the relations between the Commission and the socio­
economic interests? Who has the upper hand?
The traditional corporatist and elite theories predict that the vested socio-economic 
interests order and then the administrations accommodate the latter’s orders. However, 
the Commission appears to have obtained its relative independence in reshaping the 
preference o f  its policy clients. This is the case when the issue at stake is o f low 
political saliency at the domestic arenas. The public o f  the member states is not 
sensibilized to the so-called low profile issues and the governments do not appear 
constraint by divided voters. In this case, the commission appears to have its hands 
free to embark upon policy innovation. Which are the strategies followed by the 
Commission in this attempt? Which factors can increase the possibilities o f  the 
Commission to succeed as policy entrepreneur? Many scholars have stressed on the 
role o f  the experts as independent sources o f policy innovation when the issue at stake 
is tackled on a problem-solving basis. Is this the case for the Commission’s innovative 
activity? In which way the Commission invites external experts to participate in the 
game? What types o f policies does the Commission pursue? These are questions that 
this dissertation concerns and tries to answer.
In the mid-1990s, the period when I started working on this research project, relatively 
little had been written on this subject. In the years that followed the literature on the 
subject has developed and many experts have contributed to furthering the 
understanding o f  the nature and functioning o f  the Commission. Within this academic 
context, my study seeks to understand a specific part o f  the broad role o f  the
7
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Commission in Community policy-making: the Commission’s role as a policy 
entrepreneur. The Commission does not act as a unitary actor in a policy domain. 
Different departments pursue different and some times conflicting dimensions o f public 
interest. For example, some departments have the mandate to protect the environment 
while others seek to promote the industry’s competitiveness. Is this division o f labor 
able to lead the various administrative units to embark upon bureaucratic competition 
in order to dominate the Commission’s policy output? Is this policy competition able 
to lead to policy expansion? How is the strategic game between Commission’s 
administrative divisions, states and societal organizations structured ? The premise of 
this study is to understand the policy-making process as an interaction o f the 
Commission’s top-officials involved in the policy domain with their policy clients and 
other external policy suppliers. The aim is to provide a middle-range theory o f 
bureaucratic policy innovation in order to shed more light on the driving forces o f 
European policy expansion.
This dissertation is divided into four sections. First, I provide the theoretical 
framework for the role o f the Commission in the Community policy-making. I raise 
specific hypotheses which link this with the structure o f interaction between the 
involved administrative departments o f the Commission and their policy clients, socio­
economic interests and other external policy suppliers, the experts community. In the 
second chapter, I test the proposed theoretical framework against the empirical 
findings in the case o f  the innovative policy-making o f  the European Commission, and 
specifically o f  Commissioner Martin Bangemann, and the Directorate General for 
Industry (DGIII) in the field o f  Maritime Industrial Policy. In this case, the policy
S
innovative attempt takes part within the environment o f  a well-developed Commission 
administration with a well-established structure o f interaction with its policy clients 
industrial and other societal interests and other external policy suppliers. In the third 
chapter, I examine the theoretical arguments under different conditions. I test the 
theoretical framework against the empirical findings in the case of innovative policy­
making o f  the Commissioner Christos Papoutsis and the relevant administrative unit o f 
the Commission in the field o f tourism. In this case, the tourism related administration 
o f the Commission is underdeveloped and with weak links with other intervening 
administrative unit and its policy clients, and external policy suppliers. Finally, I assess 
the general value o f the proposed theoretical arguments based on a comparative 
examination o f  the findings in the cases o f maritime industries and tourism.
CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORETICAL FRAM EW ORK
The research task o f this dissertation is to examine the involvement o f the European 
Commission in innovative policy -making. It is true that the Commission especially the 
last 20 years and after the kick off the Single European Act has been proved a very 
active player in promoting, through innovative policy-making, the European 
integration. There is a variety o f  theoretical approaches to the understanding and study 
o f  this process, from the grand theories o f neo-fimctionalism (Hass 1958, Lindberg 
1963) and inter-govemmentalism (Hoffinann 1966), and liberal inter-govemmentalism 
(Moravcsik 1991) up to middle-range theories such new-institutionalism (Bulmer 
1994) and policy networks (Peterson 1995). The grand theories look at the integration 
process as a whole and the middle-range theories examine particular aspects o f the 
process stressing on the role o f the institutions and middle-range policy actors. I will 
accommodate my attempt to explain the innovative role o f  the Commission within the 
last string o f  theories since the target is to explain the structure o f  interaction between 
the policy innovators and the rest o f  the involved elements o f  the examined policy­
making.
Grand theories can also contribute to understand the conditions under which the 
Commission has more or less degrees o f freedom to act. I am well aware that all these 
competing theories have been criticized that they provide partial explanation o f the 
policy-making and the integration process o f the Community. All theories, when they 
are applied empirically perform weaknesses to explain specific events in the integration 
process or specific aspects o f  Community policy-making. This led in recent years most
10
o f the scholars o f the European integration to accept that there may be no one theory 
to capture all aspects o f European policy-making (Hix 1999, Nugent 1999, Sandholtz 
1996). Rather, we should admit, as Majone, Dehousse (1993: 2) puts it “no single 
theory or disciplinary approach can possibly explain a complex, dynamic and in many 
respects unique process like European integration”. Hence, it is needed to review the 
various theories and to provide a typology o f the policy-making of the Community in 
order to see under which policy conditions policy innovation is the dominant element 
in the functioning o f the Commission.
t- i
In order to obtain a clear and consistent typology, I try to gain from the good 
properties o f  game theory in presenting with clarity patterns o f strategic interaction 
amongst purposeful actors. For this reason, I organize the theory review on game 
theory approach. I follow a game theory approach to present the structure o f policy­
making o f the Union. This structure is presented as a two-level game played 
simultaneously in nested policy arenas, the domestic and the Community arena. The 
players are governments and societal actors. The Commission is understood here as a 
dynamic third party with significant impact on the interaction o f the above players. I 
review the theories o f EU policy-making by providing a typology o f three identified 
types o f  Community policy-making based on two analytical parameters o f  the structure 
identified at the macro level; the level o f  salience o f  the issue under consideration in the 
domestic arena, and the level o f  the expressed interest o f the Commission to become 
involved in the specific policy-making.
From this discussion, as we will see, it comes out that most issues entered in the
11
Community agenda are o f low political visibility. I f  an administrative unit o f the 
Commission expresses high interest to deal with such an issue by pursuing new' 
policies, then bureaucratic politics amongst the involved players occur with the 
Commission being the driving force. In this case, how can I model the role o f the 
Commission? Grand theories cannot tell much on this point. Middle-range theories o f 
neo-institutionalism are applicable in this case. From the existing theories Principle- 
agent theories (Pollack 1997) provide a good explanation for the room of maneuver 
which the agent-Commission holds, due to its embedded advantage in terms of 
information and expertise over its principle-Council. This asymmetric information and 
knowledge structure reduces the ability o f the principle-Council to obtain full control 
over the functioning o f  the agent. However, this approach cannot elaborate on the 
strategies followed by the Commission and the types o f policy outputs pursued. 
Commission is still treated as a unitary actor and everything is explained in relation to 
its relative independence from the principal-Council. I
I could also argue that the theoretical approaches that try to legitimize the role o f the 
Commission as a body with the properties o f an independent regulatory authority are 
rather restrictive since they focus only on the regulatory role o f  the Commission 
(Majone 1997). Thus, a  theoretical approach that goes beyond this point and explains 
at the micro- and meso-level the way the Commission acts as policy entrepreneur is 
needed. Clearly, principle-agent theoretic arguments and normative approaches for the 
role o f  the Commission as regulator contribute significantly to the understanding o f 
why the Commission jumps in--or should jump in-the game, but they do not explain 
adequately how the whole entrepreneurship occurs.
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For this reason, I revisit the bureaucratic model o f decision-making popularized in the 
60s by Graham Allison (1971) and Anthony Downs (1967) and incorporate elements 
o f the bureau-shaping model proposed by Patrick Dunleavy (1991) for explaining the 
functioning o f  top-officials within their organizations. I adapt these arguments to the 
functioning o f  the top-officials o f the Commission, namely the Commissioners and the 
executive staff o f the administration and I test them against the empirical material in 
the following chapters.
The E uropean  Union Policy-M aking: A Game Theory Approach
A complete description o f  EU policy-making must take into account: a) both the 
horizontal channels of interaction amongst the different chief-negotiators o f  member 
states and the vertical channels between state leaders and their electorates, and b) the 
role o f  EU institutions such as the European Commission, and the European Court of 
Justice to the extent that they function according to their own bureaucratic 
organizational interest over specific policy agendas.
Based on a game theory approach, the proposed analytical framework incorporates 
explicitly the involvement o f  the Commission and.the vertical and horizontal channels 
o f interaction between state leaders and followers. I present the EU decision-making as 
a nested game1, in which voters impose constraints on their leaders, when the latter 
operate also as negotiators in the EU principal arena. In this structure, the
13
Commission, according to the EU institutional design, acts as a dynamic third party 
with significant impact on the interaction o f both state leaders among themselves and 
with their followers.
This game is o f the nested type because: a) chief-negotiators at the European arena 
hold their own ordering in policy preferences, which, in turn, depend upon the ordering 
o f preferences o f their followers, who hold the same policy tastes although their 
ordering may not coincide with that o f their leaders, and b) due to its dynamic 
functioning as a bureaucratic organization, the Commission is able to influence the 
pay-off o f the chief-negotiators in the principal and the electoral arena. The interaction 
o f the Commission with the players o f the game as it is carried out in both the 
European-principal and domestic-electoral arenas can be understood as a comparative 
statics problem between two situations: one without and the other with the 
participation o f the European Commission. The interference o f the Commission may 
change the pay- off for the actors. The leaders will have different pay-offs and, 
therefore select different strategies, according to whether the Commission ends up 
expressing high or low interest in the specific policy agenda. The equilibrium strategies 
o f the two games, with and without interference o f the Commission, have to be 
calculated and compared.
I construct the nested game o f the EU decision-making process in both the European 
and the domestic arenas, and I try to identify and evaluate at the macro-level the 1
1 For a definition of nested games see Tsebelis (1990).
14
gaasxKins se i l
significance o f the European Commission Union in determining the output o f  the 
game, reviewing the recent developments in the European integration literature and, 
more specifically, in the branches o f  neo-institutionalism and formal models (Peters 
1992; Dehousse and Majone 1993; Blumer 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 
1994; Cram 1994; Majone 1994; Heritier 1996; Scharpf 1996; Garret and Tsebelis 
1996), and neo-liberalism (Keohane and Hoffinann 1991; Moravcsik 1993; Sandholtz 
and Zysman 1989; Garret 1992).
To simplify matters, I assume that the games are o f a one shot type. There are two 
players, state-leaders and their followers, in both arenas, the European and the 
Domestic, and in each game, the players have a choice between the same two 
strategies: cooperation and compromise over the issue at stake, or non-cooperation 
and intransigence, where every player prefers his/her own way over the issue. The pay­
offs are symbolized by the same letters (T,R,P,S). What differs is the order o f  these 
pay-offs in each game. In the case o f  mutual cooperation each player receives a reward 
Ri from the implementation o f  the new collective policy. In the case o f mutual non- 
cooperation each player receives a penalty Pi from the absence o f a collective policy at 
the European level. When one cooperates while the other opts out, preferring its own 
way or free riding, the player who is willing to compromise receives the sucker’s pay­
off Si, and the higher the Si the more willing this player will be to compromise. The 
player who is unwilling to compromise receives the temptation pay-off Ti, and the 
higher the Ti the more tempted this player is to follow his/her own way.
15
Player 2
Cooperate Non-Cooperate 
Cooperate R1R2 S1T2
Player 1
Non-Cooperate T 1S2 P1P2
Table 1: Pay-off M atrix fo r  leaders and followers in Domestic and 
Community arena
The followers, vested interests, pressure groups and voters, when they are not 
polarized over the issue at stake, play the prisoners dilemma (PD) game, where a 
mutual compromise over the issue is preferred over the mutual intransigence. In this 
game the players identity that they have a common interest over the negotiated issue. 
However, the luck o f trust among them discourages them to reach the preferred 
agreement with the highest pay-off. When the followers hold completely divergent 
preferences over the negotiating issue, are polarized and play the deadlock game, 
preferring more in this case to have their own way, which is the most preferred pay-off 
of the game.
Non-polarized chief negotiators play the prisoner’s dilemma game for the same reasons
as their followers play. For polarized chief-negotiators, as for their followers, the most
preferred outcome is to have their own way, or to free ride when the opponent signals
his/her inclination to accept this way and compromise over the issue. However, what
distinguishes the ordering o f negotiators’ preferences from those o f  their followers is
16
that negotiators always prefer compromise and cooperation under the threat o f their 
opponents opting out, or mutual intransigence, especially when they are aware that 
state policies are not longer optimal in the long term. Hence, for polarized chief- 
negotiators, the game is o f  the chicken type.
Inequalities (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) present the relationship between the different pay-offs in 
the three possible games:
In the case o f non-highlv divided states over the policy issue at stake followers and 
chief-negotiators plav the same game:
Pay-offs o f  followers and chief-negotiators: Ti>Ri>Pi>Si (Prisoners’ dilemma) (1.1)
In the case o f  highly divided states over the policy issue at stake followers and chief- 
negotiators plav different games:
These simple games could represent the behavior attributed to leaders and followers by 
the group o f  European integration theory literature mentioned above. One can verify 
from 1.1 and l .2 that, regardless o f  whether 1he game is the prisoner’s dilemma or 
deadlock, the state-leaders and their followers are better o ff when they play “non- 
cooperate”, no matter what the other does. Therefore, the solution for both o f  the one 
shot games is mutual intransigence. In the case o f  prisoner’s dilemma, the unique 
equilibrium pay-off (Pi,Pi) is Pareto inferior, which makes the equilibrium unstable. If  
there is the possibility for the players to communicate and commit themselves in
Pay-offs o f followers Ti>Pi>Ri>Si (Deadlock) (1.2)
Pay-offs of chief- negotiators: Ti>Ri>Si>Pi (Chicken) (1.3)
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mutual cooperation, they can obtain the (Ri,Ri) equilibrium which is the first best 
outcome o f the game, with the pay-offs for the players on the Pareto frontier. An 
institution such as the CEU could provide such a possibility. This is the case that 
academic scholars of international organization theory such as Robert Keohane (1984) 
propose to legitimate an active “hegemonic” role for international organizations in 
order to enforce the states to achieve superior multilateral agreements. We will return 
later to examine what it is that allows the CEU to act in such a way. For the moment 
let us hold that, in this case, CEU has a legitimate role in the negotiations, namely, to 
help the negotiating parts to achieve the Pareto superior collective output.
In the case o f the deadlock game, the unique equilibrium strategy o f  non-cooperation 
for the followers is stable because it is also Pareto optimal, and therefore it cannot be 
challenged by any collective action. In this case, the chief negotiators o f the states at 
the European arena, appear to be heavily constraint by their followers who are 
unwilling to  accept an agreement over the. negotiating issue. At the same time, as 
already mentioned, the negotiators hold mutual intransigence as the least preferred 
output. The crux is that chief-negotiators can be replaced if they do not promote the 
policies their followers advocate. In fact, leaders are interested not only in negotiating 
successfully in the European arena, but also in maintaining their position as leaders in 
the domestic arena.
Following the analytical method o f  nested games, leaders* pay-offs at the European 
arena are contingent on the pay-offs o f their game in the domestic arena. As a result, 
their actual pay-offs will be a convex combination of the pay-offs in the two arenas. I
18
choose the linear combination to break down the leaders' actual pay-off because rS iis 
simplicity. In algebraic terms:
POL=( 1 -K)POE+KPOD
where POL stands for the actual leaders’ pay-offs, POE stands for leaders’ pay-offs if 
they play only in the European arena, POD stands for leaders’ pay-offs if  they play 
only in the domestic arena, and K is in the interval (0,1), and indicates the degree o f 
significance o f  the domestic arena or the weight o f the followers in the negotiations o f 
the chief-negotiators, while (1-K) indicates the weight o f  the European arena.
When K increases, chief negotiators give most weight to their domestic arena, and 
their POL is very close to the POD o f  their followers. In terms of politics, this means 
that when the salience o f  the negotiating issue is high in the domestic arena, voters 
care a lot about the issue and the margins o f maneuver for elites decrease. The chief- 
negotiators will be heavily penalized, if not replaced, if  they do not comply with their 
followers’ policy preferences over the issue. The order o f  POL coincides with the 
order o f  POD, the inequalities (1.1) (1.2) hold, and therefore the chief negotiators are 
involved in a prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock game. In this case, in the absence o f  any 
communication, the dominant choice-strategy for the negotiators is non-cooperation, 
which leads to a Pareto , inferior , outcome. Then, an active institution such as the 
European Commission could establish a communication channel and provide the 
above-mentioned conditions to the players for achieving a Pareto efficient outcome.
I f  K is very small, the followers do not care much about the issue, the salience o f the
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issue is relatively low, and chief-negotiators can play in the European arena without 
constraints. In the case where the states hold convergent policy preferences, the 
ordering o f  POL follows the inequality (1.2) and the game is prisoner's dilemma. In the 
case which States are polarized over the policy issue the ordering o f POL follows 
(1.3), and the game is chicken. This is a game with multiple equilibria. Each player 
makes his/her best choice according to his/her opponent’s choice. If, somehow, one 
player makes it clear tliat he/she prefers his/her own way, then the other is willing to 
compromise with him/her, receiving side payments or promises to have his/her own 
way in other issues which are more important to him/her. The same reasoning may 
produce the reverse outcome, where the first player compromises when the second 
prefers his/her own way. Both o f the outcomes are equilibrium points, but in the 
absence o f  specific communication conditions, there is no obvious way o f  arriving 
there. The divergence o f policy preference generates a problem of coordination 
between the two players. In any case, in this game, mutual intransigence is the least 
preferred (worst) outcome for both players.
The fear o f  arriving at this worst possible outcome, in which the pay-off for each 
player is Pi, may, under certain conditions which will be specified subsequently, lead 
both players to compromise over a European policy solution. We understand that in 
the case o f  chicken, where chief-negotiators are less constrained by the domestic arena, 
the solutions are more complex, being contingent on the opponent’s strategy. Politics 
thus become more pragmatic, and third parties, such as the European Commission, 
which can influence the game providing the players with the already mentioned specific 
conditions o f  communication, play a central role.
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To sum up this discussion, chief-negotiators play a prisoner’s dilemma or a deadlock 
game when their hands are tied by their followers in the domestic arena. Alternatively, 
when the leaders are not heavily constraint by the domestic arena they play the 
prisoner’s dilemma when their followers are not polarized, or a chicken game when 
they are polarized in terms o f policy preferences. From our analysis the role o f  third 
parties such the European Commission may be proved crucial in driving the players to 
follow strategies, which lead to an equilibrium outcome o f the game on the Pareto 
welfare frontier.
T he Role o f the European Commission in the Nested Game in Both the 
E uropean  and  the Domestic Arena
Let us now examine how the Commission plays this role. A prisoner’s dilemma or a 
chicken game, as stated (Tsebelis 1990), may have, under certain conditions, mutual 
cooperation (in our case a new policy arrangement at the European level) as 
equilibrium strategy:
"In prisoners’ dilemma, or chicken game, when correlated strategies are possible, 
the likelihood of cooperation increases with R and S and decreases with T and P. 
the logic of these arguments rely on the development of correlated strategies. In 
order to develop such strategies, promises, threats, credible threats, or 
punishments are required". (Tsebelis 1990:68)
Through its active interference in the game, or by simply providing a communicative 
channel for the players, the Commission helps them to develop correlated strategies, 
promises, credible threats (punishments or rewards). Contingent strategies are then 
possible, and this will induce actors to  change their strategies in the principle arena of
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intergovernmental bargaining, and, finally, cooperation amongst rational, self- 
interested opponents in the prisoner’s dilemma or chicken game can be developed.
There are two ways through which the Commission could alter the equilibrium 
solution o f the State-State game: a) by changing the chief-negotiators’ actual pay-offs 
[POL:Ti,Si,Pi,Ri] o f the game in the European and the domestic arenas (Tsebelis, 
1990), and b) by strategically choosing the timing o f initiation o f an alternative policy 
in the negotiations arena, promoting European policy solutions based on convergent 
state policy preferences (Dehousse and Majone 1993), and postponing issues on which 
states are polarized and the game is deadlocked (Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 1994; 
Tsebelis 1994). To achieve this, the main policy instruments in the hands o f the 
Commission are, first, its role as agenda setter for formal negotiations as derived from 
the Treaties o f  the EU, and secondly, its capacity to channel information on the 
benefits and costs o f an alternative policy in such a way that it can shape preferences 
within the state’s domestic arenas, altering the salience (changing K) o f the issue in 
which the Commission expresses certain interest. Finally, another instrument in 
influencing the cost and benefit o f an alternative policy is the Commission’s 
competence to impose penalties (changing Pi) or to introduce rewards (changing Ri,Si) 
through the management o f material and legal resources that the Commission 
constitutionally holds.
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The Increasing Irrelevance o f the Domestic Arena for the European A rena and 
the Rise o f Invisible Politics
As already stated, if chief-negotiators are heavily constrained by the domestic arena 
(K>>), then the masses are influential in both arenas -th e  domestic and European— of 
the decision-making process. This constitutes a type o f  visible politics, that is, politics 
designed to be watched, and approved, by the electorates. The reasoning outlined 
above assumes that leaders take as given the preferences o f their followers 
(exogenously set preferences and perfect information) and then they represent them in 
the European arena, lire  equilibrium strategies o f mutual intransigence can also be 
predicted using the theoretical approach o f ‘two-stage intergovernmental bargaining” 
(Moravcsik 1991), which assumes exogenously set preferences by the domestic actors.
A closer approach to reality, however, involves imperfect information and the 
assumption that grass roots societal actors and voters do not hold exogenously set 
preferences. These assumptions make all the types o f  actors discussed above less 
influential in the decision-making process. Societal groups may be “pressured” as well 
as exert “pressure” (Peters 1994: 10), and they may, under specific conditions, 
mobilize their followers in order to increase the share o f  the segment they represent in 
the European game. If this is the case, the preferences o f the interacting actors over the 
issue, instead o f being a rigid constraint for the leaders o f  the states in the 
intergovernmental bargaining arena, can be manipulated by the leaders and so become 
“a strategic weapon” for the negotiators according to their individual preferences.
23
IMIWWMMMWWWI
For these reasons, chief-negotiators are less constrained by the electoral arena, and this 
allows them to play a game less visible game to the wide public. The rules o f  this game 
and its institutional setting provide an efficient bargaining procedure for the negotiating 
parties. A bargaining procedure is efficient when it produces an equilibrium output 
from which none o f the negotiators has a reason to deviate.2 The process itself -rules 
and institutional framework— is designed to provide to the negotiators both, 
information and the capacity to make contingent strategies. These strategies are open 
to the public only to the extent that it contributes to the effectiveness o f the strategies 
themselves. The bargaining output has to be approved directly by the followers o f the 
negotiators, otherwise it is not efficient, but the bargaining procedures do not have to 
be watched by the followers. This constitutes what is often called informal politics.3
I argue that elite leaders enjoy an oligopolistic position in representing the interest o f 
their group within the domestic arena, which allows them to shape their followers* 
preferences. At the same time, the cost o f information regarding elite leaders’ behavior 
is very high.4 Under these conditions, the salience o f  an issue is not exogenous to 
negotiations. On the contrary, K depends on the availability o f information to the 
followers and the oligopolistic power o f representation which chief negotiators hold. 
The less informed the followers are and the more oligopolistic power o f  representation 
the chief-negotiators hold, the more the salience of an issue may be manipulated. I f  we 
add that in any case an issue, in order to become o f high salience for a state, has to
2 For a presentation of the concept of efficient bargaining see Milgrom and Roberts (1992): 19-48
3 See Middlemas in Crouch and Marquand. (eds.) (1992)
4 See Tsebeiis (1990): 164-172
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pass the test o f being crucial for a sufficiently large majority o f citizens o f  the state, 
and moreover, that few policy issues pass this test, we could argue that most o f the 
issues negotiated in the European arena hold low K and are, for most o f  the time, o f 
low significance for the wide public.
Furthermore, in line with the tradition o f bureaucratic politics, “problems are resources 
as well as mere problems, and organizations attempt to seize on or to create 
(conceptually if not in reality) problems in order to enhance their own power” (Allison 
1971). This may be particularly applicable to the behavior of the Directorate Generals 
(DGs) o f  the Commission when they demonstrate high interest in specific policy 
arenas, and also to the behavior o f  the national administrations. However, this does not 
imply that bureaucrats are free to promote an issue towards high salience in the 
domestic agenda. On the contrary, they have to act under “environmental-background” 
constraints. In the case o f  non-polarized states over a particular issue, the invisible 
game is o f  a prisoner’s dilemma type, while in the case o f  polarized states, it resembles 
more to a chicken game (Tsebelis 1990). In these cases, the intergovernmental 
bargaining theory becomes very weak in explaining the far more complex invisible 
bargaining.
The Institutional Design of Invisible Politics at the £U; The European 
Commission
I argue that the design o f  invisible bargaining at EU level most resembles to G. 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model. Domestic and supra-national concentrated
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groups—smaU size groups in the Olsonian world5—organizations, government and CEU 
departments, political individuals, and top-bureaucrats are involved in the decision­
making process without the predominance of anyone participant.
The increasing irrelevance o f domestic arenas as external constraints on European­
wide games opened up the decision-making process o f the EU to qualified majority 
rule and confined unanimity to only a few issues crucial for the sovereignty o f the 
states. The majority rule in turn triggered participation in bargaining and coalition 
formation, and a large number o f possible winning coalitions exist in any policy 
agenda.6
In this process, the European Commission, because o f  its constitutional task to be the 
formal agenda setter, is the key player. The Commission could provide binding 
constraints to make states compromise and to reduce the temptation to “cheat”, and, 
moreover, the Commission may under specific conditions, shape the preferences o f  the 
Council o f Ministers by providing new information and altering the pay-ofls o f  reward 
in case of cooperation over the issue at stake. In this sense, echoing Peters:
“...Although the great decisions about Europe are taken at the level of prime 
ministers, much of what happens depends on less glamorous bureaucratic 
interaction and bargaining.” (Peters 1992:121). ;
The Commission normally issues between 4000 and 5000 legislative instruments per
3 See Olson. (1965)
6 See Bueno De Mesquita and Stokman (eds.) (1994).
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year. These are in the form of directives, regulations and decisions. Most o f  them have 
to be approved by the Council o f Ministers, which basically does so without 
modifications. Some others are restricted to decisions that follow directly the 
implementation o f existing legislation (administrative law).7 The later should not be 
underestimated since they belong to the implementation stage of the policy making, 
which very often proves more important for policy receivers than the policy decision 
itself (Peters 1992). This makes bureaucracies even more crucial players in the policy 
making process. “Eurocrats”, in charge o f interpreting and executing legislation using 
their discretionary power, can drastically influence and modify the policy output in 
favor o f one actor or another. Since it has to do with uncertain future behavior, the 
nature o f  legislation itself resembles to an unwritten contract between the policy 
supplier and the client, and leaves as much room for policy maneuvers to the 
executives as is enjoyed by judges, e.g. see implementation o f merger policy.8
Some students o f agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones (1993) for example) have 
argued that organizations seek to imposé monopolies o f  problem definition over 
particular policy areas. These organizations tend to have a particular range o f  solutions 
and policy definitions available to them (e.g. competition policy), and may want to 
utilize those solutions as the means o f  gaining as much competence as possible. The 
DGs, may therefore compete with one another in order to monopolize the policy 
arenas and define the agenda. Even in the reverse case, where the issues are not set 
exogenously by societal groups and individuals, and policy makers do not function as
7 See Nugent (1992): 71
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“issue takers”, but rather as “issue shapers”, it is very rare for this policy domain to 
become dominated by only one “issue-shaper” in the negotiated agenda. I argue that 
the definition of policy within the institutions of the EU is sufficiently loose and 
unstructured that there will be few monopolies. There will be, rather, a continuing 
pattern o f competition and instability, with the Commission acting accordingly, as a 
developing bureaucracy o f the EU, constitutionally committed to making policy at the 
supra-national level. ___ ;
In the context o f the above analysis, I argue that: a) when the Commission 
demonstrates high interest for a specific decision agenda, such as industrial policy, 
competition policy, environmental policy etc., but the issue is o f low salience on the 
domestic agenda, then the competition amongst the various DGs themselves, and the 
DGs and national and sub-national bureaucracies is dominant, and can only be 
understood through bureaucratic politics analysis, and b) in the case o f low salience 
and low interest for the Commission, the policy network is localized and the decision 
domain is well-defined within the borders of a DG or a vertically integrated process, 
from the sub-state up to supra-state level o f decision-making. There are no 
overlapping or crossing interests concerning problem definition and solution functions. 
In this case, the decision process does not resemble bureau-conflicts over the 
domination o f  the issue at stake.
To have a general overview o f  the role o f the European Commission in EU decision- 8
8 See Burley and Walter (1993); Majone (1995).
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making, based on this game theory approach and supporting discussion, I systematize 
the EU policy-making according to the salience o f the issue in the domestic arena and 
organizational interest expressed by the Commission over the policy issue at stake. I 
provide below a typology o f three different decision-making structures.
O rganizational involvement o f the Commission
High Low
Issues o f  H IG H  salience Intergovernm ental Intergovernm ental
in the domestic arena bargaining dominance bargaining dom inance
Issues o f  LO W  salience 
in the domestic arena
B ureaucratic politics “Localized” politics 
dominance.
Table 1: The Decision S tructure o f EU policy-making
Decision-Making structure 1: “Intergovernmental bargaining dominance” is prevalent 
when the issue at stake is o f  high salience in the domestic arena (K>>). In this case the 
Commission acts as a third party with minimum influence, a  broker for example, to the 
state-state prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock game, trying to enable them to reach stable 
equilibrium around “Pareto superior” cooperation.
Decision-Making structure II: “ Bureaucratie dominance” is prévalent, when the issue
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is o f low salience (K<<) in the domestic arena and the Commission interest is high at 
the Community level. Here, the Commission acts as a powerful third party to a 
prisoner's dilemma or a chicken game amongst states. In this case, the nature o f 
invisible politics and the bargaining amongst various organizational actors provides the 
Commission with more room to act as policy initiator, mediator and innovator in an 
attempt to lead the negotiating parties to stable equilibrium points on the Pareto 
frontier. When this is the case, bureaucratic politics take part: a) within the 
Commission amongst the various policy units (DGs), and/or b) amongst the 
Commission and state and sub-state bureaucracies.
Decision-Making structure III: ** localized dominance” is prevalent when the salience 
of the issue is low in the domestic arena and the Commission also expresses low 
interest over the policy issue. In this case, we deal with a sub-case o f  bureaucratic 
politics, the “soft bureaucratic politics” over the implementation o f a European policy, 
where the principle o f subsidiarity is the rule o f the game. In this case, the Commission 
acts as the guardian and the monitor o f the EU legislation, trying to decentralize to 
state and sub-state level the administrative work and the less prestigious and more 
troublesome part o f the policy-making.
I use the term o f  policy “dominance” o f  one structure over the others in the sense that, 
in each policy case, all the three decision-making type-structures co-exist, but one-the 
dominant- is the main channel o f decision-making at the EU level. Our analysis shows 
that in the above structures the innovative role o f  the European Commission is central 
in the case o f  bureaucratic politics (low political saliency, high interest o f the 
Commission). For this reason I concentrate on the relative theoretically unexplored
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area, as we earlier discussed, o f  bureaucratic politics in order to provide a testable 
explanatory framework for the innovative role o f  the Commission in the structure of 
bureaucratic interaction.
A Bureau-Shaping Model for the European Commission; O pening Up the 
‘‘Black Box” r
I revisit the bureaucratic model o f  decision-making popularized in the 1960s by Allison
and Downs and, by incorporating elements o f new institutionalism, I adapt it to the
case o f the policy-making o f the European Commission. We have to bear in mind that
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model describes decision-making only as it occurs in the
executive branch and not in the legislature. There are two main elements o f  Allison’s
bureaucratic model. The first forms the “structure” o f  the decision-making model:
numerous individuals and organizations, with varying interests, are involved in any
single issue, without the predominance o f any participant. The second element
comprises the decision-making “process”; the decision is formulated through
bargaining and compromise, and considerable slippage occurs during implementation. I
keep these broad principles o f the bureaucratic politics model, avoiding any stricter
definition, because, I believe, these two characteristics capture the essence o f  the
model and make it applicable in the decision -making o f the European Commission.
In our case we extend the use o f  bureaucratic policy model to explain the role o f  the 
Commission, not only as a US type o f  pure executive body, but also as a  main element 
o f the legislative process, acting as the embryo o f  a European type o f  government, 
accountable to the European Parliament and to the Council o f the EU. Despite the fact
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that decisions are taken on the basis o f collective responsibility, each member o f the 
Commission has special responsibility for one or more policy areas. The Commission is 
backed by a civil service. It comprises approximately 15000 officials divided between 
26 departments, called Directorates-General (DGs), each one o f which is responsible 
for carrying out common policies and general administration in a specific area.
According to the bureaucratic politics model, the top officials in this complex structure 
often have to deal with different societal interests and priorities and are concerned with 
very different questions. The various participants in this decision-making process 
attempt to promote their own perceptions o f what constitutes personal, group, 
organizational, or national interest. The policy output o f  this process does not 
necessarily emerge as a solution to the problem, but rather results from compromise, 
conflict, and sometimes the confusion o f top officials who represent diverse interests 
and have unequal influence in the decision-making process.
In order to understand the motivations and policy strategies o f the executive staff o f 
the Commission, I adopt a bureau-shaping model as it has been proposed by Dunleavy 
(1991), as an alternative to the rather restricted conventional public choice 
bureaucratic models o f  budget-maximizing bureaucratic behavior (Niskanen 1971). 
The main argument o f the bureau-shaping model is that the overall policy o f  a bureau 
is set by some combination o f  individual decisions made by its officials and by 
interaction with its external environment. Following Downs (1967), the external 
environment o f  agents consists o f  a) sovereigns (“sponsors” in Niskanen’s 
terminology) which, in the case o f  European Commission are the Council o f  Ministers
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and the European Parliament, b) rival agencies, which in the case o f  Commission are 
other DGs o f the Commission and state and sub-state bureaucracies, c) suppliers o f 
input services, e.g. external experts, epistemic communities etc., and d) clients, which, 
for the Commission are states, regions, firms, organized interests and individuals. The 
model considers that officials are individual-welfare maximizers and not the Weberian 
type o f altruist civil servants.
According to  the bureau-shaping model, the officials’ influence on the policy o f  their 
bureau is always rank-structured, with those near the top being most influential. 
Therefore, we concentrate on their utility function. Departing from the conventional 
public choice position that public officials, like any other managers, are salary- 
maximizers, I assume that higher-ranked bureaucrats place more emphasis upon non- 
pecuniary utilities such as status, prestige, patronage and influence, and most especially 
on the interest and importance o f  their work tasks (Kingdon 1984). Administrative 
sociology literature also provides positive and negative values ascribable to 
bureaucrats, where, clearly there is always a pecuniary parameter (income, job security 
or perks). As soon as this parameter is satisfied, however, these bureaucrats then turn 
towards non-pecuniary utilities (Dunleavy 1991). Therefore, I adopt the position that 
rational officials want to work in small, elite, collegial bureaus close to political power 
centers. They do not want to be heavily staffed, with a large budget and dominated by 
routines, conflicts and low status agencies.
Any bureaucrat has a range o f both individual and collective strategies available to 
boost his or her welfare. I assume that rational bureaucrats put their efforts primary
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into individual utility-maximizing strategies. They only pursue collective strategies for 
bureau-shaping when individual options are foreclosed or are already fully exploited. In 
any case, the main argument is that top officials maximize their individual utility by 
reshaping their bureaus, while constrained by: a) their own interpretive framework of 
policy-reality, b) the policy-identity (pro-liberal, more interventionist, etc.) that the 
bureau develops through its continuous dealing with the specific policy domain (the 
history o f the organization), and c) the actual configuration o f the bureau’s external 
environment.
In particular terms, bureau-shapers take into account the above constraints by 
evaluating the cost o f a shaping strategy typically based upon the volume o f work 
needed to prepare special papers, attend difficult meetings, cultivate external allies and 
contacts, respond to sovereign criticisms or investigations and justify the bureau’s case 
in public. Although I accept that, “ what each decision maker really wants in his heart 
o f hearts is more radical than what is practical” (Bueno De Mesquite and Stokman 
1994: 85), 1 assume that bureaucrats are risk averse, weigh high their environment and 
adopt their policy preferences close to what is practical and realistic. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the environmental conditions, since they determine the cost o f 
advocating a policy change, have the major impact upon how officials evaluate their 
utility pay-ofife obtained by pursuing this policy change.
From the above discussion, we can draw the following assumption, which constitutes a 
necessary condition for top-officials to pursue a policy change: a strategy for bureau 
shaping is put forward by a  top-official when his or her expected utility pay-offs from
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the change are greater than the cost o f  advocating this particular change and any 
alternative benefit derived from other bureau-shapes including the status quo. '
(Expected Utility from a policy change)-Cost o f policy advocacy > Alternative benefit
Net Expected Utility Pay-off
Dunleavy9 systematizes the bureau-shaping strategies in his bureau-shaping model 
around five main categories:
1. Major internal reorganization o f  the Bureau. Changes in structure that can increase 
the degree to which an agency conforms with the elite policy-making ideal. Any 
expansion is concentrated at the policy making level.
2. Transformation o f internal work practices. Policy-level officials want to increase 
the interest o f their work tasks, lengthen the time horizons used in decision-making 
and extend their discretionary ability to control policy. A shift towards more 
sophisticated management and policy analysis systems insulates the agency from 
criticism by rival bureaus, external partners (experts, epistemic communities etc.) or 
the sponsor body (legislator).
3. Redefinition o f relationships with external “partners”. Policy level officials 
promote in relation to their clients (regulatees, interest groups) policies that increase 
discretionary involvement in the relevant issue, implying a shift towards a  more 
corporatist style o f relationship. In relation to external policy advisers and contractors, 
they follow a hands-off approach and seek to minimize the dependence upon external
’ Dunleavy 1991:202-205.
organizations.
4. Competition with other Bureaus. The top-officials o f a bureau embark upon 
competition with other bureaus searching for policy programs and policy issues that fit 
with their ideal bureau form. In this case, the competition resembles an oligopolistic 
competition, where one bureau acts as challenger and the other as incumbent.
5. Load-shedding, hiving off and contracting out. Central government departments 
may simply be able to legislate the transfer o f complex and troublesome policies to 
local government or quasi-government agents. In addition, ancillary functions can 
be contracted out to private firms.
Another way o f representing bureaucrats’ decision over their collective bureau-policies 
is a “Demand and Supply” model o f the conditions in which bureaucrats seek further 
new policy increments. The demand curve for advocacy o f new policy outputs shows 
how officials’ expected marginal utility (EMU) changes with new policy increments. 
The horizontal axis o f the graph measures the level o f  the bureau’s policy output and 
the vertical axis measures the marginal costs and the expected marginal utilities o f  each 
unit o f output for top officials.
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The EMU curve falls as output increases, reflecting the general presumption in 
economic analysis of diminishing returns to scale i.e. after a point every new increment 
o f  policy output gives less satisfaction to the officials.
The Marginal Advocacy Cost (MAC) curve rises with increased outputs, mainly 
because o f  the increased volume o f the work needed to prepare and advocate 
successively new policies. This is due to the fact that the more policy output an agency 
wants to deliver, the more external hostility it receives from other agencies which also 
fight for scarce means of policy-making. Since the MAC is defined above as net cost, it 
also takes into account other welfare boosting options, or, algebraically: 
MAC=(Marginal cost o f Advocacy)-(Altemative benefit).
At the point where an agency is unlikely to obtain further increase however hard it 
pushes, the cost curve becomes vertical. If  external hostility changes, increasing or 
decreasing, then the cost curve shifts up or down respectively.
In this graph, bureaucrats advocate expansion in the agency’s activities if its policy 
output is to the left o f the equilibrium position (E). But if  the bureau’s current position 
is to the right o f  the equilibrium, officials do nothing, switching attention instead to 
other individual or collective strategies for improving their welfare. Note here, that the 
alternative to budget maximization is inaction, not advocacy o f budget reductions as 
conventional public choice theory predicts. The bureau-shaping approach (Dunleavy 
1991) treats the budget maximizing models o f  behavior o f  bureaucracies as partial 
models o f a wider variety.
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The bureau-shaping model argues that normally the equilibrium policy output level lies 
on the sloping section o f  the MAC curve, since senior officials respond to changes in 
environmental favourability or hostility in sensitive and sophisticated ways that affect 
the shape and placing o f  the whole MAC curve. Over the longer term, the bureau­
shaping model claims that bureau-shaping internal reorganizations are very unlikely to 
simply inflate the DMU curve along its existing shape. Far more commonly, the DMU 
curve changes shape, swinging in a clockwise direction so as to maximize the benefits 
which senior bureaucrats derive from internal reorganization, while reducing their 
dependence on high levels o f  budgets in order to maintain their welfare.
M AC
DM U
i \
j JDMU2
The various strategies discussed above allow top bureaucrats directly to improve their 
own welfare by, for example, shedding troublesome direct managerial responsibilities 
and gaining increased staff and time resources for intellectually more attractive tasks 
such as planning and guidance. All the above kinds o f bureau-change produce a shift o f
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DMU1 to DMU2. Therefore, bureaucracies appear active in reshaping their tasks and 
role within the broader decision making process without necessarily searching for more 
budget increments. On the contrary, we can observe a more important role for the 
bureau, namely the increase o f its power on the policy-making process, even if it 
manages a smaller budget, which is predicted from the above comparative statics 
analysis. Within the framework o f  the above analysis, the prerequisite for the adoption 
o f  a particular reorganization o f the bureau is that the area underneath the DMU curve 
but above the MAC curve should be greater than any other arrangement in the bureau. 
This pre-condition is another way to demonstrate, as discussed earlier, necessary 
condition for top-officials to put forward a particular bureau-shaping strategy.
In a world o f  politics, where purposeful political actors interact to achieve their 
objectives, the only way to reduce the set o f possible solutions and make the output 
more predictable is to specify the dynamics o f this interaction by raising, testing against 
reality, and refining hypotheses for the elements o f these dynamics.10 In this model o f  
bureaucratic politics, policy innovation ' can be a purposeful output pursued by 
bureaucrats in their attempt to reshape their policy competence. This attempt takes 
part within the pattern o f  interaction between the various involved administrative 
departments and their policy clients and external suppliers. Then, in order to 
understand the dynamics o f  the innovative activity o f the administration, in our case 
the Commission, it is needed to see how this activity is influenced by the development 
o f  the structure o f interaction. Which are the strategies followed by the administrative
departments and which are their possibilities o f success as policy innovators under a 
well developed structure and an underdeveloped structure o f interaction. In this way, 
we can set up, and test against empirical data, a well-defined theoretical framework, 
which provides an explanadum o f a specific type o f  Community policy-making, 
particularly when the is issue at stake is of low political saliency and the Commission 
expresses high interest to promote a new European policy. In addition, we can gain 
more insights for the theory o f  bureaucratic politics. Let us now try to specify this 
model for the Commission.
The Dynamics of European Commission Policy M aking; Raising hypotheses for 
the Top-Official’s Bureau-shaping Strategies
The dependent variable o f this research project is the involvement o f the European 
Commission in European policy-making. The independent variable is the structure o f 
interaction between the related administrative departments o f  the European 
Commission and the organizations o f the various socio-economic interests, which 
operate in the examined policy domain.
I made the choice to provide an actor-centered, micro-founded explanadum o f  the 
involvement o f the European Commission in the Community policy-making. The 
structure o f  interaction provides the communication links between the policy-makers 
of the Commission and the various involved actors who act at the domestic and 
European arena, either as policy clients or other policy suppliers, to use Down’s 10
10 See also a methodological approach based on the same principle in Scharpf. (1997), Ostrom (1991) 
on how actor-centered institutionalism illustrates and explains outcomes produced by the interaction
40
(1967) terminology. By looking at the interaction o f the actors operating at the micro 
level, I can obtain the policy position o f other actors identified at the meso or macro 
level, such as associations, administrative departments and governments. Accordingly, 
the policy position of the organizations o f the involved societal actors, such as 
industrial, consumer and environmental interests are formed by their policy preference 
over the policy issue at stake. The policy position o f  the involved Commission 
administration units, following the theoretical arguments o f  bureaucratic politics, is 
formed by the policy preferences o f  its top-officials, who act under self motivation, 
subject to the constraint o f  what the other actors pursue, in order to put forward 
collective actions to obtain higher levels o f  personal utility.
In this way, I do not simply treat the role o f administration as an externality or 
intervening variable as most o f  the theories o f Community policy-making have done. 
With this analytical framework, I fully incorporate the administration actors as an 
independent source, which contributes to the explanadum o f  the involvement o f  the 
Commission in European policy-making.
Public policy and administrative values also contribute to the explanatory power o f  the 
analysis. Although I share the view that there is a strong correlation between ideas and 
interests, I treat them as two separate elements in the proposed analytical framework. I 
do so based on the fact that I am only interested to incorporate in the model the effect 
that prior-generated ideas and beliefs have on policy output, when they meet with, and
of purposeful actors.
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they are used by, societal interests which interact with one another. For this reason, 
public policy and administrative values, within which the policy is decided, are treated 
as an exogenous constraint that contributes to the explanadum.
In the Commission, the top-officials are the Commissioners with the directors o f the 
DGs. Regarding the constraint o f the framework o f public policy and administration 
values on the top-officials o f the Commission, it is observed that the Commissioners 
and, in many cases, the heads o f  the DGs are ex-politicians or political activists e.g. 
Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi, Neil Kinnock, Edith Cresson, Martin 
Bangemann, Hans Van Den Broek, Sir Leon Brittan etc. Moreover, some o f  the 
appointed Commissioners are active politicians who moved to the Commission in 
order to improve their profile through a successful career in EU-politics and return 
later to domestic politics in a higher position e.g. Ripa di Meana, Papandreou, 
Papoutsis etc. In the Santer Commission, sixteen of the twenty Commissioners had 
been members o f parliament, twelve had held at least junior ministerial office, and nine 
had held very senior ministerial office.11 Despite the fact that they are appointed to 
serve only the promotion o f European integration, they go to Brussels with strong 
ideological beliefs and, to a certain extent, “addicted” to domestic politics.12 Therefore 
their utility function as bureau-shapers is obviously constrained by their ideological and 
political background e.g. Social democrats, Christian-Democrats etc. They are also 
biased in that they are more sensitive to the domestic agenda o f  the country they come 
from.
11 See Nugent (1995): 607.
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With regard to the policy-culture constraint, it is argued that, since the bureaucracy o f 
the Commission does not have a veiy long history, in order to develop a consistent 
policy philosophy, it is more open than national bureaucracies to shopping from a 
wider variety o f  policy alternatives, as they are provided by its external environment.
For the Commission we should specify and assume that the cost o f  advocacy increases 
with: a) the time-demand for carrying out the strategy, b) the effort and resources 
required c) the increased scrutiny by the Council o f  Ministers, the European 
Parliament, state-governments, parliaments etc., and in general the organized “public” 
o f the EU, and d) the higher level o f  external criticism (hostility) that the proposed 
policy receives.
According to the earlier developed analytical framework for the provision o f  a 
typology o f the policy-making o f  the European Community, it was argued that the 
structure o f interaction o f the involved players in this process could be better 
understood, if it were seen as a two level game played in two nested arenas: the 
domestic and the Community arena. For the consistency o f the analysis we should bare 
in mind that in both arenas the players at the micro level are the various societal and 
administrative actors who operate with a particular interest in the specific policy­
making. For analytical reasons, in carrying out hypothesis testing within the framework 
o f bureaucratic politics, I give a  separate presentation o f the policy position o f  the
12 See Hooghe (1997); Peters (1992); Wessels et. al. (1985)
43
member states at the Community level. This does not mean that I treat member states 
as an independent variable, since their policy preference expressed at the Community 
level can be produced as the output o f the simultaneous game of the above-specified 
micro-actors who interact in both arenas.
The Hypotheses
The dependent variable o f  this research project is the innovative involvement o f  the 
European Commission in European policy-making. The independent variable is the 
structure o f interaction between the related administrative departments o f  the 
European Commission and its policy clients, the various socio-economic interests 
which operate in the examined policy domains, and also its potential external policy 
suppliers, the community o f  experts.
In order to operationalize the dynamics o f involvement o f European Commission in 
public policy-making, I decompose them in'two elements: policy strategies followed by 
the policy innovators and the likelihood o f success. A deductive way of theory building 
is used: a) I raise hypotheses linking the independent variable--the structure o f the 
interaction between the administration o f the Commission and the related socio­
economic interests and experts community—and the dependent variable—the elements 
of the dynamics o f the Commission based on what I have systematized as prior- 
knowledge, e.g. a review o f EU policy-making theory literature, a review o f theories o f 
bureaucracy, and observations and the collection o f documents regarding the European 
Commission functioning as a bureaucratic organization, b) I refine these hypotheses
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through their falsification, using empirical material collected and systematized in 
specific case studies.
The whole research takes part in policy arenas where the issue at stake is o f low 
saliency, where the involved socio-economic interests are weak players and the 
Commission shows high interest in creating a new European policy area. The claim is 
that under these conditions bureaucratic politics occur and hence the proposed 
theoretical model o f bureaucratic politics can be tested. The raised hypotheses for the 
strategies followed by the top-officials o f  the Commission and the possibilities of 
success are tested in the case o f  a well-developed structure o f  interaction between the 
involved Commission’s administrations and socio-economic interests, and under the 
opposite conditions in the case o f  a relatively under-developed structure.
The raised and tested hypotheses are based on the impact o f  the proposed independent 
variable on the component parts o f the dynamics o f  the role o f the Commission in EU 
policy-making. These hypotheses examine :
• How does the structure o f  interaction between the related administrations o f the 
European Commission and the organizations o f the various socio-economic 
interests, which operate in the examined policy domain, influence the strategies 
followed by top-officials o f  the European Commission towards their policy clients, 
the other involved administration o f  the Commission, and the external policy 
experts who act as potential policy suppliers:
•  Commission’s top officials try to re-shape the policy preferences o f  their
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clients no matter whether the last are well or under-represented in the 
structure o f communication with the administration o f the Commission 
(Top-officials are preference shapers and not preference takers).
• When the structure o f  interaction between the related administrations o f  the 
European Commission and the organizations o f  the various socio-economic 
interests is well-developed oligopolistic competition over the scope o f then- 
bureau is the dominant strategy o f the administrative departments.
• No matter what is the level o f the development o f the structure o f 
interaction between the Commission’s administration and the organizations 
o f the various socio-economic interests, external policy experts are invited 
and used selectively by the Commission’s policy innovators to support their 
policy proposals.
• How does the structure p f interaction between administrative and societal interests 
influence the possibilities o f success o f the undertaken policy innovation:
• The likelihood o f  success increases when the policy innovation occurs within 
a well-developed structure o f interaction between the administration o f  the 
Commission and the related socio-economic interests.
Through the examination o f  the empirical material it is also possible to see whether 
theoretical arguments for conditions under which bureaucratic politics occur and for 
the types o f policies pursued are robust. As far as the conditions for bureaucratic 
politics concern the claims are:
•  Bureaucratic politics occur in issue areas o f  low political saliency and o f high
Commission’s commitment
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The dissatisfaction by socio-economic interests is not a pre-condition for top- 
officials to embark upon change, since they are self-motivated to pursue 
strategies which maximize their personal utility.
Concerning the pursued policy output by the top-officials o f the European 
Commission, I argue that they pursue policies based on cost-benefit analysis (as 
opposed to efficiency criteria), with low costs o f implementation and high benefit for 
them as policy-makers. According to the above criteria, within the 90s policy 
environment in the Community, the Commission's top-officials promote more 
regulatory policies, which provoke low hostility and have a non-discriminatory impact 
on their receivers, and therefore have a low cost o f adoption and implementation.13 
They also equally prefer policies in which they hold the position of project manager 
because this gives them the high benefit o f  being a policy mediator. Last on the ranking 
o f the top-officials’ policy preferences with regard to the pursued policy output is 
budgetary policy instruments financed by the Community budget, since there is high 
hostility to this possibility by the majority o f the member states. Overall, in accord with 
the proposed bureau-shaping as opposed to the budget-maximizing theoretical 
argument, it could be argued that top-officials tend to pursue policies which give them 
increased role at the implementation stage as executives and prestigious mediators 
without cumulating budget increases and labor-intensive classic bureaucratic structure.
13 See Dehousse and Majone (1993).
47
The Organization of Case Studies
The structure o f  the empirical part is organized in case studies that move from the 
more general towards the more specific and allow for variations in both the defined 
elements of the dependent variable and the identified as independent variable14.
The choice o f  the case studies was made in such a way that the elements o f the 
dependent variable, strategies followed by top-officials o f the European Commission 
and the likelihood o f success, are allowed to vary according to the interaction with the 
independent variable, which is also allowed to vary. Even if the result o f testing is no 
variation in some o f the elements o f  the dependent variables, this has to be an outcome 
unforced by the research strategy. According to King, Verba, and Keohane:
“We need the entire range of variation in the dependent variable to be a possible 
outcome...in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of the 
explanatory variables...But, as long as we have not predetermined that feet 
(constant dependent variable) by our selection criteria, there is no problem”
(King, Verba, and Keohane 1994: 104).
A choice of case studies on the basis that the phenomenon o f policy change is observed 
—the policy outcome being the puzzle in our theoretical discussion— risks drawing the 
criticism of selection bias. Moreover, such a selection does not allow for testing the 
conditions under which a policy change may or may not occur, since it examines only 
the case of a successful effort for policy change. For these reasons, the case o f 
maritime industries is selected as a successful case o f policy innovation and that o f  
tourism as a less successful one. At the same time, the selection o f the sub-cases o f
14 For a presentation of this methodological approach see King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), and also 
Yin (1994).
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maritime R&D policy instruments on the one hand, and the OECD trade negotiations 
on the other, allows for variation in the policy output pursued, which increases in this 
way the number o f observations.
The choice o f  the “case o f a case” methodological approach could be a safe enough 
direction in testing in order to specify the bounds of applicability o f  the refined 
hypotheses, since they hold for all the case studies from the more general down to the 
more specific. At the same time, the theoretical framework is tested in a continuous 
and also broad set o f information. The effort is made in order to find a balance 
between parsimony and generalizations which are expected to be applicable with high 
probability to broader cases. As it is clearly stated by King, Verba and Keohane:
“The theory should be formulated so that it explains as much of the world as 
possible...If the theory is testable...then the broader the better, that is, the 
broader the greater the leverage” (King, Verba and Keohane 1994: 114).
Based on the above criteria, every case is a case o f a broader one. The broadest
research field is the functioning o f the European Commission as policy innovator. To
study this, I study two cases in which two different departments o f  the Commission are
engaged in innovative policy making: Commissioner Martin Bangemann and the
directorate-general for industiy, and Commissioner Christos Papoutsis and the unit for
tourism.
The choice is also made in order to allow for variations in the identified as explanatory 
variable. In the first case —the functioning o f the directorate-general for industry- 
DGIII— there is a developed administrative structure with a long history, which is
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highly respected within the Commission, and enjoys well-established relationship with 
powerful industrial interests, its policy clients. For many commentators o f  EU affairs, 
DGIII is the corporatist or elite type o f administrative body within the Commission, 
‘the privileged interlocutor o f  the Commission with industry”. The second--the unit for 
tourism—is a recently established and almost unstructured policy division o f  the 
Commission. It has no influence within the Commission, and most o f  its potential 
clients in the tourism industry are unaware o f its existence. The striking element with 
tourism is that, despite its weak organization as policy domain, it appears very active in 
searching for new Community-driven policy instruments for tourism.
Through this variation it is observed: a) the degree o f relative independence o f top- 
officials to put forward policies without a call by industrialists, and sometimes against 
their policy preferences, and b) the policy strategies followed by the Commission and 
their likelihood o f success and the types o f policy outputs pursued, that is policies with 
money and without money, e.g. the ESPRIT budget and the R&D task force, 
institutionalized forums etc.
In order to obtain “the case o f  a case structure”, we examined a sub-case o f industrial 
policy: the case o f the Community's innovative policy. for maritime industries. Tourism 
policy-making resembles the structure o f maritime policy-making in terms o f the 
complexity of policy instruments and the policy actors involved. However, tourism 
only developed after 1990 as public policy field at the Community level, and it does 
not have a wide structure o f sub-fields which would allow such a type o f policy 
analysis. For this reason, the case o f  case structure is not applicable for the case o f
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tourism. However, the choice of the above cases and sub-cases is a balanced choice.
since it provides a structure in the research project that satisfies to a great extent the 
criteria of variation in the dependent and independent variables and of a direction from 
the general to the specific. In this way, a high level o f confidence can be obtained, 
when I discuss the results o f the testing o f my analytical framework and the 
falsification o f  the theoretical hypotheses, which constitute the proposed explanadum 
of the involvement of the Commission in policy innovation activities.
Summing-Up
The EU policy-making process can be understood as a multi-game played 
simultaneously in nested policy arenas. Two factors are principally responsible for the 
structure o f decision-making that occurs within the EU institutions: the level o f 
salience o f the issue in the domestic arena, and the level o f  organizational interest o f 
the Commission. To have a general overview of the role o f the European Commission 
in EU decision-making, based on these two factors, we generate three different 
decision making structures (see table 1):
Decision-Making structure I: “Intergovernmental bargaining dominance” is prevalent 
when the issue at stake is o f high salience in the domestic arena (K>>). In this case the 
Commission acts as a third party with minimum influence, a broker for example, to the 
state-state prisoner’s dilemma or deadlock game, trying to enable them to reach stable 
equilibrium around “Pareto superior” cooperation.
Decision-Making structure II: “ Bureaucratic dominance” is prevalent, when the issue 
is o f low salience (K<<) in the domestic arena and the Commission interest is high at 
the Community level Here, the Commission acts as a powerful third party to a
51
prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game amongst states. In this case, the nature o f 
invisible politics and the bargaining amongst various organizational actors provides the 
Commission with more room to act as policy initiator, mediator and innovator in an 
attempt to lead the negotiating parties to stable equilibrium points on the Pareto 
frontier.
Decision-Making structure III: “ Localized dominance” is prevalent when the salience 
of the issue is low in the domestic arena and the Commission also expresses low 
interest over the policy issue. In this case, we deal with a sub-case o f  bureaucratic 
politics, the “soft bureaucratic politics” over the implementation of a European policy, 
where the principle of subsidiarity is the rule o f the game. In this case, the Commission 
acts as the guardian and the monitor o f the EU legislation, trying to decentralize to 
state and sub-state level the administrative work and the less prestigious and more 
troublesome part o f the policy-making
Our analysis shows that despite the fact that states constitute the main players in the 
decision process, the European Commission is also an important player as policy 
innovator when the issue at stake is o f low salience and the Commission expresses high 
interest to pursue a new policy aiming at the reshaping o f its competence over the 
issue. In this case, I find a bureaucratic politics model more applicable for explaining 
the informal politics that take place. It is argued that the policy output o f  this process 
is resultant in the sense that what takes place is not necessarily chosen as a solution to 
the problem, but rather results from compromise, conflict, and sometimes confusion on 
the part o f  top officials representing diverse interests and having unequal influence.
The raised hypotheses for the strategies followed by the top-officials o f  the 
Commission and the possibilities o f success are tested in the case o f a well-developed 
structure of interaction between the involved Commission’s administrations and socio­
economic interests, and under the opposite conditions in the case o f a relatively under­
developed structure. The raised and tested hypotheses are based on the impact o f  the 
proposed independent variable on the component parts o f the dynamics o f  the role o f 
the Commission in EU policy-making. The hypotheses examine:
• How the structure o f interaction between the related administrations o f  the 
European Commission and the organizations o f the various socio-economic 
interests, which operate in the examined policy domain, influences the strategies 
followed by top-officials o f  the European Commission towards their policy clients, 
the other involved administration o f the Commission, and the external policy 
experts who act as potential policy suppliers:
• Commission’s top officials try to re-shape the policy preferences o f  their 
clients no matter whether the last are well or under-represented in the structure 
o f communication with the administration o f the Commission (Top-officials are 
preference shapers and not preference takers).
•  When the structure o f  interaction between the related administrations o f the 
European Commission and the organizations o f the various socio-economic 
interests is well-developed oligopolistic competition over the scope o f their 
bureau is the dominant strategy o f  the administrative departments.
•  No matter what is the level o f the development o f the structure o f  
interaction between the Commission’s administration and the organizations 
o f the various socio-economic interests, external policy experts are invited
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and used selectively by the Commission’s policy innovators to support their 
policy proposals.
• How the structure o f interaction between administrative and societal interests 
influences the possibilities o f success o f the undertaken policy innovation:
•  The likelihood o f  success increases when the policy innovation occurs within 
a well-developed structure o f interaction between the administration o f the 
Commission and the related socio-economic interests.
Through the examination o f the empirical material it is also possible to  see whether 
theoretical arguments for conditions under which bureaucratic politics occur and for 
the types o f policies pursued are robust. As for as the conditions for bureaucratic 
politics concern the claims are:
• Bureaucratic politics occur in issue areas o f  low political saliency and o f high 
Commission’s commitment
• The dissatisfaction by socio-economic interests is not a pre-condition for top- 
officials to embark upon change, since they are self-motivated to pursue 
strategies wliich maximize their personal utility.
As far as the pursued policy output by the top-officials o f the European Commission, it 
is argued that they pursue policies based on cost-benefit analysis (as opposed to 
efficiency criteria), with low costs o f  implementation and high benefit for them as 
policy-makers. Overall, in accord with the proposed bureau-shaping as opposed to the 
budget-maximizing theoretical argument, it could be argued that top-officials tend to 
pursue policies which give them increased role at the implementation stage as
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executives and prestigious mediators without cumulating budget increases and labor- 
intensive classic bureaucratic structure. '
In this way, by testing the above theoretical hypotheses and arguments, we can 
articulate a well-defined theoretical framework for the role o f  the Commission in EU 
policy-making. Finally, we can also gain more insights into the theory o f  bureaucratic
politics.
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CHAPTER TW O: THE CASE O F EUROPE'S M ARITIM E INDUSTRIES 
The Case
An illustrative example o f a policy case in which the policy output is not the sum of 
industrial and state interests is the case o f Community's maritime policy. This policy 
output is puzzling according to various elite, or intergovernmental bargaining 
approaches to Community policy-making. In the 90s, a series o f  new policy 
instruments were introduced at the Community level related to industries such as 
shipbuilding, shipping, fishery, aqua-culture and oflf-shore industries. None o f these 
policy instruments were the outcome o f a proposal made by the member states or the 
industry. Moreover, most o f these policy innovations were related to the institutional 
setting o f  the maritime-related Community public policies. Commissioner Bangemann 
proposed to various maritime industries to form a common agenda o f  policy issues 
asking for common policy solutions, called the maritime agenda. Industry itself had 
never before considered moving in this direction. On the contrary, most o f these 
industries appeared to have conflicting policy agendas, e.g. shipbuilders vs. ship­
owners, fishery industry vs. aquaculture etc. member states, despite facing difficulties 
to tackle the problems o f many maritime industries at the state level, never thought to 
treat these activities as a unique industry with a common agenda. The policy 
innovation came from the part o f commissioner Bangemann. It is for this reason that I 
selected the Community's maritime policy in order to  examine whether the parameter 
o f the European Commission omitted by the above mentioned theoretical approaches 
was the missing explanatory variable.
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In the first part o f this case study, following the analytical framework proposed in the 
first chapter, I present the sequence o f  efforts made by the European Commission 
throughout the '90s, to promote policy change in the field o f  maritime industries. This 
corresponds to the dependent variable o f the project. The aim is to understand the 
dynamics o f this activity and explain the observed policy output.
In this case, according to the proposed analytical framework, the independent variable 
is the structure o f  interaction between administrative departments and its policy clients 
and suplliers. This structure can be delineated by:
•  the policy preferences o f  the various societal interests, such as industrial, 
environmental and consumer interests operating in maritime policy domain at both 
domestic and Community level.
• the policy preference o f the Commission's top officials involved in maritime policy 
issues.
According to the research design, the analysis is organized on two levels; the state or
domestic level and the supranational or Community level. Following this analytical
structure, before examining the policy-making at the Community level, I first present
the policy-making at the state level. Taking the above mentioned societal micro-actors,
I map the policy positions o f  the member states with the policy preferences o f  their
various administrative and regional authorities which appear to have a say in maritime
issues. With the examination o f  the policy configuration at the domestic arena, I assess
whether maritime issues are o f  high or low salience, and whether there is a policy
failure or challenge to tackle maritime problems at the State level. In this way I can see
whether my theoretical argument stated at the macro-level that bureaucratic politics
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are dominant in Community policy-making when the issue at stake is o f low salience at 
the domestic arena, and that a policy failure at the state level constitutes a window o f 
opportunity for the Commission to embark upon policy innovation in the field.
In the second part o f  this case study, I present this explanadum o f the dynamics o f  the 
policy change activity as observed in the period o f Commissioner Martin Bangemann’s 
administration. In the presentation o f the historical tracking, I identified Commissioner 
Martin Bangemann and DGIII as the driving force for policy change in the field. Based 
on the proposed analytical framework o f  bureaucratic politics, I examine the dynamics 
o f the innovative acti\ity o f  the Commission within the well developed structure o f 
interaction o f the players identified above. More specifically, I identify the policy 
motivation of the policy initiators, their policy strategies employed with regard to their 
policy clients and other potential policy suppliers, and the policy output pursued.
Following the requirement o f my research design to falsify, through encompassed case 
studies, the hypotheses o f my proposed theoretical framework o f bureaucratic politics 
in order to understand the role o f the Commission in the dynamics o f policy innovation 
at the Union's level, 1 organize this second section as follows:
In the first part, I examine the policy motivation, the policy strategies followed within 
the Commission and with regard to their policy clients and suppliers, and the policy 
output pursued by the top-officials o f  DGIII, based on collected material concerning 
the general function o f DGIII. In turn, I test whether the above findings relating to the 
dynamics o f  the functioning o f  DGIII hold for the case o f the formation by DGIII o f  a 
Community-driven maritime industrial policy. This policy activity may be divided for
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analytical reasons into three sub-cases:
• The policy activity o f DGIII to introduce a common Community-driven maritime 
strategy for all the various maritime industries through policy instruments such as 
the Maritime Forum.
• The introduction o f an R&D Maritime Task Force.
• The case o f the OECD negotiations (1989-1995) for the elimination o f protectionist 
policies in the Shipbuilding Industry.
These cases cover all the types o f policy-making in which DGIII was engaged with 
regard to maritime policy issues, and will allow the testing o f the hypotheses for the 
strategies, and likelihood o f  success o f  the innovation pursued by Bangemami- and 
DGIII as policy innovators, against a broad material o f empirical findings. At the same 
time can see whether my theoretical arguments for the motivation and the type o f 
pursued policy outputs are corroborated.
I have chosen to study DGIII and the Community policy for Maritime industries in 
comparison with the Tourism Unit o f  the Commission and its policy for tourism 
industries. The reason for this decision is that the research design allows for variations 
in the explanatory variable o f  the proposed hypotheses under test. More specifically, 
DGIII, unlike the tourism unit, represents an administrative division o f  the 
Commission, which has direct and well-established relations with industrial interests. It 
has been accused by various EU affairs analysts o f  having been captured in many cases 
by these interests. DGIII is also a division with a long history in the Commission, an 
identifiable administrative philosophy, and, since it manages the Internal Market 
program, a well-established position within the internal organization and functioning o f
the Commission. In contrast, the tourism unit is an understaffed department with a
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history of only six years, and no power within the Commission’s organization*
In this way, examinining the validity o f  the theoretical arguments, and falsifying the 
raised hypothesis for the dynamics o f  the process through encompassing case studies, 
and then allowing for variations in the independent variable with the case o f tourism, I 
can arrive with greater confidence at the conclusion that the proposed theorizing has a 
more general credibility for understanding the phenomenon of policy innovation 
pursued by the Commission's top-officials.
Let us take the case o f Bangemann's effort to bring about new Community industrial 
policy for maritime industries from its origins in the late 80s.
The Historical Tracking of the Policy Initiatives and Instruments Used by the 
Commission in Shaping the Maritime Policy Domain
On the 20th o f  September 1991, the CEU communicated to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, its COM(91)335 final with the 
title "New Challenges for Maritime Industries". The Communication was prepared by 
the DGIII under commissioner Bangemann's political supervision. This was the time 
when Bangemann promoted a new horizontal type o f  industrial policy, which operated 
at the EU level to replace the “dirigist” type o f policy followed at the national and the 
European levels in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
The 1980s was marked by a major debate over the appropriate way for public
authorities to support industry, improve its competitiveness and compete efficiently in
world markets. This simmering debate was dominated EC affairs after the mid '80s,
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having as its main protagonists the pro-liberal commissioner for competition, Sir Leon 
Brittan on the one side, and, on the other, the president o f  the Commission, Jacques 
Delors together with the commissioner for internal market, Martin Bangemann. Sir 
Leon Brittan argued that the only thing that public authorities should do, concerning 
industry, is to promote competition, and the efficient operation o f the markets. On the 
other side, Delors and Bangemann both argued in favor o f  a more active role for the 
European Community, to help European industry to move out o f recession, without 
penalizing with unemployment the majority o f the citizens o f  the European industrial 
societies, and to compete successfully with its world trade competitors. This debate 
ended in victory for Bangemann, and the adoption by the Commission o f a position, 
which was communicated to the Council and the Parliament with the COM(90)556 
final, a framework o f general principles for the Community's industrial policy, with the 
title "Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment". Later the same year, 
with the adoption o f the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht, industrial policy is 
mentioned explicitly in the article 130 as a new policy responsibility o f  the European 
Union.
The Communication "New Challenges for Maritime Industries" may be regarded as a 
policy exercise by Bangemann to develop new policies to deal with the chronic 
problems o f  a series o f industries and services related in some way to the sea, within 
the framework o f policy principles for a new horizontal industrial policy. It would 
appear to be a top-down policy proposal. This argument is unambiguously accepted by 
DGIII itself, when in the Communication for the maritime industries claims:
"This Communication seeks to open discussion on the increasing importance of
the Community's maritime dimension and aims to find the EC's answer to
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current and future challenges. Its primary intention is to develop the relevant 
maritime issues in the framework of general principles of the Community's 
industrial policy, as recently explained in the Commission's COM "Industrial 
policy in an open and competitive environment". (COM(91 )335 final: 1).
The main principle o f Bangemann's "new" European industrial policy is that modem 
industrial policy has to be horizontal and non-discriminatory amongst industrial 
sectors, that is, non-sector specific, just as conventional industrial policies. In order to 
prove this, he had the idea o f  creating the new term o f  “maritime issues” and of putting 
together under this header all the issues "[...] arising out o f  the use, exploration and 
exploitation o f the sea and its resources" (ibid.: 2). He defined in this way the borders 
o f a new policy domain using as elements, issues and operating actors, such as 
industries and services—shipbuilders and ship-owners, fishermen and offshore 
industries etc.—which had never thought to operate collectively to seek common policy 
solutions. Moreover, all these fragmented actors had never believed in the existence o f 
common solutions, since most of them had conflicting rather than complementary 
interests, and had engaged for many years in zero sum games e.g. shipbuilders vs. ship­
owners, fishery industry vs. aquaculture etc.
The next step after the creation o f the policy domain was to prove that, within the 
domain, there was a failure or absence o f national policies, and therefore there was a  
need for a policy initiated by the Commission at the Community level. To demonstrate 
this, Bangemann ordered DGIII to deliver the Communication on "New challenges for 
the Maritime Industries" which addressed the following issues:
"The Commun ity should quickly find answers to the following questions:
-what are the maritime interests of the EC,
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-how its maritime interests are affected by current and future developments in the 
international maritime field,
-whether member states’ maritime policies are still adequate in the context of a 
rapidly changing and increasingly demanding international maritime 
environment,
-how to promote at the European level the Community’s maritime interests, and 
especially, the competitiveness of the EC's maritime industries." (COM(91)335 
.final: 5).
Bangemann then tried to bring together all the fragmented elements mentioned above 
which, according to his definition, constituted the maritime community. His aim was to 
create a common identity for them, the maritime identity. The first step was to 
promote this in the COM(91)335 final, where the Commission proposes the formation 
o f a discussion forum for maritime issues.15 In 1992, the Maritime Industries Forum 
(MIF) was created. Since then the MIF has operated as an institution, which maintains 
an ongoing dialogue amongst all participants e.g. shipping, shipbuilding, marine 
equipment, ports, fisheries, o ff shore industry, relevant services and representatives of 
public authorities. At its annual plenary sessions, the MIF, develops recommendations 
concerning priorities in the relevant policies, and has been proved an important 
platform and structure for wider co-operation and for policy-making across the, top- 
down formulated, maritime policy domain.16 As the MIF itself accepted in its plenary 
session in Rotterdam in June 1994, two years after its initiation, the forum was 
operating as an active communication channel, that stimulated debate between the 
different parties involved in maritime questions:
ls See in COM(91)335finaI: 23, where the Commission proposes for the first time the formation of a 
discussion forum with representatives of all interested parties.
16 For the works of MIF see the proceedings of its plenary sessions from 1992 until 1997.
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"[...] a debate which did not exist before, and developed a constructive dialogue 
between the industry, the member states and the Commission" (Commission of 
the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/ Maritime Industries Forum 1994:2).
Moreover, in the next plenary session in Bremen in 1995, the MIF recognized that its 
work had gradually moved from problem identification and analysis towards the 
proposal of specific policies to the various public authorities and the Commission.17 
Overall, it can be argued that the MIF managed to fulfill the ambitions o f the 
Commission as a top-down exercise intended to awake, sensibilize and bring under the 
same policy agenda o f European maritime industries, a wide spectrum o f sea-related, 
fragmented and rival industrial regional and social interests, which had never thought 
that they could work together.
Bangemann's policy idea for the European Maritime Industries also had a spill-over 
impact on institutions outside the Commission. The idea was also sold to the G7 States 
by the CEU at the G7 Summit on the Information Society in February 1995, which 
acknowledged the importance o f  the global nature o f  maritime industries by adopting a 
specific program for the creation o f  the international Maritime Information Society 
(MARIS). The proposal to the G7 Summit was made by the Commission, and the 
management o f MARIS is the responsibility o f the Commission It is another important 
new horizontal, both budgetary and non-budgetary type o f  industrial policy for 
Maritime Europe.18
17 See proceedings o f the Bremen plenary session, Commission o f the European
Communities/DGIIl/D/5/ Maritime Industries Forum 1995:2.
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In 1994, two years after Bangemann's Communication on "The New Challenges for 
Maritime Industries", and the initiation o f the Maritime Forum, the European 
Parliament also adopts the Commission's policy idea to create a common policy 
agenda, for all the economic activities and actors, that in some way were connected 
with the sea o f Europe's coastal regions. The foundation o f  the Alliance of Maritime 
Regional Interests in Europe (AMRJE), as an initiative o f  the European Parliament, 
added at the EU level, the regional perspective o f  a European public policy for 
Europe's maritime industries. The conclusion that AMRIE is a result o f  a spillover o f 
the policy-innovative role o f  the Commission in this field, can be easily drawn from the 
fact that Bangemann is AMRIE's honorary president. Based on its activities, it can be 
argued that AMRIE has given continuous and constructive support to the forum and 
the policy proposals of the Commission.19 AMRIE appears particularly sensitive to the 
pressure or threat of unemployment and de-industrialization in maritime regions, 
connected with the possible closure o f  traditional maritime labor-intensive activities, 
and sunset maritime industries such as shipbuilding. So far, AMRIE has not produced 
specific policy proposals independent o f  the Commission's policy initiatives. Rather it 
acts within them and in a complementary sense.
In 1995, the Commission set up the R&D task force "Maritime Systems o f  the Future”, 
identifying maritime industries as a priority area for research and development 
promotion. The Commission, again acting in a proactive way (as it will be 
demonstrated in detail in a separate section o f this thesis concerning the task force),
18 For the development of MARIS see Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/D/5 (1995).
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recognized maritime infrastructure, as essential for the employment, the 
competitiveness of the European industry, and the quality o f  life.19 20 The Commission 
picked the maritime sector as a key sector in which to introduce a new policy 
instrument at the European level in order to encourage the relevant industry and 
commerce to meet three crucial objectives: a) to channel more R&D investment in the 
maritime sector, b) to pursue more intensively technical innovation, and c) to work 
together, in partnership, across member states, to obtain synergy on the supranational 
level, which would not be reaped within the existing fragmented policy environment.21
Since 1989, the Commission was engaged in representing the member states in 
multilateral negotiations under the OECD for the elimination o f protective policies in 
shipbuilding. This was negotiated between the EU, the US, Japan, South Korea and 
Norway. The final Act o f the OECD Agreement was signed by all the OECD parties in 
Paris on 21 December, 1994. The signing o f this agreement was the result o f tough 
negotiations, started in 1989, and reached "ad referendum" between the negotiators in 
July 1994. In these negotiations —which were not an initiative of the Commission, but 
were rather proposed by the side o f USA in late 1989— none o f the negotiating parties 
was keen to reach an agreement. They started negotiating in the hope that the 
negotiations would never come to a successful end. However, the Commission 
developed a pro-agreement position in the negotiations and embarked upon an 
intensive negotiating role as broker o f  best policy alternatives with the result that the
19 See AMRIE-Center of Excellence (1995) “AM RIE's O utline M ission an d  Aim s o f  a  European 
M aritime Regional P olicyn 22f\  1/, Brussels.
20See Commission of the European Communities/DGIII (1996a)
21 See Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/ D/5/TF (1996).
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agreement was reached. The only country that did not ratify the agreement is the 
United States. Due to this delay in the ratification process, the agreement may never 
come into force. However, even in this scenario, the agreement will provide the 
starting point for a new set o f negotiations.
The policy developments discussed here clearly dem onstrate that the picture o f policy 
instruments operating for Europe's maritime industries and regions since 1991 has 
changed remarkably. A number o f  new policy instruments and policy players at the EU 
level are at the disposal o f Europe's maritime world. This process o f  policy innovation 
should be perceived as a policy exercise, pro-active to  the demands o f  economic and 
regional interests, and it has, as driving forces, Commissioner Bangemann and DGIII 
of the Commission. Let us now examine in more detail the dynamics o f  this process.
The Policy Preferences o f Europe's M aritim e In d u stries , the Failures o f N ational 
Policies as European Policy Challenges: T h e  W indow  o f O pportunity  for the  
European Commission?
In this section I present the policy preferences o f the member states concerning 
maritime industries, as a first step within the analytical framework proposed for the 
dynamics o f the Commission's activity for policy innovation. The policy preferences 
are formed through the interaction o f  the various actors involved to maritime policy 
domain, sub-State and regional public authorities and societal actors such as industrial 
interests. 1 question the extent to which the status quo in maritime policy throughout 
the Community satisfies the various policy clients or is challenged by them and may 
thus appear as a window o f opportunity for the Commission to  propose policy 
innovations in the field. In this way, I see whether policy failure and dissatisfaction at
the domestic level is pre-condition for a policy change at the Community level.
The Maritime Policy Challenges o f  the 90s
The beginning o f the 1990s finds Europe's sea related industries, such as shipbuilding 
and shipping, marine resources, with serious competitiveness problems, and shrinking 
market shares. The trade trends indicate that the European Community is: a) a net 
importer o f fish, and in natural energy resources, b) a net importer o f shipping services 
from the beginning o f  the 1980s, c) and a net exporter in shipbuilding for particular 
types o f  vessels (reefer and cruise vessels), but with downward sloping trend.22
Due to the above characteristics, the coastal regions o f  Europe faced growing 
unemployment. According to a Commission study, maritime sector, including fisheries, 
employees 2.5 million people.23 This employment base is vital for the maritime regions. 
At the same time, the occurrence o f the maritime disasters o f the Exxon Valdez and 
the Amoco Cadiz had an enormous impact on the environment, and upon local 
economies, and provoked concern in coastal regions for maritime safety. Hie concern 
was particularly serious since the EU has around 89000km o f coastline, many islands, 
large peninsulas as well as the largest concentration o f ports in the world.24
The trade performance o f the maritime industries has also a serious impact on the 
Balance o f Payment o f the EU as a  whole, and not only on the countries hosting
22 See COM(91)335 final and COM(93)526 final
23 See COM(91)335 final: 5
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maritime activities. This is because:
a) The continuing globalization o f  the international economy in the beginning o f  the 
1990s led the EU to carry 90% o f  its external trade by water using shipping services. 
The completion o f the internal market, together with the liberalization o f the 
economies o f eastern European countries increased the already high volume o f  intra- 
EU trade, and pushed up the demand for transport facilities such as short sea shipping 
(defined as transport along Europe’s coastline, Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, the 
Black Sea, and the inland waterways). Maritime and inland waterway transport 
appeared, at that time, to offer a possible alternative to heavily congested and 
expensive to maintain or modernize, land transport.
b) The EU as a whole, and not only the maritime regions, is the biggest consumer o f  
fish in the world, and trends indicate that the demand is steadily increasing. This leads, 
on the one hand, to the over exploitation o f Europe's fishery resources, and on the 
other, to dependence upon imports. This makes the development o f  aquaculture o f  
increasing importance for Europe not only in economic terms, but also in terms o f  
natural resource preservation.
c) The EU demonstrates an increasing demand for energy. At the beginning o f 1990s, 
the issue o f  energy gained importance on the political agenda o f  European states 
because o f  the increasing population and the fear for possible depletion o f  vital 
minerals and fossil energy sources on land. The oceans are now perceived with priority 
as future sources o f energy, minerals, chemicals and space. 24
24 See ibid.: 6
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Let us consider, against the above challenges, the mode o f  operation o f European 
maritime industries and their interaction with Europe's public authorities.
The Situation in Shipbuilding and Shipping
In the 1980s, shipping and shipbuilding were still traditional labor-intensive sectors, 
relying heavily on subsidies, state supported financial schemes, and defense and other 
public procurement preferential contracts. But during this decade other countries, 
mainly Japan, and South Korea managed to gain the leading position in most o f  the 
markets of shipbuilding by using state aid and by employing new technologies in the 
production o f  ships more intensively and efficiently than their Europeans competitors. 
Unfair pricing also left its mark also on shipping, and led European shippers to change 
ship registers to opportunity registers in order to survive massive competition over low 
pricing in freight rates.
At the same time member states faced serious difficulties in managing their huge and 
increasing public budget deficits accumulated in the seventies and eighties. Public 
authorities were less willing to provide public aid for maritime industries, and often 
appeared unable to support industry in order to maintain its world market share, due to 
their budget constraints.
Against this background, maritime activities were increasingly dependent on 
investment in new technologies and innovation in production and operation 
procedures, which allowed the industry to provide, in comparison to its global
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1competitors, better services at lower cost, and with the highest standards in terms o f  
environmental protection and safety. The challenge for shipbuilding and shipping, in 
order to reverse negative trade trends was to transform themselves from labor 
intensive industries to capital and technology intensive industries.
According to the Commission's report on Maritime industries:
"The possibility of building technologically sophisticated ships, allowing EC 
ship-owners to operate with smaller but highly trained crews, may allow for 
improving the competitiveness of EC fleets vis-à-vis those of third 
countries...ship-owners will soon call for a new generation of high speed cargo 
(and passenger) ships to meet the requirements of just in time delivery, and a 
division of labor for high-value or sensitive (technology intensive) products."
(COM(91)335 final: 10,11)
However, at the beginning o f 1990s, the need for increased and more efficient 
investment in R&D, in order to enable the shipbuilding industry to provide efficient 
and safe ships, and other marine vessels and equipments compatible with all the 
communication aspects o f  modem life, had not been realized by European shipbuilders. 
They continued to operate in a deeply fragmented European market, struggling with 
public authorities over anemic public budgets, and for more subsidies and protection. 
R&D is mainly national driven, and is mostly dedicated to basic marine research, rather 
than being user-oriented.
For the above reasons, maritime R&D was still considered by member states as a 
minor activity, and the area o f  maritime R&D was remaining underinvested. The 
shipbuilding industry appeared unable to identify its own R&D priorities and to 
effectively push public authorities for support because o f  the fragmented character o f
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the production chain in shipbuilding, which is mainly dominated by SMEs. Voices from 
shipping and shipbuilding were calling upon the national governments to protect them 
through trade negotiations from the growth of distortive competition measures by third 
countries, the protracted oversupply o f  services, and pricing practices that were 
discriminatory or bellow the cost o f  production and operation. The member states 
having exhausted themselves from the continuing race to back industry with more 
protectionist schemes, were trying, in the various international fora and through 
bilateral negotiations to set up a level plain field for shipping and shipbuilding, but 
without success.25
The Situation in the Marine Equipment Industry
This industrial sector is the supply chain for all maritime industries, and covers all kinds 
of ship-machinery, and navigational and safety equipment, as well as marine 
environmental instrumentation. This chain consists o f  a large variety o f  mostly 
medium-sized companies. All the above SMEs are spread across Europe, making a 
major contribution to the local economies. However, in the absence o f  technical 
harmonization o f  Europe's marine equipment, they have few opportunities to exploit 
economies of scale within European-wide internal markets.26 At the same time, the 
increasing demand for technologically sophisticated equipment makes it essential to 
increase the volume o f resources invested in R&D oriented mainly towards the
25 See about IMO discussions of 1990 in the COM(91) 335 final, and the OECD trade negotiations for 
shipbuilding, which I will discuss, in a separate section as a case where the Commission acts as both 
interest accommodator and interest shaper.
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conversion o f scientific knowledge into industrial applications, in order to meet recent 
requirements in the field o f  safety, environmental protection, efficient production and  
operation o f maritime services, such as shipbuilding, shipping and marine resources 
utilization industries. In other words, more resources, cooperation and coordination in 
R&D are necessary between the different sectors o f the marine equipment supply chain 
and the scientific disciplines concerned.
At the beginning o f the 1990s, the SMEs o f the chain operated in a fragmented w ay 
across Europe, within different and unconnected sector-wide or national frameworks, 
and only a few operated within EC driven R&D frameworks. The main characteristic 
o f this operation was lack o f  cooperation, extended overlapping between sectoral o r  
national research projects, underinvestment in essential research targets, due to the 
high risk o f  investing a high volume o f  resources with high uncertainty over quality, 
and the timescale for reaping results. Overall, poor performance in R&D was gradually 
leading to a deterioration o f the market position o f the sector overall, and to the 
substitution o f European marine equipment by ad hoc importation o f machinery build 
in Japan and Korea.
Because o f  the lack o f an overall perception o f  the common and coordinated effort 
required in R&D on the part o f the member states, and also because o f  the lack o f any 
effort by industry, due to its fragmented nature, to sensibilize public authorities, the 
1990s found the sector undergoing serious difficulties. This all constituted a policy 26
26 The Commission in its COM(91)335 final: 13, mentions two possible European-wide markets: in 
equipment for exploring and exploiting the oceans and in ship's propulsion machinery.
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failure at the national level
The Situation in the Resources o f the Sea Industry, and in Marine Research
The resources o f the sea industry, as the Commission accepts, are not a well-defined 
unit.27 In fact, the Commission itself is the first policy actor to decide to put under the 
same header all industries which provide the infrastructure and services for the 
exploration and exploitation of the oceans, including fisheries. Until this point, the 
national public authorities, and also the industries themselves, did not recognized this 
as a single industrial sector, with a common industrial policy agenda. However, the 
sector, as it is shown in the background part o f  this policy analysis, is an emerging 
complex sector, with increasing importance for the energy and environmental 
dimension o f Europe in the 90s. The complexity o f  the sector may be better seen by 
focusing on just one sub-sector, the offshore. At first glance seems to be a single 
sector from, but in fact, it comprises the construction sector (rigs, platforms, mostly 
built by specialized yards- and marine technology explorations), field developments, 
and other services, including supply vessels. This particular sector brings together 
equipment industry, yards, and marine science technology.
In the beginning o f  1990s, the resources o f the sea industry slowly started only taking 
shape, based on the recognition by the sector’s main industrial research and policy 
actors that the exploitation o f  the oceans, as an interdisciplinary area, depended on the 
cooperation o f the different sectors and disciplines concerned. The complex nature o f
27 Ibid.: 14
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the newly emerging sector and the fragmented character o f the SMEs which dominate 
its various components-sectors made the networking, and the coordination o f  
information and o f  the specific activities o f  the actors involved, essential. In order to b e  
successful in the long run, the resources o f the sea industry had the need to be 
provided with such an institutional infrastructure, mainly in R&D and information 
activities.
R&D investment is crucial for the newly emerging sector. This investment has to be  
made in R&D projects in marine science and technology, and in efforts to transfer 
technologies from other industries. Overall, the complex nature o f  marine science 
necessitates optimal organization o f  marine research. However, in most o f the member 
states, the dominant mode o f carrying out marine research, is the institutional 
separation between research in fisheries, defense, ocean mining, navigation, coastal 
engineering, and in basic oceanography, between marine biology and geology. In this 
way, the national driven R&D activities fail to capture synergies and to benefit from 
the osmosis between basic and applied research, and among the various disciplines. It 
is certainly the case that in this part o f  the maritime industries policy domain, there is in 
some member states an absence o f  public policy at the national level to tackle the 
policy challenges o f a new, slowly emerging and complex marine resources industrial 
sector that operates at the global scale.
Overall, it could be argued that, in the 90s, the industrial policies of the member states, 
concerning maritime industries, appeared to be inefficient. In part this is due to the fact
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that there are less budgetary instruments in the hands o f public authorities to back 
industries, but it is mainly due the changing and newly arising demands for maritime 
services. The extent o f cooperation among Europe's maritime industries and public 
authorities is still too limited, despite the existence o f common, and cross-boarders 
problems. This is particularly the case in the field o f R&D, with respect to industrial 
cooperation, in obtaining access to so far protected markets, and in establishing a level 
field for trade. This was the major window o f opportunity for the European 
Commission to act as policy entrepreneur, to propose and deliver new policy 
instruments, and to change drastically at the end o f  the 1990s the picture of public 
policy domain for maritime industries.
It should be noted that the challenges conceived by the Commission for policy 
innovation at the Community level are not necessarily recognized as such by all the 
other parties involved in maritime policy-making. Many o f  the problems mentioned 
above never received high attention from the policy-makers o f  the member states. 
Apart from shipbuilding, which is an important economic sector for some o f  the 
member states, the remainder of maritime industries represent small fractions o f  the 
production structure o f national economies. The awareness o f  voters on maritime 
issues is relatively low with the exception o f  events such as environmental 
catastrophes.
Due to these factors, the member states do not appear to place maritime issues at the 
top of their negotiating agenda in the structure o f  Community policy-making. As I 28
28 Ibid: 14,15
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discuss in the next section, the Commission embarked upon, with relative success, a 
top-down policy exercise to sensibilize both industries and member states. In this 
context, the factors mentioned above constituted challenges for Community driven 
policies.
According to the typology proposed in this dissertation for the policy-making o f the 
Community, since maritime issues show low salience in the domestic arenas and the 
Commission expresses high interest in becoming involved in the field, it is expected 
that maritime policy-making resembles bureaucratic politics. In this structure, the 
Commission has much room for maneuver, acting as policy coordinator, or broker o f  
best practices, but also as policy innovator. Politicized Eurocrats compete with each 
other, proposing new policies and trying to redefine the policy domain according to 
their strategies for maximization o f  their utility function. Let us examine the dynamics 
o f the above process in detail at the micro-level.
The Dynamics of Commission Policy-making for the Introduction of a European- 
W ide Maritime Strategy
In this section, I will present the policy strategies pursued by DGIII, with respect to its 
policy clients and other suppliers o f  policies related to industry in general, and then 
more specifically to maritime industries. I will use .these topics to  test the hypotheses 
constructed in the proposed theoretical framework for the strategies followed by top- 
bureaucrats and also to examine whether the argument for the motivation and the 
policy outputs that could be obtained in bureaucratic politics are corroborated.
In the presentation of the dependent variable in the first part o f this case study,
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Commissioner Bangemann and DGIII appears to be the central point in the effort o f 
the CHU to introduce the new policy scheme for Europe’s maritime industries. 
Bangemann and DGIII act as the first movers and the driving force in the dynamics o f 
the innovative process. In order to better understand the reasons that lead them to be 
so active in policy-innovation in the field o f maritime industries, it is necessary to 
examine in more detail the general elements o f  the 'functioning o f DGIII as an 
administration unit. These include its policy strategies, and the policy instruments 
produced, which prompt DGIII to assume the role of policy entrepreneur in EU 
policy-making. I will test the raised hypotheses against the empirical findings which 
concern the functioning o f  DGIII in general, and with regard to maritime industries in 
more details. More specifically I will test:
•  Whether the dominant strategy o f the top-officials o f DGIII towards the other 
involved administrative units is to compete with other DGs with the aim o f 
redefining industrial and maritime related policies in order to achieve their 
administrative target to reshape their competence.
• Whether the strategies employed with respect to their policy clients are to reshape 
their policy preference, and
• Whether they make selective use o f experts and the epistemic communities to 
legitimize or to buy policy instruments which fit with policy guidelines they have 
already decided
I will also examine whether my theoretical arguments with regard the motivation and 
the policy output pursued hold. More specifically, I see whether, top-officials o f 
DGIII try to gain more competence and influence within Community policy-making, 
and for this reason pursue, as policy outputs, regulatory and project management
policies and not policies which lead to labour intensive classic line bureaucracies with
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large budgets.
The Motivation o f Commissioner M artin Bangemann to A ct as Policy Innovator
I identified Commissioner Bangemann as the first mover for policy innovations in the 
field o f  maritime industries. According to the proposed theoretical hypotheses, the 
motivation o f the Commissioners to embark upon policy innovation is directly linked 
to their personal career ambitions as politicians, their ideological and political beliefs 
for the role of public authorities and is also influenced by the policy priorities o f their 
national domestic agenda. Bangemann was an important political figure in German 
politics before coming to Brussels. He was an ex-economic minister, former leader o f  
the German liberal party. He was for many years vice-president o f the Commission, 
and member o f the Commission at the same post for 15 years, since 1985, which gave 
him considerable influence in the policy-making o f the Commission. He had strong 
beliefs regarding the active role o f the state in the economy, which he debated with 
pro-free trade proponents such as Sir Leon Brittan at the Community level throughout 
80s and 90s. At the same time, he had very strong connections with German industries. 
Some o f  these industries, such as the shipbuilders in Bremen, were facing structural 
problems and were lobbying him to promote policies at the Community level to help 
them to regain in competitiveness.
From the mid-80s, Bangemann devoted his policy activity almost exclusively to the 
promotion o f a new industrial policy for the Community that would complement the 
internal market program. He had a personal policy agenda for a new type o f  industrial 
policy. He took the view that the market is an institution capable to do some jobs and
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not all of them. Hence, there is a need for other institutional settings, such as 
horizontal industrial policies, "clever" R&D policies etc., which complement the 
market in its allocative role o f resources. This ideological framework, and also his 
strong and ambitious personality, may explain the fact that, within the Delors and also 
the Santer Commission, he has been seen to be very active in promoting a whole series 
of new R&D and industrial policy instruments (Forums, Round Tables, Task Forces 
etc).
The Administrative Targets, and the Strategies Followed Within the Commission by 
DGlU's Top-Officials.
In its working program for 1996, DGIII explicitly identifies policy-innovation as one o f  
its main policy targets, in order to promote its mission to boost the competitiveness o f 
EU's industry:
"Based around the objective of competitiveness our role is to:
Act as the interface between industry and the rest of the CEU.
Promote industrial competitiveness through existing Community policies.
Develop new policies and instruments concerning industrial competitiveness at 
Community level." (Commission of the European Communities/DGIll/A3 1996:
3).
The intention o f  DGIII is to expand its policies and to increase his presence in other 
DGs’ policies related to the issue o f competitiveness. The «expansionist» inclinations o f 
DGIII may be legitimized by the fret that there are many policy actions, such as 
infrastructure, education, training, energy, competition and trade policies, that affect 
industry either directly or indirectly. Apart from Article 130, the Treaty of the EU does
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not provide a specific tool for implementing industrial policy. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for DGIII, in order to fulfil its target to promote industry's competitiveness, 
to try to act through policies and activities laid down under other provisions o f  the 
Treaty, which may affect the capacity o f European industry to compete efficiently in 
global markets. DGIII’s top-officials argue29 that "DGIII has strong assets", such as its 
capacity to understand and interpret industrial issues in order to deal with matters such 
as trade policies, competition policies and, in general, all the policies mentioned above 
that influence the operation o f the European industry. DGIII argues that, it has the 
information and the expertise in its staff to make all the decisions of the Commission 
concerning industry based on "sound economic and industrial analysis":
"Our knowledge of the different industrial sectors should serve as a safeguard 
that regulatory decisions (concerning industry's operations) are based on sound 
economic and industrial analysis. We must ensure that the application and 
evolution of HU competition rules and regulatory policies do not disadvantage 
EU industry vis-à-vis its international trade partners. Therefore, DGIII must act 
as watchdog over the competitiveness of EU regulatory, competition, and trade 
policy." (Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Working Group 4 
. * 1996:1)
The above assertion o f  Dili is also legitimated by its internal organization and its task 
to run the internal market program for the CEU. DGIII, having departments specific to 
industrial sectors, and the responsibility to issue all the regulations for the setting up o f 
internal market in the late 80s, has developed close relations with Europe's industries,
29 In winter 1996, DGIII organized a closed management seminar among its top-officials in order to 
redefine its policy objectives and priorities. I had the chance to attend, as an observer, the topic- 
specific and plenary sessions of the seminar. The empirical evidence for the position of DGIII’s top-
81
and holds detailed data concerning the production and market structure o f  the various 
industrial sectors. Therefore, its staff are convincing when they argue that the DG 
possesses the necessary information channels and expertise.
Their framework o f administrative and public policy values, which is mainly influenced 
by their educational and professional background, also makes them more inclined to 
become involved in other DG’s policies. Most o f DGIII’s personnel, both permanent A- 
grade, and hired experts, are economists and engineers,30 who have worked for years 
in close collaboration with industry. Indeed, many o f  them come from industry, and, 
moreover, after leaving DGIII they often go back to industry.31 These factors make 
DGIII’s criteria for what constitutes the right policy for Europe's industiy, very 
different from the view o f other departments of the CEU such as DGIV, and DGI, 
which are dominated by lawyers with a positive legalistic and pro-liberal understanding 
o f the issues of competition. DGIII's top-officials share the view that the "right policy" 
to improve the competitiveness of industry needs a more complex treatment o f the 
questions o f economic efficiency, one that goes beyond the positive, legalistic 
understanding o f lawyers for competition policy issues, or the criteria followed for 
other regulatory activities o f the CEU, such as environment. According to this 
perspective, this complex dimension o f economic efficiency is under-represented in 
CEU policy-making. DGIITs top-officials claim that their close relations with industry
officials comes from unpublished and confidential working papers presented in the seminar and also 
from personal notes made during the discussions to which 1 had access.
30 See the educational profile of DGIII's active staff in Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIX/A4 ( 1995).
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provide them a good knowledge o f  the problems and policy agenda o f industry. 
Therefore, they are legitimated to get involved in the interservice consultation o f  the 
departments o f  the Commission in order to fill this policy gap. According to DGIII's 
top-officials:
"For being successful in this regards (the competitiveness question), it will be 
required (for the CEU) to take account of a wide variety of circumstances, in an 
appropriate way. There are many sometimes conflicting parameters for the CEU 
in pursuing the economic efficiency goals, such as identifying the best interests 
of European industry: short-term benefits Vs long term, balance of up-stream and 
down-stream interests, the different needs of sun-rise and sun-set sectors, the 
optimum size of companies and the balance between multinationals and SMEs, 
regional differences in industry structure and strength. It is there, that DGIII has 
to play an important role in the interservice process, but its voice in the process is 
under-represented." (Commission o f the European Communities/DGIII/Working 
Group3 1996: 1).
DGIII identifies itself as a weak element in the chain o f interservice consultation. 
DGIII's people in the management seminar argued that, in most cases, weak 
interservice consultation occurs, where DGIII's sectoral units are, "at the end o f the 
chain", and have one day or less to define a position. "The need to make last minute 
efforts takes away from DGIII possibilities to work efficiently on the policy issues". 
Their complaint is that, despite the requirement that they are consulted over industry 
related issues, they are more or less ignored by other services. The other DGs consider 
that they can handle the issues o f  economic efficiency using their own expertise. For 
this reason DGIII argues that: 31
31 Davingon and Perisish, ex- general directors of DGIII, went back to industry after leaving the head 
of DGIII. Miccossi the general director of DGIII for the period that I carried out the research in 
Brussels is professor in economics and, before join the DGIII worked for the Federation of the Italian 
Industries (Confidustria).
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"DGIII would need to embark on a clarification of who talks from the services, 
for policy issues to industry on competitiveness matters, possibly with the aim of 
an exclusive DGIII mandate (similar to DGI’s claim for exclusivity for its 
country desks). In this context DGIII should develop a stronger role in the 
interpretation of relevant Commission policies". (Ibid.)
The other CEU services involved are uneasy about accepting DGIII as a major element 
in the inter-service process, for yet another reason. DGIII tries to enter in the relevant 
Community policies as far as they affect the competitiveness o f European industry, 
without possessing budget lines for all these policies. Therefore, any interservice 
consultation is a very painful process, creating difficulties for the other services to 
accept DGIII as an equal partner in policy making.
As we will extensively discuss in the cases o f the formation o f  a European maritime 
strategy, the terms o f reference of the R&D Maritime Task Force, and the OECD 
negotiations for eliminating protectionist policies in the shipbuilding industry, 
interservice consultation is the hard core o f what I define as bureaucratic politics. 
Interservice consultation appears to be the battleground where CEU policy making 
resembles the part o f  the model o f bureaucratic politics where administrative units 
compete over their competencies. In our cases, we see DGIII acting as an invader o f 
the other DGs, and the latter attempt to keep this activity to the lowest possible level.
Another factor in the 1990s that has contributed to the aggressive behavior o f  DGIII 
towards other DGs or towards new policies, is the fear o f its personnel that it will be 
marginalized after the glorious days o f  the setting up o f  the Internal Market. The top- 
officials o f  DGIII, especially after the completion o f the internal market project, appear 
particularly concerned about the continuously declining number o f  policy portfolios for
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which, they have responsibility. In the management seminar o f  the winter o f 1996, the 
fear o f  becoming a "marginalized administrative unit" was at the top o f their discussion 
agenda:
''DGIII lost a part of its specific competencies in implementing the Single Market 
Program...now we lack specific competencies...the only exception to this lack is 
the transfer of ESPRIT and Information Society to our policy territory". 
(Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Group 7 1996: 4)
On these grounds, DGIII's functionaries raise the argument that they have to come up 
with new policy proposals concerning industry's competitiveness in order to earn their 
role in interservice consultation for all industry related policies, since, as they 
emphatically state:
"The limits of the Commission's competencies have never been unambiguously 
identified." (ibid.)
On this line o f  policy strategy, DGIII tries "to have an eye, and a say" where industry 
policy question appear, and, through this mobility, to increase the chances o f getting 
new pieces o f the pie o f European policies.32
From the above analysis, it is obvious that the interest o f DGIII in policy innovation is 
grounded on concerns internal to the DG and on the collective strategies o f  its top- 
officials, who tiy  to maximize their own utility by reshaping the competence o f  their
32 An illustrative example of the policy strategy of DGIII to reshape its competence towards more 
prestigious topics, appears in the minutes of the meeting of the directors of DGIII o f23/10/95, 
concerning Micossi's (General Director of DGIII) report on his visit to China, Japan, and Baltic 
states: "the Baltic countries are active to become member states and seek a systematic interface with 
the EC on internal market issues. This should be supplied by the office set up by DGXV. However, we 
should reinforce our influence in these activities of DGXV and through industrial cooperation. 
Proposed action for the directors: to look at the matter and propose a strategy to improve our (DGIII's) 
presence and influence. "(Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Assistant to Director 
General 1995)
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DG. This does not mean that the interest o f DGIII to reshape its competence is not 
also influenced by the will o f its political boss. Commissioner Bangemann. 
Bangemann's political agenda for new policies is a separate source for bureau-shaping 
strategies by DGIII. However, what is clear in this case is that the aggressive 
inclinations of the top-officials o f DGIII towards more prestigious portfolios have its 
relevant independence from Bangemann's innovative political agenda. DGIII’s high- 
ranked staff wants in any case to reshape its competence. The Commissioner can 
encourage or discourage this trend amongst his top administrators according to his 
own policy strategies. Both sources o f  policy innovation —the collective strategies o f 
DGIII's top officials to maximize their utility rewards, and the innovative political 
agenda o f the Commissioner— are independent, in that they have their own autonomy 
in ftinctioning, but they are closely interacting elements in the efforts o f the CEU to 
reshape its policy competence.
The relative independence o f the staff o f  DGIII from its political boss in trying to 
penetrate and enter other DG's policy areas can explain the fact that this aggressiveness 
is observed even in cases where thé "opponent" is a department under the same 
Commissioner and, therefore, under the same political supervision and planning. This is 
the case for “Information Society” where DGIII and DGXIII appear to compete over 
the policy instrument, despite both departments being under Bangemann's political 
command. The conflict in this case is initialized at the administration level, and the 
Commissioner tries to keep the policy competition at the lowest possible level. For the 
information society, Bangemann’s cabinet asks both DGIII and DGXIII to:
"provide a fact sheet of their activities in this field, and should indicate in which
areas they see their "comparative advantage". On this basis, Cabinet together
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with DGIII and DGXIII will make an evaluation, in a view to avoid double 
employ". (Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Assistant to 
Director- General 1996:2 ).
Up to this point, both DGs were engaged in producing Communications and policy 
proposals concerning information society, industrial cooperation, and R&D. The 
intention o f Bangemann's cabinet is to avoid overlapping.33 In this way, the political 
boss attempts to eliminate the friction between the DGs, to refine and synthesize the 
different positions and overcome the problem o f different interpretive frameworks by 
imposing as a unifying framework his own political view, which finally creates a 
common policy position or proposal.
Overall, it can be argued that the administrative targets o f DGIII, after the completion 
o f the internal market program, are to reverse the trend o f losing power in the industry 
related policy-making o f the CEU, and to re-shape their competence by obtaining new 
policy instruments which increase the utility rewards o f  its personnel. The strategic 
behavior o f  DGIII's top-officials in order to obtain these targets is to make use o f the 
channel o f  interservice consultation so that they have a say in every question related to 
industrial competitiveness. In this way, they aim to redefine existing policy agendas or 
put forward new ones through competition with other departments o f the CEU, so 
obtaining a more significant role in CEU industry related policy-making. This strategic 
behavior can be grounded, as argued in the theoretical section o f  this thesis, on the
33 This is obvious by looking at the position of the cabinet, in the Durban Seminar 11/12 Dec. 1995, 
for industrial policy issues with participants, Bangemann and top-officials of his cabinet, DGIII and 
DGXIII. The cabinet asks DGIII, and DGXIII to produce common policy proposals on R&D, 
information society, industrial cooperation, the issue of convergence of audiovisual and 
telecommunications. (Commission of the European Communities/Cabinet Martin Bangemann 1996).
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collective strategies o f DGIII's top-officials to maximize their personal utility in terms 
of non-pecuniary rewards. This inclination o f DGIII towards bureau-shaping activities 
interacts with the innovative dimension of Bangemann's policy agenda. It is this 
convergence in terms of innovative strategic behavior that makes DGIII so active in 
searching for new and more prestigious industrial policies. To have a comprehensive 
understanding o f  the dynamics o f this process, the methods o f  DGIII concerning its 
policy client, European industry, and its suppliers o f policy alternatives, such as 
external policy experts, must also be examined.
The Strategies o f  D G III Concerning its Policy Clients and Suppliers
In the previous section our aim was to identify the strategic objectives o f  DGIII as 
administrative unit. The output was that DGIII, together with Bangemann, has policy 
innovation and expansion, as its main element in its policy agenda. According to this 
analysis in order to materialize their policy and administrative objectives, Bangemann 
and DGIII embarked upon a policy-searching process, attempting to adapt existing 
policy instruments to their needs, or to replace them with new ones. In their effort, 
they evaluate policies and buy ideas and suggestions made by experts or other actors 
related to the field.
The main evidence emerging from my empirical work on the strategies employed by 
DGIII and Bangemann's Cabinet in order to carry out their policy-search is that, 
experts and the other elements o f the consultation process have to act over a pre-set 
policy framework with the criteria of policy evaluation specified by DGIII and the 
Commissioner. DGIII sets the policy agenda and a blueprint o f policy proposal, before
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any external interaction or consultation with industrial associations or members o f the 
scientific community.
The general strategy which DGIII follows can be systematized as a two-stage 
consultation procedure. In the first stage, DGIII and the Cabinet attempt, through a 
closed brainstorming session amongst top-officials o f  the Cabinet and the 
administration, to evaluate running policies and to search for improvements or for 
policy change, b^sed upon inputs from within. In this way, they set up a first draft o f 
policy ideas specified according to their own policy objectives and policy philosophy or 
interpretive framework. At the second stage, DGIII discusses and spreads the ideas, 
amongst other CEU officials, Commissioners, member states, industries and experts. 
However, the agenda o f the discussion is already set at the first stage, and its hard-core 
ideas are open only to refinement and to changes.
DGIII asks experts specific questions. Its functionaries appear to have an agenda with 
which they contact the "outside world", and they do not simply seek any kind o f policy 
ideas that may bring them the rewards o f  higher utilities. Their policy-search activity 
does not resemble a garbage can approach. On the contrary, there is a pre-fixed policy 
agenda for discussion, based on underlying factors, such as policy demands, and the 
cost o f  policy adoption, which have "been assessed by the Cabinet and DGIII in 
advance. Although the external consultation process may work as a channel for inputs, 
and may provide facts and figures for future policy formulation, in this two-way 
communication process, the dominant direction is from DGIII to the world o f  experts 
and not vice-versa.
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These arguments can be confirmed by looking at three other major and important 
policy projects undertaken between 1996 and 1999 by DGIII and Bangemann: the 
Communication COM(96)903final for "Developing Benchmarks for Industrial 
Competitiveness", an effort to promote a new approach concerning R&D with the 
formation of the filth framework on R&D, and the regulatory activity o f DGXIII and 
DGIII on the technological convergence o f  audiovisual services and 
telecommunication*
At the end of 1995, DGIII was preparing a communication on how to improve the 
industry's competitiveness using what was, for Europe, the novel policy concept o f 
"benchmarking methodology."34 The policy novelty had already been identified, and its 
policy elements had been set by the top-officials o f DGIII, namely the general director, 
and the director o f  DGIII/A, before the initiation o f the external consultation. At the 
meeting o f directors in October 1995, the general director o f DGIII asked the director 
o f DGIII/A to prepare a report:
"The objectives are clear: we want a report to be used as a political instrument to 
i) identify priorities, ii) to define benchmarking methodology in) to mobilize all 
the DGIII in order to set up a common philosophy (over industry's 
competitiveness)" (Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Assistant 
1995).
Then, after a round o f discussion within DGIII and the Cabinet, the director o f 
DGIII/A prepared and introduced "the key concept o f  benchmarking" to the outside 
world. In winter 1996, DGIII organized several workshops within the framework o f 
the economic advisory group (EAG) o f  DGIII. This consultation process,
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institutionalized by DGIII, involved inviting the academic community, experts, 
industrialists and other officials o f the CEU to contribute to the proposed innovation o f 
benchmarking.
The same consultation process was proposed to DGIII and DGXIII officials by 
Bangemann's cabinet, in the Durbach Seminar in December 1995, as mentioned in the 
previous section, in order to prepare together a proposal for Bangemann for an 
updated and more efficient approach for the setting up o f the 5th R&D framework 
project. At the first stage, the cabinet set out, within the borders o f its administration 
responsibility, namely to DGIII and DGXIII, the specific elements that the new 
approach should include:
"Reflections on the 5th Framework program should be concentrated around the 
following evidence: while technologies are converging and the demand for cross- 
disciplinary R&D is growing, the structure of the 4th Framework has still a rigid 
and inflexible structure.
Therefore, the adoption of a rolling work program is needed...
There is a need for concentration on citizens needs by involving them in the 
actions and inviting them to participate...
Proposed action: DGIII and DGXIII must prepare a reflection paper to cabinet 
until mid-March". (Commission of the European Communities/DGIII /Cabinet 
Martin Bangemann 1996: 2).
Then, at the second stage after mid-March, the discussion was opened up, in part to
refine the proposed new policy approach, but mainly to promote this approach:
"In order to promote the new approach discussions should be undertaken with 
member states, industry, concerned Commissioners etc. Proposed action: 
DGIII/DGXIII must prepare a related action plan until the end o f March."
(Ibid.: 3) 34
34 See the communication "Developing Benchmarks for Industrial Competitiveness'', COM
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In the case of regulating the telecommunication and audiovisual technologies, at the 
first stage the cabinet along with the administration, identified the policy problem, and 
set it in its policy agenda:
“the technological convergence between telecommunication and audiovisual is 
not reflected by the regulatory framework. There are still two separated 
regulatory frameworks, structured along vertical lines.** (Ibid.: 4)
The cabinets set the parameters o f  the solution:
"the long term perspective is the creation of a common framework. A reflection 
paper on a possible approach should be prepared. Common principles to be 
applied to all sorts of services could be identified". (Ibid.)
After the initial setting o f the policy agenda, the experts were asked to contribute in
order to legitimate and further specify the proposed policy:
"The reflection to the policy proposal could be discussed by a virtual institute 
composed of experts of this area." (Ibid.)
However, it should be noted at this point that, despite the two-stage external 
consultation procedure, the industry and the experts did not enter into the process 
exclusively at the second stage. In fact, they were officially invited to discuss a preset 
policy agenda at the first stage, but they also participate unofficially in the agenda 
formation at the first stage. This procedure resembles more closely what I would 
define as invisible/informal politics, where industrialists, political actors, and experts 
are involved in policy formation activity, on an individual basis founded upon personal 
contact, away from the public eye. This type o f invisible politics is strongly present in 
the relationships between DGIII and its policy clients and suppliers. However, in no
(96)903fmal.
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sense are these informal politics a bottom-up policy exercise, where experts and 
industrialists simply order their policy preference to the top-officials.
Approaches that focus exclusively on DGIII's policy output and on mapping and 
analyzing what the industry prefers, fail to give a convincing explanation for the way in 
which many policies come about. They consider only one side o f  a far more complex 
interaction where, apart from industrial societal preferences, there is also the influence 
o f the institutions o f the CEU and the preferences o f  its staff. Both the top-officials and 
the cabinet, as we have already discussed, have their own relative independence as 
players, with their own political and policy preferences grounded on their own 
collective strategies to maximize their personal welfare. Therefore the picture o f  the 
structure o f interaction o f DGIII with industry and experts is neither a top-down, nor a 
bottom-up process o f interaction. Rather, it resembles a two-way communication, 
where the two structures o f external consultation identified above—the formal two- 
stage communication and the informal individual and ad-hoc one—co-exist.35 In both o f  
these communication structures, DGIII has a central, pro-active role in pursuing its 
policy and administrative objectives by trying both to accommodate and to shape the 
policy preferences o f its policy clients. Let us proceed to a more detailed elaboration o f 
the two types o f communication; the official and the unofficial structure.
35 DGIII, in the winter management seminar of 1996, describes the ways of contacting industry as a 
bundle of several types of contacts "ranking from impromptu meetings with a particular firm through 
to sophisticated consultation frameworks" (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIII/Working Group 7 1996:4)
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The Official External Consultation of DGIII With its Policy Clients and Suppliers: a Top-
Down or a Bottom-Up Policy Exercise?
The most typical examples o f formal and institutionalized conducts between DGIII and 
its external world are the Maritime Forum, the Textiles Observatory, the European 
Information Technology Observatory, associations and industry groups promoting 
standards, the twenty ESPRIT consultation boards, the various round tables, and the 
transatlantic business dialogue. All the above structures were initiated by DGIII, and 
serve two purposes. First, they act as a sensor for DGIII, identifying the policy needs 
o f  industry and shopping policy alternatives to satisfy these needs. Secondly, they act 
as a channel for the dissemination o f DGIII driven policy proposals and programs36. 
DGIII argues that it is essential for the materialization o f its policy mission to invest 
"considerable efforts to strengthen (in this way) on a permanent base, relationships 
with the industry leaders, experts, and associations".37 *Their intention is to define and 
implement action plans for promoting industry’s competitiveness, through the joint 
sharing of information with industry.
According to corporatist and elite approaches,3* it can be argued that DGIII proposes 
this formal establishment of permanent meeting places, where industrial policy issues 
are discussed on a regular basis, in order to obtain for itself the prestigious role o f 
coordinator or mediator. However, the evidence, as in the case o f  Maritime Forum,
36According to DGIII through these structures they try:" to inform industry about what the CEU is 
doing for them, and to learn what industry wants, with a view to developing the appropriate policies 
to defend European industry and enhance its competitiveness." (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIII/Working Group 7 1996:1)
37 Ibid.
3* For a review of corporatism and elite theories of State see Ham and Hill (1984), also for the 
application of these theories to the Community's policy making, see Green (1993).
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shows that, contrary to the conventional clientism, where the interests — the clients — 
find and approach the servants, the situation here is the other way round. It is observed 
that DGIII is very active, and tries to make its role as a public institution both 
legitimate and popular39 with its potential clients, who may benefit firom the policy 
outputs, although they may not expect it, as it is demonstrated by the case o f maritime 
industries. The establishment o f  these policy fora was not the result o f a  bottom-up 
process, despite some o f them, such as the textile observatory, being sector specific. 
Most o f  the fora were set up as parts o f  the policy search process o f DGIII and the 
CEU to find more effective ways to  promote industry's competitiveness, using 
horizontal and cross- sector policy approaches, rather than the unsuccessful "picking 
the winners" industrial policy o f  the '60s and 70s. DGIII proposed cross-sector and 
horizontal industrial policy fora in order to free its hands from the pressure o f narrow 
sectoral interests, which basically pursue redistributional policies. Within these fora, 
apart from mediator and coordinator, DGIII wants to act also as a policy entrepreneur. 
Using this communication structure, DGIII tries to find a broader legitimacy and 
support to enhance its competence by promoting new policies o f efficiency 
improvement. These are horizontal policies such as R&D, vocational training, trade 
liberalization with positive effects diffused to the entire economy. These policies have 
lower cost o f  adoption than the redistributional policies, since they are not zero sum 
games.40 The anxiety o f DGIII to act as a policy innovator is mirrored in this following 
claim:
39 As I will discuss later in the case of Maritime Forum, DGIII orders a public relations, campaign, in 
winter 1995, to promote its maritime strategy and the relevant policy instruments, such as the Task 
Force Maritime.
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"If the background of our general role as Community officials seems clear, it is, 
however less evident in the mind of many Europeans how and for whom these 
policies and programs have really been conceived, develop and 
impIemented...A£er the completion of the internal market program, DG1II has to 
come up with fresh policy ideas and to forward policy innovation, otherwise,
DGIII is going to lose its comparative advantage in relation to other DGs, this of 
the most popular interface of the CEU in its relations with Industry". 
(Commission of the European Coramunities/DGIIIAVorking Group7 1996: 4)
Using the fora, Bangemann and DGIIl's top-officials from the post o f the chair or the 
secretariat, they try to sell their role as problem-solvers to their clients. Through 
encouraging the dialogue on a regular base amongst economic decision makers, they 
try to identify focal points over policy action plans, and promote and create clustering 
and alliances or other forms o f policy cooperation, which gives their policy agenda 
more leverage and feasibility.40 1
From the above presentation o f  empirical material concerning the structure o f the 
official consultation channels between DGIII and its clients and suppliers, it is obvious 
that DGIII together, with its political boss plays a pro-active role with respect to the 
rest o f the world. They are both keen to embark upon top-down policy exercises, 
where their role is not only that o f  a passive listening point and coordinator, but also o f 
active mediator and policy entrepreneur.
The pro-active role o f  DGIII and Bangemann is the dominant element in the official 
process, but this does not necessarily mean that conventional clientism is not present in
40 For a definition of efficiency improvement and redistributional policies see Milgrom and Roberts
(1992): 22-25; Tsebelis (1990): 104-118.
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the communication structure. The organizing o f DGIII in industrial sector specific
divisions has been heavily criticized by pro-liberal and free trade proponents on the
grounds that it leads to the capture o f  the functionaries o f the DGIII by vested
industrial interests (steel, textile industry, car industry, pharmaceuticals etc.). In the
winter 1996 management seminar, this topic was one of the most debated amongst the
top-official o f DGIII. The functionaries working in the sector specific industries had to
defend themselves against the "capture accusation":
"Sometimes experienced officials with deep knowledge of industry are suspected 
of having non-objective and biased attitudes towards the demands of their 
Industry". (Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/Working Group7 
1996:5)
The position o f the general director was that the phenomenon o f  clientism existed in
this particular sections and proposed as a remedy the periodical transfer o f  the
personnel from one section to another in order to reduce the time span available for the
flourishing of the phenomenon o f corporatist capture. The DGIII officials concerned
denied that they act as simple lobbyists for specific industries, and replied to these
criticisms and the transfer proposals with the argument that
"moving personnel simply to avoid involvement with industry is counter­
productive, leading to loss of experience and complaints from industry...these 
ideas have to be firmly refused and combated as they do not correspond to the 
reality, create confusion within industry and contribute to the loss of expertise 
and critical behavior in given industries". (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIII/Group7 1996: 5)
The existence o f  the dispute, and the official acceptance by the general director o f 
DGIII that clientism exists in his directorate reveals that invisible politics with a
4 Typical examples of this activity are the maritime forum and the top-down creation of the European
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bottom-up direction exist and are responsible for many new policy proposals or the 
specific interpretation o f general policies at the implementation level, according to the 
preferences o f the industry involved. Despite the officials o f DGIII denying that they 
act as simple lobbyists and arguing that they work to promote the long-term interest o f 
their client to compete efficiently in world markets, none of them was ready to propose 
to the client industry that it has to close down. It is clear that DGIII officials have to 
accommodate preferences and then shape them in a way that promotes rather than 
eliminates the specific interests. Therefore, the top-down direction co-exists with the 
bottom-up in the official process of consultation. In conclusion, therefore, it can be 
argued that the proposed model o f bureau-shaping behavior, where interest- 
accommodating strategies co-exist with interest-shaping strategies, appears to best 
represent this type o f official communication channels.
The Unofficial External Consultation Process Between DGIII and its Policy Clients and 
Suppliers
As already discussed, informal contacts between DGIII officials and the rest o f  the 
world is a common phenomenon which takes place in both stages of the formal 
consultation. This activity constitutes the hard-core process o f  what I defined as 
invisible politics. The fact that this consultation process takes place ad-hoc at any time 
and not on a regular basis, makes the study o f  the process a formidable, if not 
impossible research task. However, lobbing in Brussels is a common activity, which 
takes place everywhere, and, despite the fact that it is not formalized as in the case o f 
US policy-making tradition, nobody doubts its presence and influence on EU policy­
maritime industry identity, the maritime task force on R&D, and the Europe-Japan round table.
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making.42 The bottom-up dimension, where the CEU accommodates the policy 
preferences o f its clients, is clearly present and accepted. In the informal consultation, 
it is interesting to see whether CEU officials use this informal channel for top-down 
policy exercise in order to materialize their observed preference-shaping strategies at 
the formal level.
During a stage at DGIII in winter 1996, I had the opportunity to participate as an 
observer in several of the directorate’s internal policy formulation meetings, and so 
gain an insight into how DGIII deals with its policy environment on an informal base in 
order to promote its policy objectives. The output o f  these observations, with respect 
to the research question set out above, is that a top-down dimension in the unofficial 
consultation exists and plays a crucial role in the directorate’s policy-making.
The most illustrative example o f this assertion is my observations from a closed 
meeting amongst directors and heads o f  unit o f  DGIII held in Brussels on 16 
November 1995, as part o f the policy exercise "Information Technology (ESPRIT), 
meeting the needs o f Industry."43 The director o f DGIII/F responsible for this task 
spoke in the closed meeting to his top-officials in DGIII responsible for all the 
industrial sectors, and tried to set the policy style o f talking to the industry. He 
outlined the- steps in the process o f pursuing the objective, "meeting industry's need", 
and in allocating a budget o f 1OMECU to "good" R&D activities. The director started
42 See the work of Richardson and Mazey on EU lobbying in Richardson and Mazey (eds) (1993).
43 The meeting, which took place in Rond-Point Schuman 11 at 1600 on Thursday 16 November 
1995, was organized by the direct«' of the directorate F as the initiation o f a discussion on the 
proposal: "Industrial Information Technology projects and industry policy: a proposed new action".
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with the point that industry does not necessarily have clear ideas on how to 
incorporate information technology to its activity. Therefore the first step for DGIII 
was to "stimulate industry to see what it really needs". He juxtaposed the arguments 
raised by some o f  his colleagues, that DGIII cannot know more than industry itself 
what constitutes its own needs, and that this top-down practice o f picking winning 
projects "disturbs the wise invisible hand o f  the market". He replied to these concerns 
by saying emphatically:
"Please stop this religion, and see in practice if DGIII is able to identify and 
shown to industry needed information technology applications. There is no 
alternative. There is only one-way for us: imagine, design, discuss, decide" 
(Alexopoulos 1995a)
Imagination, o f course, does not come out o f the blue, but has to be based on the 
various inputs that DGIII experts obtain from formal, R&D task forces, workshops, 
round tables, other fora, and informal channels o f communication with industry.
However, the director raised the point that industry associations are the participants 
and the contact points for DGIII’s formal consultation, and that these associations are 
not well equipped to identify industry's information technology needs. Because o f  this 
problem, he proposed to use the associations as information channels to bring then- 
members, namely the individual industries, into the game. Moreover, to get active 
managers and not only industry’s lobbyists into the game, he suggested that before the 
formal meetings with industry, DGIII should use any kind o f  consultation to gather 
information from the active players o f that industry. He encouraged his colleagues to 
make extensive use o f  unofficial consultation to prepare the formal meetings: "Lets 
talk informally, with our "friends" in each industrial sector" (ibid.). Another way o f
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r^ceeding, he suggested, was through studies on each particular industry, which 
can order from private consultants. In any case, the top-down dimension in this 
process is dominant. This is a characteristic example o f how the top-officials o f DGIII 
use informal information channels not only to accommodate, to the extent that they 
exist, the policy preferences o f  their clients, but also to shape the preferences o f their 
clients when they do not appear to be aware o f the usefulness o f  the proposed policies.
As P.Weissenberg, the director o f  DGIII/D, and later chief o f Bangemann’s Cabinet, at
that time responsible, amongst other things for the technology-intensive industries o f
aerospace, defense, maritime and the related R&D task forces, characteristically said to
his colleagues in another meeting for the R&D Task Forces:44
"Industry needs to be educated in the policy style of identifying together with us,
R&D priorities, and searching together with us, for the promotion of them, 
through cooperative R&D actions, and by using private and public funding, to 
create synergy, and-to avoid overlapping or capital inadequacy. In this policy 
style, the Commission acts as a catalyst, and a coordinator”. (Alexopoulos 1995b)
DGIII appears to function pro-actively, making extensive use o f the informal 
consultation process to promote its policy objectives. What I describe here is clearly a 
pro-active rather than a re-active role o f  DGIII concerning, through the un-official 
external consultation, the policy preferences o f  industry.
44 The meeting was held in Weissenberg's office on 8 November 1995 amongst the concerned officials 
from DGIII/D with the aim of discussing the R&D priorities of industry.
The Policy Output o f  D G III as Policy-Maker
In order to have a complete picture o f the role o f DGIII as a policymaker, it is also 
necessary to examine the policy outputs which are pursued and produced in the 
process. Looking at the present tasks and policy instruments o f DGIII, we can see that 
DGIII is still involved in regulatory activity concerning the standards and the 
functioning o f the internal market, and also holds the budgetary instrument o f  the 
ESPRIT program to promote industry's competitiveness. Concerning new policies, the 
vast majority o f them are neither regulatory, nor budgetary apart from the reallocation 
and optimization of the existing ESPRIT budget. The 1996 and 1997 Work Programs 
o f DGIII basically consisted of: reports on progress o f running policies, 
communications, activities o f launching and managing R&D pilot projects, 
demonstration projects to difiuse R&D results to the various industrial sectors, 
initiatives to develop fora for cooperation, actions to organize dialogue between 
decision makers, experts and the industry on a regular base, and initiatives to 
modernize the role o f  public authorities with respect to industry. DGIII also issued a 
few directives strictly related to the completion o f  the internal market. In contrast to its 
heavy regulatory activity in the past, DGIII turned to market-driven open standards in 
the place o f proprietary ones and tried to decrease the regulatory burden on economic 
agents to the minimum level.
In terms o f budget size, the work program for 1996 and 1997 remained constant, and 
even in some cases, was reduced. As emerges from the management seminar in winter 
1996, a budget increase is not the first priority o f  DGIII. Instead, the top priority, in
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line with the management objectives o f  the whole Santer Commission, is to increase 
not the size, but the internal efficiency o f  the existing budget. However, this fiscal 
discipline is not translated to frozen or squeezed competence for the DG. On the 
contrary, this budget constraint, externally set by the member states, appears to push 
DGIII to seek more actively to expand the types o f  policy instruments mentioned 
above, which are characterized by their non-budgetary form, and their orientation 
towards building communication channels and disseminating information on a 
permanent institutionalized base. The new policies mainly address the problem of 
institutional failure rather than the problems o f financing concerning the functioning o f 
industry. Since it cannot finance industry, DGIII tries to earn its rolé as project 
manager, information channel, policy coordinator and policy entrepreneur.
All the new policy instruments—the maritime forum, the maritime information society, 
the R&D task force ’’Maritime Systems o f  the Future"—introduced by DGIII in the 
domain o f  maritime industries are elements o f  the above mentioned policy roles. The 
OECD agreement on shipbuilding state aid could be added to the regulatory actions— 
the 6th and 7th Directive on shipbuilding—already taken by the Commission in order to 
reduce market distortions and to promote fair competition for the shipbuilding industry 
in the world market.
These policy outputs cannot be predicted by bureau maximizing bureaucratic theories 
and theories o f  European public policy, which ignore the role o f  institutions with their 
own incentives to become involved in policy-making. However, if the analysis is based 
on a bureau-shaping bureaucratic politics approach, it is a straightforward outcome.
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Based on the above results concerning the dynamics o f  the involvement of DGIII as 
policy-maker for European industry, I will seek to understand the strategies followed 
by DGIII towards other DGs in interservice consultation and towards clients and 
experts in its external environment in the specific case o f  European policies related to 
maritime industries.
The Strategies o f D G III towards Maritime Industries and the Other DGs Involved 
It could be argued that the top-officials o f  DGIII want to promote the interests o f their 
traditional clients, mainly shipbuilders and other related industrialists, and launch the 
term maritime strategy with the broadest possible dimension in order to bind together 
all the industries related to the sea. However, this policy exercise cannot be explained 
as a bottom-up exercise where DGIII simply accommodates the policy preferences of 
its policy clients. Rather, it can be perceived as an interactive process where DGIII 
both accommodates and shapes the policy preferences o f  the maritime industries and 
regions. Along this line o f policy strategy, between 1990 and 1997, five annual policy 
reports were produced by DGIII in the form o f  communications to the Council, the 
European Parliament, and to the Social and Economic Committee. These concerned 
the situation in shipbuilding and the efforts o f  the CEU to introduce a new policy 
approach which embraces the whole spectrum o f  maritime economic activities.
In explaining the policy strategy o f  DGIII to report on an annual base on its efforts to 
promote public policies for maritime industries at the European level, we can start 
from the assertion that this strategy is a response by DGIII to persistent pressure from
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maritime interests, and not part o f  a top-down, DGIII policy strategy.45 Going through 
these policy documents, it is obvious that they basically reiterate the same policy ideas. 
However, each year they seek to remind the rest o f the involved institutional players at 
the European level and the capitals o f the member states o f the importance o f  maritime 
industries as a whole for Europe's population and not just the significance o f specific 
partial industrial interests such as shipbuilding. DGIII tries, in a systematic way, to 
create a policy momentum for new Europe-wide and state-driven policies to promote 
Europe's maritime interests. It is DGIII that calls upon a series o f  interacting players to 
identify themselves as maritime industries in order that they can, in turn, claim from 
Europe's public authorities specific public goods such as infrastructure, R&D, 
environmental protection measures, etc.
It is important to notice the strong top-down dimension o f  the two-way policy process. 
Let us examine whether DGIII acts as if  it were captured by powerful industrial 
interests such as shipbuilding. There is no doubt that, at the beginning o f 1990s, 
Bangemann was receiving persistent pressure from German shipbuilders such as 
Bremen and Vulcan and from the European Association o f Shipbuilders (CESA) in 
general to do something for them at the European level. Shipbuilders were trying to 
regain some o f the policy instruments that they had lost at the national level and to 
respond more efficiently, with new policies, to the unfair, aggressive trade and 
industrial policies o f  Japan and Korea. These countries became the Europe’s main 
competitors in this field, since they were assuming Europe’s former dominant position
45 As a top official of DGIII admitted in an off the record interview in Brussels on 5th March 1996: " 
we can say that most of these communications are o f limited substance. They just come out each year
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in most ship-construction and ship-repair markets. It was in this context that 
Bangemann had the "policy idea" to try to bring together shipbuilders, shippers and the 
other maritime industries and establish a common complementary maritime interest. In 
this way, he could create and represent a very "powerful client" in EU policy-making, 
obtaining more benefits for his "old friends" from the industry and more prestige for 
himself.
As discussed earlier, none o f these groups—shippers, shipbuilders, fisheries, offshore 
industry and environmental groups—had previously considered that they could pursue 
concerted policies for promoting their interests. On the contrary, for years they 
believed that they had divergent interests. Since the beginning o f  the 1990, Bangemann 
and DGIII have been trying hard to convince them that they have something in 
common and thus constitute maritime Europe. As I have shown, in the historical 
tracking o f this policy exercise, industrial preferences were basically industry specific, 
and none o f them ever made a proposal for a maritime Europe. When Bangemann 
initiated the idea, most o f  the associations were suspicious o f  the effectiveness o f a 
policy exercise which put conflicting interests in the same basket. Moreover, due to the 
fragmented character o f  the production structure o f  the maritime industries, many o f 
these individual enterprises mainly SMEs never thought that apart from shipbuilders, 
shippers or fishers, they could also be members o f the European maritime industry. 
This led DGIII, in 1995, to put on its policy agenda an action plan to promote the 
concept o f maritime industry, by creating greater cohesiveness within the industry,
because we want to show to our clients (mainly shipbuilders) that we work hard for them.”
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setting up a database o f its client industry and organizing a public relations campaign.46 
These initiatives were intended:
"to inform and promote the concept to individual companies and organizations, 
which are defined as Maritime Industry, and to persuade other relevant audiences 
to recognize the Industry as vital to European Industrial, Transportation, and 
Economic policy and performance...we (DGIII) consider that fundamental to the 
above objective is the need for enthusiastic support and coherent understanding 
of the Industy' to be generated and evangelized by key opinion formers within 
the sector itself." (Industry and Investor Relations Ltd 1996: 11)
Two years later, on 14 March 1997, during a workshop for the setting up o f the
maritime industry's R&D master plan, Paul Weissenberg, the chief o f Bangemann's
Cabinet, said to Europe's maritime industrialists:
"There is still a need to convince Europe that it has a strong "maritime 
identity”...we (Bangemann and the DGIII) created the momentum at the political 
level, we have managed for the last six years to put the maritime issues on the 
political agenda...Bangemann managed to have the maritime issues on the 
priorities of the 5th Framework... please show to the politicians the public goods 
that maritime industries can deliver...lobby member states at the Council to 
allocate more resources to maritime issues...we have created the political 
momentum, maintain it and take advantage of it." (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIII/D/5/TF 1997a: 1)
Therefore, the role o f DGIII cannot be explained within the framework o f corporatism 
and elite theories. An explanation however can be reached through the framework o f 
bureaucratic politics, where the top-officials o f  DGIII are embarked upon a policy 
exercise in which they both accommodate and shape policy preferences, aiming to
46 See in the Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/TF (1995) the minutes of the 
meeting between DGIII and the representatives of Industry and Investor Relations Ltd, London, UK- 
public relations special ists~h eld in Brussels on 20/12/1995 in order to examine the visibility of a 
maritime industries public relations campaign and the proposal prepared by a public relations 
specialist in Industry and Investor Relations Ltd (1996).
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maximize their own utility function. The last could be achieved by the representation o f 
more new clients such as shippers, fishers etc., and by managing more sophisticated 
policy instruments such as R&D policies and trade negotiations, which require more 
discretionary power and mediation.
The Strategies o f D G VII Towards Maritime Industries and Other DGs
DGVII also adopted the term "Maritime Europe" proposed by Bangemann, but has 
tried to incorporate in the definition of the term its own policy priorities, namely to 
promote efficient and reliable maritime and intermodal transport systems rather than to 
focus on DGIII's concerns o f  job creation and competitiveness. However, the 
improvement o f the efficiency, reliability, safety compliance and environmental 
protection aspect o f  maritime transport is based upon a sufficient infrastructure being 
provided by maritime industries such as shipbuilding and marine equipment. This 
requirement led DGVII to agree upon the idea o f a unified policy agenda which brings 
together all the involved players. DGVII’s aim is to achieve synergies for the 
promotion o f maritime transport.
DGVII felt comfortable with the new policy framework, since most o f  the end-users o f 
the goods and services produced by the maritime industries are part o f the European 
transport system. DGVII is already established and operating as policy-maker for the 
European maritime transport policy domain. This gave DGVII the confidence to 
believe that it would be the dominant policy-player, promoting more effectively the 
interests o f its own traditional clients —shippers and maritime transport related 
services— and better exploiting its comparative advantage in the management and
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implementation o f  the policies developed together with DGIII.
The Dispute
The convergence in policy preferences for both DGIII and DGVII initially led to  the 
adoption o f  the term "a maritime strategy for Europe" as a new European policy 
framework for their clients. However, the two administrative units o f the CEU were 
deploying strategies to promote their own policy targets, each o f which assigned a 
different content to the term "maritime strategy". The aim o f each DG was to define 
the term and tailor the resultant policy instruments in a way that maintained or 
upgraded the role o f  the respective DG in the decision-making process, and better 
served the interests o f  their own policy-clients. This led them to embark upon a dispute 
over the content, the design and the management o f  the policies decided within the 
framework o f "a maritime strategy for Europe".
DGVII appears keen on maintaining its own clients without searching for new ones. 
Acting as an incumbent policy-maker in the European maritime transport domain, it 
tries to exclude aggressive policy invaders, such as DGIII, from its territory. DGIII 
acts as an aggressor searching for new clients and a new role because o f the gradual 
shrinkage o f  its competence with the completion o f the internal market program. This 
difference in the strategic behavior of the two DGs concerning the management o f  
their competence could explain the constantly negative position adopted by DGVII 
towards any proposal made by DGIII which impacted somehow on DGVII's traditional 
clients. This was the case, for example, with the aggressive behavior o f DGIII to 
ensure having the last say in every DGVII policy proposal concerning competitiveness
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issues for the shipping sector.
A characteristic example o f this reluctance o f DGVII to accommodate DGIII's policy 
proposals and the aggressive behavior o f  DGIII in regards to competitiveness, is 
provided by the interservice consultation between the DGs for the communication 
COM(96)81 final, "Towards a new maritime strategy”. This was prepared by DGVII, 
and especially regarded the Maritime Systems o f the Future R&D Task Force (MTF), 
and the Maritime Information Society (MARIS). Concerning the competitiveness 
policy proposals o f DGVII for the shipping sector, DGVII systematically ignored the 
suggestions made by DGIII and did not incorporate them in the final draft o f the 
document.47
In the COM(96)81 final, DGVII recognizes the usefulness o f the new framework o f 
policy-making, such as the maritime forum, proposed and chaired by DGIII, but only 
to the extent that it contributed input to the DGVII’s own policy-making.48 This 
recognition, however, did not occur for the cases of Maritime Task Force (MTF) and 
MARIS. The MTF is mentioned by DGVII very briefly at the end o f the document, 
possibly because the task force is chaired by DGIII, but its scope o f action goes much 
beyond the traditional policy interests in R&D of DGVII.49 Speaking about R&D, 
DGVII refers with priority to the projects o f  the 4th R&D framework which have been
47 For this reason the Director General of DGIII sent a written complaint to the Director-General of 
DGVII, see Commission of the European Communities/DGIJI/S. Micosi Director-General (1996).
48 "The Commission Communication on short sea shipping made use of valuable input from the 
maritime industry forum", (COM(96)Sl final: 1)
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established with DGVII's supervision and support.49 50 MARIS is not a DGVII project, 
therefore it is only mentioned at the end o f  the document. DGVII tries to convince its 
own clients—shippers, port authorities etc—that it is the main administrative unit 
concerned with their interests. However, recognizing the need o f  coordination o f all 
the Community's R&D programs that are related to the maritime sector, DGVII tries, 
within the new policy framework, to maintain its position as a privileged interlocutor 
between its clients (shippers) and the rest o f the Commission’s departments. It is for 
this reason that DGVII tries to tailor money for R&D and define general R&D targets, 
namely horizontal technologies, according to the needs of shippers. In such a way, 
DGVII keeps for itself the communication gate between its clients and the rest o f the 
Commission, and maintains its prestigious position in the R&D policy-making process.
DGVII followed the same strategy in the consultation process for the setting up of the 
priorities o f  the 5th R&D framework.51 In this process, DGIII attempted to have 
maritime R&D issues clearly identified as a separate, independent research priority in 
the 5th R&D framework. DGVII opposed this policy proposal since it wanted to 
safeguard the budget lines exclusively dedicated to transport R&D. DGVII’s fear was 
that, if maritime transport R&D became part o f  a broader maritime R&D target, then 
maritime transport would end up competing with other maritime industries for financial
49 The case of MTF shows in a comprehensive way the phenomenon of bureaucratic competition 
within the CEU over the control of new, or reintroduced policy instruments. In order to disentangle 
the dynamics of this process, I will examine MTF in greater detail in a separate part of this project.
50 COM(96)81 final: 27
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resources, with the result that it would receive less than it received in the 4th R&D
framework. This dispute is a typical battle between bureaucracies for budgetary policy 
instruments under limited financial resources.
Ultimately, Bangemann succeeded in having the broad maritime R&D priorities, which
exceed the maritime transport priorities o f the 4th framework, identified as separate
priority o f the 5th R&D framework, alongside the R&D provisions for maritime
transport. In the COM(97)47 "Towards the 5th Framework Program: Scientific and
Technological Objectives", the CEU devotes a whole section to "Competitive and
sustainable growth (IV): marine technologies" in the marine industries:
"The objective of this action would be to boost the development and integration 
of specific knowledge and technologies which would enable the Union to fully 
utilize the sea's potential, in support of a true European policy of the sea. Die 
emphasis would be on technologies needed to boost the competitiveness of 
Europe in the range of areas concerned: technologies for the design of advanced 
ships which would be safe, efficient and environmentally-friendly; for the use of 
the sea as an economical means of transporting goods and people (advanced port 
infrastructure; regional maritime transport systems); and for the rational and 
sustainable exploitation of the sea as a source of energy and mineral resources 
(offshore and sub sea technologies)." (COM(97)47:20)
DVII managed to have a special section in the objectives of the 5th R&D Framework 
dedicated to maritime transport under the title "Competitive and sustainable growth 
(II): sustainable mobility and intermodality":
311 carried out informal interviews in Brussels to get the information for interservice consultation 
between DGIII and DGV1I for the research priorities of the 5* R&D framework, and the debate over 
the issue at the cabinet level. This was the only way to collect empirical findings since this part of 
policy-making is strictly confidential. The above proves in the most straightforward way that this type 
of policy-making is not supposed to be watched by the public (invisible politics).
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"This action is intended to assist in this process, at the point at which transport, 
environment and regional policies intersect, by helping to set up a safe, 
intelligent and interoperable land, air and maritime transport system for 
passengers and freight on a broadly intermodal basis at the European level. This 
requires, among other things, the development of systems for the rational 
management of transport, including second-generation satellite navigation and 
positioning systems; research on infrastructures, accessibility and the integration 
of regional planning and transport policies; and the development of socio­
economic scenarios." (COM(97)47:19)
However, DGVII failed to keep everything related to maritime transport R&D within 
this section. In many topics, such as shipbuilding and port infrastructure or regional 
maritime transport systems, DGVII had to share policy responsibility and 
accountability with DGIII and other DGs. At the same time, under the new, broader 
definition o f the R&D need o f maritime transport, new players are invited into the 
policy domain, and they too can apply for R&D financing. Since it was not certain that 
the member states were going to increase the budget dedicated to meet the increased 
demand for R&D funding, the traditional clients o f  DGVII would face increased 
competition in searching for financial resources for their R&D activities.
In this context, as I assume in my theoretical framework for "bureau-shaping 
strategies" pursued by the politicized bureaucrats o f the Commission, Bangemann and 
DGIII have tried to reshape their competence at the minimum cost, and have 
attempted to reach their targets in the most frictionless way. They do not wish to draw 
the attention o f other "ambitious" administrative units or other political actors and 
interest groups from the wider surroundings, by pursuing new policies since they are 
concerned that these groups could somehow block their "expansionist" effort. It was in 
order to minimize the hostility coining from the above mentioned environment, and to
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maximize the utility reward coming from the policy instruments for which it has 
responsibility, that Bangemann and the top-officials of DGIII gave the chair o f  the 
maritime forum to Kinnock and DGVII in 1997 and for the subsequent two years.
Bangemann's decision was a very delicate one, and for some o f the CEU's "insiders", it 
was a decision, that contains contradictory and incomprehensive elements. He decided 
to give the chair to Kinnock, but he maintained the right to co-set the agenda o f  the 
maritime forum by the keeping o f the secretariat o f  the MF under the responsibility o f 
DGIII. However, this decision can, to a large extent, be understood under the cost- 
benefit perspective o f bureaucratic politics. It can be seen as a decision made within 
the framework o f  a tactic pursued by Bangemann to maintain the upper hand in the 
allocation o f the R&D budget for maritime industries through the control o f  maritime 
task force, which is run under DGIII. The utility reward from the task force was 
weighted as a top priority by Bangemann, because he could thus be very useful to his 
"clients" in maritime industries for updating their technological know-how by 
channeling a sufficient volume o f financial resources via this new policy instrument.
Based on this cost-benefit policy analysis, and by partially surrendering the maritime 
forum to DGVII for only two years, Bangemann tried to protect DGIII from the 
increasing aggressiveness o f  DGVII in challenging DGIII's competence over maritime 
issues. At the same time, with this offer, he wanted to show that DGVII’s fears o f  that 
its own policy-territory was being invaded by DGIII, were unfounded. The analysis 
made by Bangemann was that the cost o f keeping both the maritime forum and the task 
force maritime was very high, due to the increasing hostility o f  the other administrative 
units. Hence, a choice between the two was unavoidable. Under these conditions, he
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decided to keep the most policy profitable instrument, the maritime task force on R&D 
and to reconsider the case in two years time.
Overall, after this discussion o f the dynamics o f CEU policy-making in the field o f 
maritime industries, it could be argued with some confidence that the attitude o f DGIII 
complies with our assertion that it acts as an aggressor, searching for new clients, new 
policy instruments, and seeking to increase its benefits from the policies for which it 
has responsibility, with the minimum adoption and implementation cost. On the other 
hand, DGVII acts as a powerful incumbent, who tries to maintain and protect its own 
policy rev'ards from potential entrants. These challengers may affect the current 
dominant position o f  DGVII as a privileged interlocutor between the Commission and 
clients such as shippers and port authorities and as the administrative unit which 
provides access for these clients to budgetary and non-budgetary CEU policy 
instruments in the field o f R&D.
The Dynamics of Bureaucratic Politics over the Definition of the Scope of the 
R&D Task Force "Maritime Systems of the Future"
Following the requirement o f the research design to test the theoretical arguments 
through nested case studies, from the most general towards the most specific, I 
examine the hypotheses raised for the strategies used by the policy innovators in the 
sub-case o f  Community maritime policies; the introduction o f  the R&D task force 
“Maritime Systems o f  the Future” .
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The Strategies Followed by Commissioner Bangemann in Order to Create the 
Policy M omentum fo r  the Introduction o f the Task Force "Maritime Systems o f the 
Future"
Against the background described above for the R&D challenges for maritime 
industries in the 1990s, Bangemann first conceived the need for coordination in 
maritime R&D. He identified the failure o f national and European R&D policies to 
cooperate in order to avoid overlapping, to achieve synergies, to promote 
technological innovation at the required level, and to help maritime industries to 
compete effectively in the global market. Based on this reasoning, he managed to 
obtain the first movers advantage in the maritime R&D policy-making. His first step 
was to propose the setting up of the maritime industries forum in 1990 and to work 
within its framework in order to sensibilize those earning their living from the sea to a 
common policy agenda o f a European dimension. Bangemann recognized these groups 
as a unified policy player. In this way, these-industries obtained besides their sectoral, 
regional or national identities, a unifying identity o f  a European dimension. As already 
mentioned, this "sensibilizing” gave greater leverage power to the otherwise 
fragmented maritime industries for promoting their interests.
At the same time, Bangemann tried to increase the awareness o f  the European public 
and policy-makers that it is in Europe's common and vital interest to support maritime 
industries in order to have clean seas, better transport facilities and a rational use o f 
sea's living and non-living resources. In this way, he could reduce the cost involved in 
the effort to convince national and EU policy-making systems to adopt new policies
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for maritime related issues.
The other important element that contributed to the effectiveness o f the effort to 
introduce a Community driven policy on R&D for maritime industries, was that the 
three Commissioners related to the issue—Edith Cresson for research. Martin 
Bangemann for industry, and Neil Kinnock for transport and trans-European 
networks—hold common policy beliefs concerning the role o f  public authorities in 
complementing the functioning o f the market. They share the same view that the 
market is an institution capable o f  doing some but not all jobs. Hence, there is a need 
for other institutional settings, such as horizontal industrial policies, '‘clever" R&D 
policies etc., which complement the market in its allocative role o f resources. This 
common ideological framework as well as the strong and ambitious personalities o f 
these three Commissioners, might explain the fact that, within the Santer Commission, 
these three Commissioners, have together proved very active in promoting R&D and 
industrial policy instruments (fora, round tables, task forces etc). Forming in this way a 
coalition in the college o f the CEU, they have more bargaining power and leverage to 
succeed in winning majorities.
Within this policy environment it was easier for Bangemann to convince the other 
commissioners, in October 1994, that maritime industries should be amongst the six 
priority sectors to be considered as essential for industrial competitiveness, 
employment and the quality o f life. On 25 March 1995 with its communication "R&D 
Achieving Coordination through Cooperation", the Commission decided and
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communicated to the Research Council, that it is essential for all the parties involved in
R&D activities to concentrate their research efforts on the six priority sectors.52 The
member states could focus on improving the coordination of European research
activities in these fields, in order to bring European and national research closer
together, to avoid overlapping and to achieve synergies. They could also support
demonstration projects if necessary. The CEU suggests that such actions must be
undertaken at the Community level:
"No sing'e company nor any member state has the capacity on its own to tackle 
the problems and challenges which arise." (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGIII (1996a): 1)
Central to the Commission's strategy for the better coordination o f R&D is the new
policy-making framework o f R&D task forces. The task forces are organized and
staffed by the Commission, and have the aim of coordinating all the Commission's
R&D policies and related programs which have a major impact on the relevant
economic activity. With the task forces, the Commission wishes to provide industry
and research centers with a single CEU interface and contact point. The idea o f  the
CEU is that, with this "guichet unique" approach, all questions and proposals for the
Union's involvement in coordination or initiation o f R&D programs can be answered,
or channeled in the appropriate direction. The task forces are proposed as a new policy
instrument o f the Commission, but their function relies on inputs from all parties
involved in the link between research and industry. According to the CEU: ,
"The Task Forces are flexible structures created within the Commission whose 
initial objective is to establish the "state of art'" of existing research in their 
respective areas, and to identify, with all the actors involved (researchers,
52 See the COM(94>438 final
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industrialists, users, public authorities, etc.), the key themes which deserve 
additional research effort." (Ibid: I.)
In 1994, Bangen^ann had already proposed to the Maritime Forum the creation o f the 
R&D Coordination Group by maritime industries in order to provide the CEU with 
inputs in its effort to tailor and implement a more effective R&D policy. This proposal 
was adopted by the maritime forum in December 1994.53This made maritime industries 
to appear more advanced and better prepared to work under the R&D policy 
philosophy proposed by the Commission than other industries. This policy momentum, 
which was purposefully created by Bangemann, allowed him to convince the 
Commission, in June 1995, to adopt the maritime task force as one o f the first pilot 
task forces on R&D.
The Dispute Between DG1II and D G VII in the Interservice Consultation over the 
Scope o f the Task Force
With the announcement o f the creation o f  the task force by Bangemann, Cresson and 
Kinnock, in Bremen, in June 1995,54 the CEU administration units relevant to the 
policy instrument embarked upon a delicate, and certainly not "frictionless", 
interservice consultation in order to set the terms o f reference o f  the Task Force. This 
dispute lasted until the end o f October 1995, when the CEU adopted the final draft 
after a compromise at the level o f  the Chief o f Commissioners' cabinet. The main 
players in this dispute were DGIII-industry and DGVII-transport. According to the
33 See the Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/TF (1994).
54 See the Commission of the European Commun ities/DGIII/D/5/Maritime Industries Forum (1995).
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decision o f the three Commissioners, DGIII would chair the task force in close
cooperation with DGVII, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVII. Therefore DGIII had the 
responsibility for drafting the terms o f  reference for the new policy instruments under 
the general guidance o f the COM(94)438 final and of the other CEU directions 
concerning the importance o f  maritime industries for the economy and the people o f 
Europe. The first draft was completed and sent for interservice consultation in August 
1995, with DGIII asking for comments by the 4th September.55 However, the process 
encountered difficulties and lasted until the end of October, due to strong disagreement 
expressed by the other DGs, most especially DGVII. Let us examine this whole 
process more closely.
Each o f the directorates—DGIII, DGVII, DGXII, DGXVII, and DGXTV--tried to 
insert as much as they could from the projects and policies which come under their 
own responsibility. In this way they attempted to gain more control and to have a 
stronger say over the new policy instrument, since it would contain more elements 
from their own policies.
The Position of DGIII
DGIII acts as a new potential entrant in the field o f maritime R&D. Until this time, the 
R&D for maritime transport was an exclusive policy area o f  responsibility for DGVII, 
while the R&D for marine science and technologies belongs to DGXII, energy and off­
shore R&D belongs to DGXVII, and aquaculture R&D to DGXIV, The effort o f
33 See note send by Miccosi-DGIII, to the other DGs concerned on 9/8/95 (Commission of the
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DGIII to enter the policy domain o f these other DGs has the major difficulty that 
DG1II wants to deal with "other DGs’ money". The only budgetary instrument that 
DGIII holds in relation to maritime R&D is the ESPRIT, since information technology 
is horizontal with cross sector applications. It is not easy to instruct other DGs what to 
do with their own money. Against this background, DGIII tried to legitimize itself as a 
coordinator o f the various specialized policies in R&D, which stood to gain in 
synergies and positive spillovers if the DGs in charge coordinated their activities. In 
order to justify its role as coordinator in the new maritime R&D task force, DGIII 
proposed the definition of the instrument to be the broadest possible in order to 
incorporate all the maritime related R&D programs run by the CEU. DGIII suggested 
that the maritime task force should cover R&D programs in marine transport, marine 
resources such as fishing, aquaculture, off-shore hydrocarbons and renewable energy, 
and the protection and preservation o f the marine environment. DGIII also proposed 
the broadest exploitation of the maritime information society, and not only for 
transport matters, as DGVII preferred.
The Position of DGVII, DGXII, DGXIV, and DGXVII
The main opposition to DGIII’s proposed terms o f reference came principally from 
DGVII-Transport, and, to a lesser extent, from DGXII- Science. DGXVII-Energy and 
DGXIV-Fishery did not feel threatened by the manner in which DGIII was trying to
European Communities/DGIII/Director-General 1995).
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define the scope o f the task force.56 DGXVII and DGXIV were running R&D 
programs with smaller budgets than those o f the other DGs. In the case o f DGXIV, the 
main concern was how to optimize the use of the existing resources, since their policy 
clients were not taking full advantage of the available budget.57 DGVII had an 
overloaded policy agenda, with the liberalization of the state electricity utilities and the 
promotion of the pan-European energy network. D G V irs existing R&D programs on 
energy based on renewable resources and the use o f marine resources to produce 
energy were relatively small, and would not be reduced in the framework o f the task 
force. On the contrary, both DGXVII and DGXIV were looking for ways to make 
alliances within the administration in order to make their policy agenda more popular 
and to attract more clients form industry and research institutes to invest in their R&D 
programs. Their strategy was to improve and better utilize the R&D policy instruments 
they held and to obtain more users o f their policy instruments. The allocation of more 
resources to energy and fisheries was not the priority, but rather the next step after the 
full exploitation o f  the resources already allocated. The task force had the potential to 
work as a catalyst for DGXVII and DGXIV to achieve their targets without losing 
either their established position in CEU policy-making or their privileged relations with 
their traditional clients. Hence, with this timetable, DGXVII and DGXIV had no 
reason to oppose DGIII’s invitation to this broad R&D policy exercise. In any case, it
56 For the position of DGXIV see the comments sent to DGIII by the director, E.Mastracchio, with the 
Commission of the European Communities/DGXIV (1995) note. For the position of DGVII see the 
comments sent to DGIII by the director, general, RJ.Coleman, with the Commission of the European 
Communities/ DGVII/ Director-General (1995) note. For the position of DGXII see the Commission 
of the European Communities/DGXII/Al (1995) note. For a brief presentation of the comments of 
DGVII and DGXII and the response of DGIII see the Commission of the European Communities/ 
DGIII/D/5/TF (1995b) note.
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was beyond their policy agenda to become the coordinators o f the whole maritime 
R&D exercise, since the profile o f their task as administrative units -energy, fisheries— 
had a partial content which could not legitimize such an expansionist strategy.
On the other hand, DGVII proposed a definition o f the Task Force to fit exactly within
its own competence. It proposed that:
"The main role of this Task Force is to look at the different R&D requirements of 
the shipping sector...aiming at the enhancement of the competitiveness of the 
maritime transport."
(Commission of the European Communities/DGVII/Director-General 1995: 1)
In the same note, DGVII criticizes DGIII, on the grounds that it tries to bring too 
many and different R&D programs under its control: "[...] it seems to us that trying to 
coordinate too many sectors (transport, materials, technology, marine resources, 
telematics etc.) may be counter productive."
Additionally, DGXII, despite the fact that it was ready to accept the role o f  DGIII as 
coordinator, responded57 8 to the latter’s proposal for the terms o f reference by 
suggesting that DGIII was trying to expand the competence o f  the task force beyond 
"normal" bounds and was trying to bring too many R&D topics within its scope. Both 
DGVII and DGXII claimed that the terms o f reference ran counter to the mandate 
given by the CEU with its COM(94)438 final to create a R&D task force to promote 
transport, a public good that is essential for the life o f  Europe's people. The response
57 In the first meeting of the Task Force in Brussels, 17/10/95, DGXIV complained that the fishery 
industry-the client—was not taking advantage of the related budget lines of the 4th R&D framework. 
See the Commission o f the European Coramunities/DGIII/D/5/TF (1995c).
58 See the Commission of the European Communities/DGXIl/AI (1995).
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of DGIII was that the Task Force had to comply with the needs o f maritime industry 
and to promote R&D for the whole spectrum of maritime industries. Its aim was also 
to help many o f  these industries emerge from recession and gain competitiveness in the 
world markets. In DGIII's view, the public good was job-maintenance and jobs- 
creation, and users' oriented R&D, which is the hard core o f  the COM(94)438 final. 
Later, DGXII withdrew its objections, but DGVII maintained its position. DGIII 
argued that DGVII wanted to leave marine resources R&D out of the terms o f 
reference. Such that the scope of the task force would better fit DGVII's profile,59 and 
thus it would be able to make a claim to co-chair the task force. DGIII’s assertion is 
not far from the reality since DGVII officially declared its intention to challenge the 
decision taken at the Commissioners' level that DGIII should chair the task force. 
DGVII wanted to reopen the issue o f  who ran the task force during the interservice 
consultation. R.J. Coleman, the general director o f  DGVII, in his reply to DGIII 
argues: "Moreover, I would like to suggest that the inter-service meeting would also 
deal with the organization and management set-up o f the Task Force" (Commission o f  
the European Communhies/DGVII/Director-General 1995).
DGVII, managing transport policies and having responsibility for most o f the budget 
lines for trans-European networks, multimodal transport, transport network 
interoperability and maritime transport, feh it had the most legitimate claim to run the 
task force. Therefore, it was unhappy that the task force was to be run by DGIII and 
thus acted as an incumbent, who does all it can to keep out o f  its domain every 
potential entrant, raising the cost o f entrance and blocking any communication between
59 See the Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/TF (1995b).
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the potential invader and the incumbents' policy clients. This explains the relative 
unwillingness o f  DGVII, in comparison with the other DGs, to accept DGIII’s 
proposals for the terms o f references o f  the maritime task force.
The Equilibrium Point o f the Rival Strategies
DGIII finally won the battle over the terms o f  reference of the task force. According to 
my theoretical framework o f bureaucratic politics, I can attribute this output to two 
main elements: first, Bangemann and DGIII, acting as policy innovators, obtained the 
first mover advantage by selling the necessity o f  a new policy which was tailored to fit 
to their own policy profile; secondly, the cost for DGVII to reduce the scope o f  the 
task force to include only transport was very high, since this would have left too many 
industries, which had already been identified by the CEU as interlinked and essential 
for Europe's employment and quality o f  life, uncovered in terms o f R&D policy 
coordination. The interest of DGVII to promote an effective European-wide transport 
system, something which had also been identified by the CEU as essential for the 
people o f  Europe, could not be served against the need to boost the competitiveness o f 
the rest o f  the European maritime industries. These industries also have a major impact 
on the employment, energy, and environmental dimension o f  Europe's societies. The 
CEU as a whole adopted the proposal o f  DGIII for the maritime task force, because it 
was a broader R&D policy exercise that aimed to promote, through technological 
innovation, more than one public good, that is, it promoted competitiveness, and 
energy and environmental sustainability, including transport system effectiveness. Such 
an inclusive policy exercise could more easily find support and legitimacy from a wide 
spectrum o f  socio-economic actors than could narrow transport efficiency interests.
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According to this cost-benefit policy analysis, it is not surprising that the CEU adopted 
the proposal o f  DGIII for a broad R&D Maritime, and not the DGVII proposal for a 
strictly maritime transport task force.
The OECD Negotiations for the Elimination of Distortions in the W orld 
Shipbuilding M arket: the Dynamics of the Commission Involvement in the 
Negotiations
Finally, I test the raised hypotheses, and examine the validity of the theoretical 
arguments of the Community policy-making model o f  bureaucratic politics against the 
empirical findings in the case o f the OECD negotiations for eliminating market 
distortions in shipbuilding. With the examination o f this case, I obtain a complete test 
o f the theoretical framework throughout all the main elements o f the Community 
maritime related policy-making.
The Case
In none of its proposals concerning shipbuilding did the Commission propose 
multilateral negotiations for shipbuilding subsidies. In any case, as I learned from 
interviewing one o f the Commission participants in the negotiations, even if someone 
were to propose negotiations over the issue, nobody believed that these negotiations 
could ever lead to an agreement. This prediction can also be made by looking at the 
policy preferences o f  the negotiators. It is obvious from the mapping o f  the policy 
preferences that there is no convergence among the policy actors. There are, then, two 
obvious questions. Who took the initiative to propose the negotiations, and how did 
the negotiations reach an agreement?
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Surprisingly, the initiative came from the part o f the USA in late 1989, despite the feet 
that the US shipbuilding industry represents a very small share—1-2%—o f the world 
market. However, the agreement came about due to the involvement o f the 
Commission as a broker in the process. This leads us to raise the second question, 
concerning how the agreement came about, and to try to disentangle the apparent 
paradox o f an agreement, which nobody wants, but everyone agrees to sign. To 
understand this, it is necessary to bring in our discussion the role o f public institutions 
such as the Commission.
If the Commission was acting merely as the representatie o f  the member states and 
national industries, its position during the negotiations should be very moderate in 
pushing for agreement. Neither the member states nor the industry wanted to eliminate 
but rather to bring under control state aid. However, in the five years o f negotiations, 
the Commission developed a pro-agreement position which cannot be explained by 
interest-based theories which ground their analysis on the examination o f  underlying 
factors such as state and industry interests. Let us examine in more detail the role o f 
the Commission, basing our approach on the assumption that the Commission is a 
policy actor with its own policy objectives that it interacts with the other players 
involved.
The History o f the Agreement
The shipbuilding agreement was negotiated under the auspices o f  the OECD between 
the EU, the US, Japan, South Korea and Norway. The final act of the OECD 
agreement was signed by all the OECD parties in Paris on 21 December, 1994. The
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signing o f  the agreement was the result o f tough negotiations started in 1989 and 
concluded "ad referendum" amongst the negotiators in July 1994. The Commission 
represented the Union in the negotiations on the basis of a mandate given to it in July 
1990. In this process the Commission was in regular and strict consultation with all the 
twelve EU member states. The final outcome of the negotiations, the agreement of July 
1994, had been approved by the Council o f the EU foreign ministers, and the final act 
was then signed by all OECD members involved. What remains to be done for the 
agreement, to enter into force, was the ratification o f the treaty by all the signatories. 
All the parties committed themselves, at the time o f signing the final act, to ratifying it 
by the end o f  1995. However, at the beginning of 1997, the USA showed 
unwillingness to ratify the agreement. As an interim solution, the Commission 
proposed to the Council a prolongation o f the Union’s present state aid regime for 
three more years. As Commissioner Bangemann pointed out in the Maritime Forum in 
Marseilles o f 4-5 July, 1996:" we must not leave our industry unprotected, as long as 
third countries do not abandon their protective trade practices” (Commission o f the 
European Communities/DGIII/D/5/Maritime Industries Forum 1996).
The Content o f the Agreement
This agreement on shipbuilding aims to introduce fair competition and to prevent 
unfair trade practices at the global level in what has been for many years a sector 
characterized by unfair practices and distortion o f competition. Under the agreement, 
on its coming into force, all parties will eliminate direct and indirect subsidies to the 
shipbuilding industry. Some forms o f  aid will still be permissible, notably selective 
spending on basic research--up to 50% of eligible costs—or applied research—up to
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35% o f  costs. Anti-competitive actions such as price-fixing, bid-rigging, or predatory 
practices will also be outlawed.
The main policy instruments o f the package are:
a) Anti-dumping instruments tailored to fit the shipbuilding sector,
b) A revised approach to export and home credit for ships. On the one hand this 
accepts the significance o f public, export and home credit schemes as vital 
means for stimulating growth in shipbuilding, a sector severely hampered by a 
fall in demand and by painfiil restructuring. On the other hand, the agreed 
approach to credit schemes intends to improve the climate for growth in the 
sector without allowing one country to exercise more favorable export credit 
terms than others.
c) The abolishment o f the "Jones Act", a legislation protecting domestic US 
shipping from external competition. The Jones Act currently reserves the US 
domestic shipping market—which is, however, a small market—for US-built 
boats. With the agreement, the US has to abandon the "Jones Act" within the 
next three years o f the agreement coming into force.
d) Special treatment for restructuring. All the countries which have presented 
plans for the restructuring o f the shipbuilding sector to  the EU—namely Spain, 
Portugal, and Belgium—could have these plans exempted from the disciplines 
o f  the agreement until 1997 for Belgium and until 1998 for Spain and Portugal.
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Europe's Shipbuilding Industry, National Policies and the Community Policy 
Challenges
From the mid 80s on, EU shipyards produce about 22% of the total world ship output. 
Its main global competitors are Japan with 42% of the world market and Korea with 
17%. Other producers with a significant share are China with 2.3%, Poland with 2.5%, 
Russia with between 2% and 3%, and Ukraine. The US only produces between 1-2% 
o f the world production--a small number o f ships used almost entirely for internal 
cabotage and US coastal shipping.60
Worldwide, shipbuilding has been a heavily subsidized labor-intensive sector for two 
basic reasons. The first is the importance o f  the sector for the defense industry o f the 
states, and the second is the high political cost for governments in the event o f closing 
down shipyards. Job losses in shipbuilding could have a severe impact on 
unemployment and could lead to de-industrialization o f  local and national economies. 
Due to these factors, until the mid 80s in Europe most o f the public policies related to 
shipbuilding benefited from various forms o f state aid.
In terms o f  public policy-making,61 the 80s was the decade during which all the 
economies o f Europe faced serious problems in the management o f their public 
budgets and public deficit was a serious issue. It was during that time that the cutting
60 For a complete picture of the trends until the late 90s see the communications for the European 
maritime industries of COM(91)335 final; COM(92)490 final; COM(93)526 final; COM(95)38 final; 
COM(96)84 and COM(97)470 final.
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of public spending and the task to curb the public deficit became the first priority in the 
economic policy o f  the member states—a clear departure from the conventional recipe 
o f Keynesian type macro-economic policy.
After the mid 80s, the member states appeared to be running the risk o f financial 
suffocation. On the one hand, they had to spend in order to satisfy the increasing 
pressures for more subsidies exerted by industries experiencing difficulty and the 
increased need to support the rapidly growing number o f  unemployed, and, on the 
other hand, member states had to curb the public deficit due to its inflationary 
pressure. Obviously, the existing state-driven subsidy schemes were reaching their limit 
o f their capacity to absorb the public pressure. As a result, state aid policies were no 
longer considered by governments to be the first best policies available.
It was at that time that the Commission took these policy circumstances as a window 
o f opportunity and intervened with a series o f  policy proposals which established the 
Community-driven policy concerning shipbuilding. The proposals were based on three 
policy targets:
a) To set a ceiling on subsidies amongst the producers o f the member states with the 
call to compete outside and not inside the EC. This target was a defensive policy 
reaction to the budget constraints which the national governments were facing. It 
was for this reason that the member states welcomed and easily adopted not only 
soft law intervention by the CEU, but also policy-making in the form o f  directives, 61
61 For the situation on Europe's public policies concerning shipbuilding, and the economic 
background in the late 80s see also in this thesis the shipbuilding section on "The Policy Preferences
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such as the 6th directive in 1987, and the 7th directive in 1990, concerning state aid 
to the shipbuilding industry.
b) To promote the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry with the introduction o f  
modem technologies such as information technology and electronic automation- 
robotics and, in this way, to transform it from a sunset, labor intensive industry to a 
capital and technology-intensive industry. According to the Commission, this was 
the only way for the industry to compete efficiently with its main world 
competitors, Japan and Korea. In the 80s, in order to realize this policy target, the 
Commission came up with three policy communications to the Council and the 
Parliament; the COM(87)275 final, the COM(88)205 final and the SEC(88)440.
c) At the same time, the Commission started bilateral negotiations with Japan and 
Korea in order to set up a playing field of competition and to avoid aggressive 
competition amongst these parties.
The Policy Preferences o f the Players Involved in the OECD Negotiations fo r  Fair 
Trade in Shipbuildingf and the Window o f Opportunity fo r  the Commission
By the end o f 1980s, nobody in Europe, Japan or Korea considered the possibility o f  
starting multilateral trade negotiations to eliminate subsidy schemes at the level of the 
global market. On the contrary, shipbuilders worldwide wanted to maintain these 
subsidy schemes. In Europe, industry accepted the ceiling on subsidies imposed by the 
Commission, in order to rescue as much o f the state aid it could, since this was 
diminishing due to the increasing lack o f financial resources available to the states. In
of Europe's Maritime Industries, the Failures of National Policies as European Policy Challenges: The 
Window of Opportunity for the Commission".
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fact, the shipbuilding industries o f the member states were competing among 
themselves to obtain a larger share o f the market. This competition was based on who 
received more export and production subsidies from the national governments.
At the same time, Japan, and Korea began to appear much more competitive and to 
gain increasingly greater market shares. Under this threat, European industrialists had 
no alternative but to stop competing internally over new subsidies and to ask public 
authorities for protection from the aggressive trade behavior of Japan and Korea, 
Shipbuilders began pushing for negotiations to maintain their market shares by setting 
a ceiling on the capacity o f Japanese and Korean shipyards.
National administrations in Europe were also happy with the initiative o f  the 
Commission to set a ceiling on state aid, but their thinking was not so strategical as to 
embark upon multilateral negotiations to eliminate subsidies in shipbuilding 
worldwide62.
Japan and Korea were using state instruments such as home and export credit schemes 
or other forms o f  state aid to increase the capacity o f  their shipyards and to support 
them in gaining greater market shares. These countries did not have any difficulty 
financing these kinds o f subsidy schemes, since it is well known that in the 80s both 
Japan and Korea had high rates o f saving, low interest rates and small public deficits, if 
not surplus. Moreover, East Asian countries had no interest in starting any kind o f
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negotiations for the elimination of subsidies, since these subsidy schemes appeared to 
be their comparative advantage in relation to their European competitors.
In none of its proposals concerning shipbuilding did the Commission propose 
multilateral negotiations for shipbuilding subsidies. In any case, as I was informed 
during an interview with one o f the Commission participants in the negotiations, even 
if elements within the Commission had it in mind to propose negotiations over the 
issue, nobody believed that these negotiations could ever lead to an agreement. 
Therefore, there was no need for the Commission to propose such a process which 
was considered to be doomed to failure.63 This prediction can also be made by looking 
at the policy preferences o f the negotiators. The mapping o f the policy preferences 
shows that there was no convergence among the policy actors to start multilateral 
negotiations. Surprisingly, the initiative came from the part o f the USA in late 1989, 
despite the feet that the US shipbuilding industry represents only a very small share 1- 
2% o f the world market. However, the agreement came about due to the involvement 
o f the Commission as a broker in the process. Let us examine more closely the role o f 
both the US as policy initiator and the Commission as policy broker.
The USA Opens the Window o f Opportunity
To start from the beginning, in June 1989 the US shipbuilding industry, represented by 
the shipbuilders' Council o f America, filed a claim for injurious unfair subsidies under 62
62 See the position of the member states, and of the European Associations of Shipbuilders in the 
proceedings of the Rotterdam and Bremen plenary sessions of the Maritime Forum. Commission of 
the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/Maritime Forum 1994 and 1995.
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section 301 o f  the US trade laws, against the major shipbuilding countries o f  the 
world: Germany, Norway and Japan. Later that year, however, US trade ambassador 
Carla Hills persuaded US shipbuilders that a better way to eliminate the foreign 
subsidies was for them to embark upon multilateral negotiations. Industry then 
withdrew the complaint based on section 301 in return for the "accused countries” 
accepting to come to the negotiating table. The OECD’s five-year quest to eliminate 
shipbuilding subsidies had begun.63 4
How did the United States become involved in this business? Did they really want to 
eliminate subsidies? These are the obvious questions that have to be answered in order 
to understand the role o f the US as the initiator o f the negotiations. In 1998, seven 
years later, we can safely say that the agreement was not their aim. That is why US has 
not ratified the reached agreement, almost three years after it was signed, making it the 
only government which did not proceed to comply with the agreed timetable o f  
ratification.
In the late 80s, the US shipbuilding industry was searching for various ways to press 
US government for subsidies, since it was facing serious survival problems.65 US 
shipbuilders wanted to put the government under pressure on the grounds that they 
could not compete internationally because their'com petitors were supported .by 
constant funding from foreign treasuries. By signing the 301 complaint, they sought to
63 Interview with DGII1 official made in Brussels on 4/03/1996.
64 For the position, and the role of the US in the negotiations, see the Congressional Record-Senate 
(1995): 15496-8.
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make it obvious to the US government that they were facing unfair trade competition. 
When the government proposed to them starting multilateral negotiations, the industry 
accepted because it had the certainty that there was no way for an agreement to be 
reached. Therefore, following the probable failure o f the negotiations, the US 
government would protect them against the unfair trade practices o f their world 
competitors by offering them new subsidies.
In fact, the USA abolished a state aid scheme o f 50% subsidy for shipbuilding in 1982, 
under the free trade liberal bonanza o f  Reagan's administration. However, at the same 
time, US government replaced the scheme with massive military orders for new war 
ships and vessels for the US Navy. In the late 1980s, the Department o f Defense re­
evaluated the need for new ships and cut the orders under the threat o f a huge public 
deficit which the US was running. This development caused the US shipbuilding 
industry to reconsider the alternative o f  competing for commercial ship-construction 
orders in a subsidized world market. Finally, US shipbuilders managed to obtain new 
state aid from the Clinton Administration. They used the OECD negotiations, which 
continued on and off for five years as evidence that there was no fair play in the world 
shipbuilding market. The state aid took the form o f  a revitalization plan for the 
shipyards and consisted o f federal assistance to industry in order to convert from 
defense production to  civilian markets.65 6 After the initiation o f  the new US state aid 
scheme for shipbuilding, US shipyards were no longer interested in the OECD 
agreement that had been reached in 1994.
65 "In ten years (1980s) the number of major US shipyards producing only commercial ships declined
from 11 to l"  (Ibid).
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This raises the second question; “how did the agreement came about?* and forces us to 
try to disentangle the apparent paradox, o f  an agreement which nobody wants but that 
everyone agreed to sign. To do this, it is necessary to bring into our discussion the role 
of public institutions, such the Commission.
The Role o f the Commission as Broker and Catalyst in the Negotiations
The Commission was the negotiator on behalf the member states. Of the negotiators, 
the Commission proved to be the keenest to reach agreement. During the negotiations, 
the Commission consulted closely with the member states and the industry. However if 
the Commission was merely presenting the position o f the member states and the 
industry, its negotiating strategy in pushing for agreement should have been very 
moderate, since neither the member states nor the industry wanted to eliminate state 
aid, but, rather, to bring it under control. However, in the five years o f negotiations, 
the Commission developed a pro-agreement position. This attitude cannot be explained 
by interest-based theories which ground their analysis on underlying factors such as 
state and industry interests. Let us consider in more detail the role o f the Commission, 
basing our approach on the assumption that the Commission is a policy actor with its 
own policy objectives, and that it interacts with the other players involved.
In this case, as we have already discussed in the previous section, the USA, and not the 
Commission, was the policy initiator. The USA created the window o f opportunity for
66 Ibid.
the Commission to intervene and to play an active role. However, the output o f this 
activity, the OECD agreement, is not the least-common-denominator o f state interests, 
as the intergovernmental bargaining model expects. On the contraiy, what we see is 
that the EU industries lobbied the US shipbuilding industry to press the Clinton 
administration not to ratify the agreement.67
In addition, the agreement is not the Pareto efficient solution neo-institutionalism 
would predict. According to this approach, we would expect the Commission to act as 
a broker, trying to work out a prisoner’s dilemma type o f problem. In this case, the 
agreement is Pareto optimal and the Commission fills the institutional gap—there is an 
institutional communication failure—and ensures the cooperative output. However, it is 
far from obvious tliat the agreement to cut down subsidies will make all the parties 
better off from the moment o f  signing. Everything depends on the implementation 
stage and the way the reduction in subsidies takes place. The move from the status quo 
to the Pareto frontier always has a strong redistributional effect. During the process o f  
abolishing subsidy schemes, some will lose more than others or may even exit the 
market. This will be the result if there is no adjustment period involving policies 
tailored to support the specific industries and to help them to adapt themselves to the 
new open policy-environment. An equally important element for ensuring that 
everybody benefits from the agreement is the efficient monitoring o f  its implementation 
in order to avoid cheating.
67 Off the record interview with a Commission functionary who participated in the negotiation process 
of the agreement, 5/03/96.
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Many from the side of the shipbuilding industry and the member states are very 
skeptical about the agreement.68 They blame the Commission for proceeding too fast 
and signing the agreement following a dogmatic, free trade approach. As a result, they 
say, it underestimated the redistributional effects o f the agreement for European 
shipbuilders.69
In order, to explain this puzzling policy output, we have to obtain a better 
understanding o f  the role o f the Commission in the process.
68 See the proceedings of the plenary session of the Maritime Forum in Bremen 1995, and Marseilles 
1996. Commission of the European Communities/DGIII/D/5/Maritime Forum (1995) and (1996).
69 The continues complaints of the HP and the national delegations led the Commission to go back 
and ask for a longer period of adjustment for Spain, Portugal, and Belgium.
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The Strategy o f  the Commission Towards its Policy Clients and the Dynamics o f  
the Interservice Consultation
The Commission acted as a unitary player in the negotiations, but its position was the 
output o f the interservice consultation that took place between the various directorates 
o f the administration that were related, in some way, to the issue at stake. A delegation 
consisting o f members of the DGI-International Relations, o f  the DGIV-Competition, 
o f the DGIII-Industry. and also DGVII-transport for the Johns Act, went to Paris, 
where the negotiations took place. The chief of the delegation and the negotiator with 
the other delegations was a member o f  DGI. In the negotiations each o f the DGs had 
to support a different policy objective. To proceed the analysis, and to explain the 
output o f the negotiations, it is important to concentrate on reaching an understanding 
o f the dynamic interaction o f these negotiation-objectives.70
The Negotiation Objectives of DGIII
DGIII had to promote the interests o f industry through proposals for improving the 
position o f  Europe's sliipbuilding to compete in the world market. As a bottom line in 
the negotiations, it had to avoid agreements that would make industry lose the market 
share it held before the initiation o f the negotiations. Together with the agreement to 
abolish subsidies schemes, DGIII was interested in obtaining from the negotiations the
701 systematized and codified the positions of DGIII, DGIV and DGI based on information collected 
through interviews with members of the Commission delegation, in Paris. Because of its confidential 
and invisible design, as I discuss elsewhere, the interservice consultation does not allow the 
publication of written documents with the positions of the involved departments. The only public 
position is the position of the Commission as a whole, as emerged from the interservice consultation.
140
imuMiuimiwwiw w
■ b»h wfnrmtnnnononwinrM»
longest possible period for adjustment for Europe's shipyards, and guarantees that 
none o f the parties would cheat on the agreed measures during the implementation 
stage.
The Negotiation Objectives of DGIV 1
DGIV had only one objective; to eliminate actions against competition based on the
l
interpretation o f  specific principles o f  competition law concerning market access and |
i
the use o f various forms of state aid, such as subsidies and public procurement policies. |
i
The guide and bottom line for DGIV in this interpretation was provided by the 6th and (
7th directives on shipbuilding issued by the CEU in 1986 and 1987 which set a ceiling 1
on subsidy schemes. 1
The Negotiation Objectives of DGI
First and foremost, DGI wanted to reach, an agreement, since every negotiator prefers 
that negotiations succeed than fail. Over and above this, the objective o f  DGI, which 
derived from its role as coordinator o f  the CEU delegation, was the fine-tuning 
between the objectives o f DGIII and DGIV. In other words, DGI had the task o f 
promoting positions in order to maximize the positive output due to the improvement 
o f competition in the sector, and to minimize distortions o f the competition only where 
this was necessary for restructuring and adjustment reasons.
For our analysis, it should be added that the cost o f not having the agreement was 
relative low, since the states, and shipbuilding industries did not really wish the 
abolition o f state aid. The main competitors -E urope, Japan, and K orea- could
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survive even without an agreement, and indeed, Japan and Korea did not want the 
ceiling on subsidies at all. The problem for the US was how to press the Clinton 
administration to provide them with state aid, which they eventually succeeded in 
doing. This preference background gave the negotiators plenty o f  time to negotiate in 
Paris, which explains the prolonged duration-five years—o f the negotiations. 
However, the question remains why at the end, the negotiators, eventually reached the 
agreement, especially when none o f the negotiating parties was interested in having 
achieving this outcome.
The fact that nobody wanted the complete and worldwide elimination o f  subsidies does 
not imply that everybody was against any form of regulation on shipbuilding. On the 
contrary, the negotiating parties could accept a worldwide ceiling on subsidies to the 
extent that the proposed ceiling was closer to their own national or, in the case o f the 
EU, a Community ceiling on subsidies. In other words, the negotiating parties were 
willing to export to the others their own regulatoiy frameworks concerning 
shipbuilding in order to reach an agreement. They wanted to obtain in this way the 
minimum adjustment cost and the comparative advantage o f  familiarity with the new 
regulation.71 Hence, one can argue that the preference configuration not only gave 
time, but also room for maneuver to the negotiators as they sought to find a platform 
to agree upon.
Under the above conditions, DGI, DGIII, and DGIV embarked upon an inter-service 
consultation which resembles what I conceive o f as invisible politics. Before the
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representative o f DGI as chief negotiator for the EU entered the negotiating room to 
represent the position of the EU, the DGs interacted under the supervision o f the 
Cabinets o f Bangemann and Brittan and in close consultation with the lobbyists o f the 
shipbuilding industry and the member states.
The Output of the Interservice Consultation
According to the negotiation objectives presented above, DGIII wanted to protect its 
client-industry from being abandoned to unfair trade policies in the event that the 
agreement had a low degree o f enforceability. Moreover, DGIII wanted to establish 
the EU ceiling as specified in the 6th and 7th directive on shipbuilding subsidies and 
state aid as a worldwide subsidy ceiling. It was obvious that the immediate abolition of 
subsidies for EU shipbuilding could seriously damage the industry and create high 
unemployment in the maritime regions, thus imposing high political costs on the 
national governments. Therefore, the first best agreement for DGIII was a subsidy 
scheme that resembled as closely as possible to that o f  the EU. I f  this was not possible, 
the next best result was to obtain the longest possible transitory period after the 
singing o f  the agreement in order to allow industry to adjust.
On the other hand, DGIV, with its positive legalistic approach the pro-liberal 
interpretive framework o f its top officials72 was very suspicious to the arguments o f 
DGIII for protecting industry from unfair trade practices. The 6th and 7th directives 71
71 For an extent discussion on the phenomenon of regulatory competition, see Heritier (1996).
143
were the bottom line rather than the optimum for DGIV in the negotiations. DGIV saw 
the negotiations as a window o f opportunity, not to export the Community protective 
regulations, but to obtain less protection for even European industry. Hence the 
optimal policy for DGIV was to have the minimum ceiling and to break up state aid 
schemes as soon as possible. DGIV was thus taking the opposite direction to that o f 
DGIII in terms o f policy preference. DGI, as already discussed, had to take a middle 
position and to fine tune between the two divergent negotiating strategies o f  DGIII 
and DGIV. However, under Sir Leon Brittan and later Van Den Broek, DGI had clear 
political instructions to promote an agreement closer to the position o f DGIV. We 
should also bear in mind the general context o f the euphoria created by the signature o f 
the GATT agreement.
A key element in the dynamics o f the negotiating process was that DGI, as the chief o f 
the Commission delegation, had the privilege to leave the other DGs outside the 
negotiating room. The role o f the Commission chief negotiator proved to determine 
the output o f the negotiation. The chief negotiator o f the Commission delegation was 
characterized by his colleagues as an ambitious diplomat whom, during the last stage 
o f  negotiations, in July 1995, it had been decided to appoint to  the head o f  the EU 
delegation in Tokyo. The same members of the Commission delegation in the 
negotiations have argued that the chief o f  the delegation was particularly keen to 
obtain the agreement on the basis o f his high personal preference to start his career in 
Japan having obtained a satisfactory agreement for both Japan and the EU. Therefore, 72
72 DGIV is one of the few DGs of the CEU, with a developed administrative culture, which gives 
consistency to its functioning and strengthens its relative independence from its political supervisors-
144
he was more inclined than the others in the delegation towards a compromise that was 
closer to the position o f Japan and Korea.73
Taking all these elements into account, bureaucratic politics occurred amongst the 
involved departments o f the Commission, each o f  which strove to accommodate the 
policy preferences o f their clients and to promote their own administrative targets. This 
explains the puzzle of the signed, but never implemented, OECD agreement on 
shipbuilding. It can be argued that this agreement came about because the 
Commission, through bureaucratic politics amongst its departments, had the 
compromise, and finally the agreement, as a policy preference when the rest o f the 
players where neither in favor nor opposed to this position.
The more insight we have from the microcosm o f  the bureaucratic politics o f the 
interservice consultation that took place in Brussels and Paris the more we understand 
the policy output o f the negotiations. In Paris, the members o f each DG were in 
continuous communication with their Cabinets and, in the case o f DGIII, also with 
their industry-client. Each time the negotiation was arriving at a point where the DGI 
delegate had to, or felt he had to ask for new instructions, he left room for interservice 
consultation. Obviously, this process gave him considerable room for maneuver. It was 
at his discretion to decide when consultation was appropriate. Moreover, when an 
agreement was reached, it was very unlikely that it would not to be accepted ex-post 
and for secondary reasons by the others in the delegation. An issue of secondary
Commissioners. The replacement of the Conservative Sir Leon Brittan with the socialist Karel Van 
Miert did not change the interpretive framework or the work program of DGI V.
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importance where this might be the case could be whether the ceiling in subsidies could
be moved up or down by 1 %, or whether Spain was allowed to maintain the right to
ratify the agreement in three instead of two years time. I have been told by members o f
the negotiating delegation who were not satisfied with the agreement, that this
discretionary power and the room for maneuvers of the chief o f  the negotiations was
the main factor responsible for the specific and, for them, unsatisfactory content o f the
agreement reached. What they said about the atmosphere just before the agreement is
characteristic for the importance o f the chief negotiator in the process:
"At the very final stage, just before the signing of the agreement by the 
negotiators, DGI chief of the delegation of the CEU in the negotiations, 
prohibited the other members of the delegation to contact their Cabinets in 
Brussels again, and in general to communicate with any others outside the 
delegation, until the signing of the agreement”. (Off-the-record interview with 
DGII1 functionary who participated in the process of the negotiation of the 
Agreement, 05/03/96).
Three years later, the OECD agreement on shipbuilding was ratified by all the member 
states and the other countries involved, despite o f the misgivings o f some of them. The 
only country which did not ratify the agreement is still the US. Due to this delay in the 
ratification process the agreement may never come into force. However, even in this 
event, this agreement will be the starting point for a new round o f  negotiations. 
Bureaucratic politics did not simply create new policy rhetoric, but a policy output 
with a major impact on the shipbuilding policy-making throughout the world market.
73 Off-the-record interview with a DGIII functionary who participated in the process of the
negotiation of the Agreement, 05/03//1996.
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Conclusions
Overall, it can be argued that the theoretical approach o f bureaucratic politics for the 
policy-making o f  the Community proposed with this dissertation provide a powerful 
analytical framework to disentangle the puzzle o f policy innovations in the field of 
maritime industries at the Community level. The picture o f  policy instruments 
operating for Europe's maritime industries and regions since 1991 has changed 
remarkably. A number of new policy instruments and also policy players at the disposal 
of Europe’s maritime world now operate at the EU level. Neither member states nor 
organized interests were the initiators o f these policy changes. In this section, it has 
been demonstrated that this process o f  policy innovation should be perceived as a 
policy exercise, pro-active to the demands o f economic and regional interests and 
having, as driving forces, Commissioner Martin Bangemann along with DGIII o f the 
European Commission.
I showed that the predictions o f  the proposed analytical typology o f the Community's 
policy-making fit well with the empirical findings. I observed that maritime issues show 
relatively low salience in domestic arenas while the Commission expresses a high 
interest in becoming involved in the field. The expectation for maritime policy-making 
is that it resembles bureaucratic politics. The proposed structure o f this policy-making 
has been proved effective in providing a satisfactory understanding of the dynamics of 
maritime policy-making at the Community level. It has been demonstrated that the 
Commission has considerable room for maneuver in acting not only as policy 
coordinator, or broker o f best practices, but also as a policy innovator. Politicized
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"Eurocrats" compete with each other to propose new policies and to redefine the 
policy domain according to their strategies for maximizing their utility function. I 
examined in detail the dynamics o f the above process at the micro-level.
In the first part o f this case study, I examined, using the proposed analytical 
framework, the role o f DG1II and its political boss Martin Bangemann in Community 
policy-making. I identified their policy motivation, their strategies used with regard to 
their policy clients and other potential policy suppliers as well as the policy output 
pursued. In turn, following the requirement o f my research design to falsify, through 
encompassed case studies, my proposed theoretical hypotheses, I tested whether the 
above findings concerning the functioning o f DGIII as policy innovator held for the 
cases o f maritime industries policy-making. These cases which constitute the 
innovative activity o f DGIII in the field, were the formation by DGIII o f a European 
maritime identity for the various maritime industries, the battle over the definition o f 
the terms o f reference o f the R&D Maritime Task Force, and the case o f the OECD 
negotiations for eliminating protectionist policies in the shipbuilding industry.
Through the examination o f the empirical findings concerning the operation o f  DGIII’s 
pursuit o f industrial policy in general and policy innovations for maritime industries in 
particular, it has been observed that the theoretical argument concerning the policy 
motivation o f the Eurocrats holds. The interest o f  DGIII in policy innovation is 
grounded on concerns internal to the DG and on the collective strategies o f  its top- 
officials, who try to maximize their own utility by reshaping the competence o f their 
DG. This does not mean, however, that the interest o f DGIII to reshape its 
competence is not also influenced by the will o f its political boss, Commissioner
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Bangemann. Bangemann’s political agenda, which contains proposals for new policies, 
is a separate source o f bureau-shaping strategies by DGIII. However, wliat is clear in 
this case is that the aggressive tendencies o f the top-officials o f  DGIII towards more 
prestigious portfolios are relatively independent from Bangemann's innovative political 
agenda. DGIII’s high-ranked staff wants, in any case, to reshape its competence. The 
Commissioner intervenes to encourage or discourage the innovative attitude of his top- 
administrators according to his own policy strategies. Both sources of policy 
innovation, the collective strategies o f  DGIII's top officials to maximize their utility 
rewards, and the innovative political agenda o f the Commissioner, are independent, 
with their own autonomy in functioning, but they are also closely interacting elements 
in the dynamics o f  the effort o f  the CEU to reshape its policy competence.
I identified Commissioner Bangemann as the first mover for policy innovations in the 
field o f maritime industries. I demonstrated that Bangemann’s motivations were in 
accord with the relative theoretical arguement. According to this argument, the 
motivation o f the Commissioners to embark upon policy innovation is directly linked 
to their personal career ambitions as politicians, and their ideological and political 
beliefs for the role o f public authorities and is also influenced by the policy priorities o f  
their national domestic agenda. I noted that Bangemann was an important political 
figure in German politics and in Community affairs. He was ex-economics minister, ex- 
leader o f  the German liberal party, vice-president o f the Commission, and, since 1985 
member o f the Commission. He had a strong belief in an active role for the state in the 
economy, a position which he debated at the Community level with pro-free trade 
proponents such as Leon Brittan throughout the 80s and 90s. At the same time, he had 
very strong connections and with German industries, such as shipbuilding, which were
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facing structural problems and were lobbying him to promote policies at the 
Community level to help them to improve their competitiveness. It was noted, 
however, that while Bangemann was motivated by German shipbuilders, he was not 
captured by them.
The theoretical argument concerning the motivation o f the Commissioners to embark 
upon policy innovation hold, and may provide a convincing explanation as to why, the 
other two Commissioners involved in maritime policy-making, Neil Kinnock, and Edith 
Cresson, welcomed Bangemann’s proposals and appeared active in promoting the 
policy innovations. The three Commissioners, Cresson for research, Bangemann for 
industry, and Kinnock for transport and trans-European networks, hold common 
policy beliefs in the role of public authorities in complementing the functioning o f the 
market. They share the same view, that the market is an institution capable o f  doing 
some jobs, but not all o f them. Hence, there is a need for other institutional settings, 
such as horizontal industrial policies, ’’clever” R&D policies etc., which complement 
the market in its allocative role o f  resources. This common ideological framework, and 
also the strongly ambitious personalities o f these three Commissioners may explain the 
fact that, within the Santer Commission, these three Commissioners have been very 
active in promoting R&D and industrial policy instruments (fora, round tables, task 
forces etc). In this way, by forming a coalition in the college o f  the CEU, they have 
more bargaining power and leverage to succeed in winning majorities. Consequently, I 
argue that the above findings constitute a  satisfactory explanadum o f  the motivation o f 
the Commissioners for policy innovation.
Testing my theoretical hypotheses for the strategies o f  the top-officials o f  DGIII, who
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act in a well developed structure o f interaction between other administrative units and 
its policy clients and suppliers, I identified the interservice consultation between DGIII 
and the other administrative departments which also have a say in maritime industry 
issues as the hard core o f what I define as bureaucratic politics. Interservice 
consultation appears to be the battleground where the policy-making most resembles 
the part o f the model o f bureaucratic politics where administrative units compete over 
their competencies. The competition amongst the DGs holds for all the cases of 
maritime policy-making that were examined. In the cases o f the formation a European 
maritime identity and the maritime R&D task force, we see DGIII acting as an invader 
in the territory o f  other DGs, with the latter trying to keep this activity to the lowest 
possible level. In the case o f  the OECD negotiations for eliminating subsidies in 
shipbuilding, in the competition amongst the departments, the aggressor is DGI- 
extemal affairs, which tries to force DGIII-Industry and DGIV-competition to adopt a 
policy position according to its own administrative targets.
I traced a strategy o f  communication between DGIII and its policy clients, where two 
structures o f external consultation co-exist: the formal two-stage communication and 
the informal and ad-hoc one. In both o f  these communication types, DGIII assumes a 
central, pro-active role in pursuing its policy and administrative objectives in that it 
tries to reshape the policy preferences o f  its policy clients. In the first stage o f  the 
formal two-stage consultation procedure, DGIII and the Cabinet attempt, through a 
closed brainstorming session amongst top-officials o f  the Bangemann's cabinet and the 
administration, to  evaluate running policies and to search for improvements or for a 
policy change based upon inputs from within. In this way, they set up a first draft o f 
policy ideas specified according to their own policy objectives and policy philosophy.
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At the second stage, DGIII spreads the ideas and discusses them with other CEU 
officials. Commissioners, member states, industries, and experts. However, the agenda 
o f the discussion is already set at the first stage and its hard-core ideas are open only to 
refinement and not to change.
The strategies employed by DGIII and Bangemann's Cabinet to carry out their policy- 
search. is that experts and the other elements o f the consultation process have to act in 
the context of a policy framework o f specified policy targets and criteria o f policy 
evaluation pre-set by DGIII and the Commissioner. DGIII sets the policy agenda and 
draws up a blue-print o f policy proposal and then embarks upon external interaction- 
consultation with industry's associations, or members o f the scientific community. I 
observed that DGIII asks experts specific things. Its functionaries have an agenda 
before they starting talking to the "outside world", and they do not simply seek any 
kind of policy ideas that may bring them the reward o f higher utilities. Their policy- 
search activity does not resemble a garbage can approach. On the contrary, there is a 
pre-fixed policy agenda for discussion, based on underlying factors, such as policy 
demands and the cost o f policy adoption which have been assessed by the cabinet in 
advance. Although the external consultation process works as a channel for inputs and 
facts and figures for future policy formulation in this two-way communication process, 
the dominant direction is from DGIII to the world o f experts and not vice-versa. 
However, it should be noticed at this point that the two-stage formal external 
consultation procedure was organized as such for analytical reasons, in order to help 
identify the element o f invisible politics. This does not mean that industry and experts 
enter the process exclusively at the second stage. In feet, they are officially invited to
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discuss a policy agenda preset at the first stage, but they also participate unofficially in 
the agenda formation at the first stage.
Overall it can be argued that the evidence at all the stages and concerning all types o f 
communication between DGII1 and its policy environment, corresponds most to what 1 
define in the theoretical framework as invisible/informal politics, where industrialists, 
political actors and experts are involved in policy formation activity away from the 
public eye. This type of invisible politics is very present in the relationships between 
DGIII and its policy clients and suppliers. However, in no sense are these informal 
politics a bottom-up policy exercise, where experts and industrialists simply request 
their policy preference from the top-officials. It has been observed that both top- 
officials and the cabinet have their own relative independence as players, and they are 
not captured by industrial or other societal interests as corporatist and elite theories o f 
EU policy-making would argue. These politicized bureaucrats hold their own policy 
preferences grounded on their own collective strategies to maximize their personal 
welfare.
Based on the examination o f the policy outputs pursued by DGIII, one could conclude 
that the theoretical argument that politicized bureaucrats seek to reshape their policy 
competence by searching for new policies o f  a regulatory, or project management type 
holds over the argument that they seek budget maximizing instruments. In terms o f 
budget size, the work program o f DGIII for 1996 and 1997 had the same scope, or 
was, in some cases even reduced. As emerges from the management seminar in winter 
1996, a budgetary increase is not the first priority o f  DGIII. Rather, its top priority is
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to increase the internal efficiency of the existing budget. The budget constraint, 
externally set by the member states, appears to push DGIII to make greater efforts to 
expand the types o f  policy instruments described above, which are characterized by 
their non-budgetary form and their orientation towards budding communication 
channels and disseminating information on a permanent institutionalized basis. The new 
policies address the problem of institutional failure rather than problems of financing 
concerning the functioning of industry. Since it cannot finance industry, DGIII tries to 
earn its role as project manager, information channel, policy coordinator and policy 
entrepreneur.
All the new policy instruments -- the maritime forum, the maritime information society, 
the R&D task force "Maritime Systems of the Future"-- introduced by DGIII in the 
domain o f maritime industries are example of these policy types. The OECD 
agreement on state aid to shipbuilding could be added to the regulatory actions-the 
6th and 7th directive on shipbuilding—already taken by the Commission in order to 
reduce market distortions and to promote fair competition for shipbuilding industry in 
the world market.
Overall, it can be argued that the policy output, concerning maritime industries, cannot 
be predicted by bureau-maximizing bureaucratic theories and theories of European 
public policy, which ignore the role o f institutions with self-incentives to become 
involved in policy-making. However, it is a straightforward outcome, if the analysis is 
based on the theoretical approach of bureau-shaping bureaucratic politics proposed by 
this dissertation.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CASE OF TOURISM
The Puzzle in the Dynamics of the Community Tourism Policy
In March 1996, the "European Voice", a weekly review published in Brussels and 
covering the Union's activities dedicated an extensive article on the policy momentum 
for the Union to include tourism in its policies. This article, which appeared in the 
middle o f  the discussions for the future o f the Union and some months before the 
Amsterdam conference for the revision o f the Treaty of the EU, caused me to ask 
"why tourism a ne*.v common policy, who really was after such a policy innovation?"
Tourism was never a high profile policy arena in European policy-making. After 
carrying out the research for the present case study, I learned that this article was 
included in a series o f publicity actions taken by the European Commission to increase 
the awareness o f the Union to the needs and the future o f European tourism. 
Commissioner Christos Papoutsis, who has tourism as part o f  his portfolio, promoted 
as a central target o f his policy agenda the identification o f tourism as a new European 
policy with its own title in the Treaty o f  the EU after its revision in Amsterdam in June 
1996. Many member states have shown unwillingness to take this route, claiming that
i
tourism is a policy domain with no supranational functional spillovers, and therefore 
ought to remain within the policy responsibility of member states. At the same time,
[ the European tourism industry is basically absent from policy-making in Brussels. This
!
can be attributed to the fragmented structure o f the industry, dominated as it is by 
small and medium size enterprises, unable to organize their collective action in an 
1 efficient way. Only the big transnational tour-operators who had enjoyed a relatively
156
unregulated business environment throughout the 1970s, felt the threat o f a high 
regulation burden, due to the popular consumer and environmental protection trends o f 
the 1980s. In the 1980s. they started arguing for the maintenance o f the lowest 
possible regulatory burden on the business. However, these voices never became a call 
for the Community to embark upon concerted policy activity for tourism. On the 
contrary, the call was for the supervision o f the member states in order to keep 
regulation at the lowest possible level. -
The reason which drove me to select tourism as a case-study is the puzzle o f  the 
continuous effort on the part o f  the Commission throughout the 1980s and 1990s to 
set up a Community driven policy for tourism, and this despite the low interest o f 
member states and o f  the tourism industry itself and the support o f an under-staffed 
administration, with no history, whose image was seriously damaged in the mid-1990s 
due to allegations o f  fraud. It is a case that represents a completely opposite situation 
to that o f  the maritime industries, where -we are dealing with vested interests which 
enjoy good rerations with an administration with a long history. According to the 
research design o f this dissertation, the choice of this case study as a comparison with 
the case o f maritime industries is made in order to give us the opportunity to have 
variation in the independent-explanatory variable. In this way, testing the validity o f the 
analytical framework and falsifying the theoretical hypotheses under opposite 
conditions, I can arrive with greater confidence at the conclusion that the proposed 
theory has a more general applicability for understanding the phenomenon of policy 
innovation pursued by the Commission's top-officials.
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Following the proposed analytical framework, the efforts made by the Commission for 
policy innovation in the field o f tourism at the Community level throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s correspond to the dependent variable o f the model. Reducing the time 
length o f the variable, I focus on the period of Commissioner Papoutsis' administration. 
This would appear to be the most puzzling period, since it is characterized by the most 
intense and consistent effort for policy innovation under the most adverse policy 
conditions. The aim o f this case study is to understand the dynamics of this innovative 
activity on the pert o f the Commission,
The independent-explanatory variable in my theoretical model is the pattern o f 
interaction between the various involved administrative departments and their policy 
clients and external suppliers. In the case o f tourism, this structure consists of:
•  The various societal actors operating in tourism policy domain at both 
domestic and Community level, namely the tourism industry interests, the 
tourist consumer interests, and the environmental and cultural heritage
■ interests.
• The position o f the Commission's top officials involved in tourism matters.
According to the proposed analytical framework, the analysis is organized on two 
levels: the state or domestic level, and the supranational or Community level. 
Following this analytical structure, I first present policy-making in the state arena and 
then examine policy-making at the Community level. Based on the interaction o f the 
above micro-actors I map the policy positions o f the member states with the policy 
preferences o f their various public authorities which appear to have a say in tourism
affairs. Through the examination o f the policy configuration in the domestic arena, I
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ascertain whether tourism issues are o f  high or low salience and whether there is a 
policy failure or a challenge to tackle tourism problems at the state level. In this way I 
can see whether the theoretical arguments that under low saliency for the policy issue 
at stake and high interest from the side o f  the Commission, bureaucratic politics are 
dominant in Community policy-making, and that a policy failure at the state level 
constitutes a window of opportunity for the Commission to embark upon policy 
innovation in the field.
According to the typology for the policy-making o f the Community proposed in this 
dissertation, since tourism issues show low salience in the domestic arena and the 
Commission expresses high interest to become involved in the field, it is expected that 
tourism policy-making resembles bureaucratic politics. In this structure, the 
Commission has considerable room for maneuver, acting as policy coordinator, or 
broker o f best practices, but also as policy innovator.
In the first section o f this chapter I provide the historical tracking o f the efforts for 
policy innovation in the field o f tourism throughout the 80s and 90s. In this way, we 
have a full presentation o f the dependent variable and o f  the string o f innovative efforts 
made by the Commission in the field o f  tourism. I then focus on Papoutsis' period in 
order to understand the dynamics o f functioning. I do this because the efforts and 
achievements o f Papoutsis* predecessors constitute the starting point o f his own effort. 
The historical tracking thus helps us to understand the extent to which the dynamics o f 
policy innovation inherited by the Papoutsis’ administration contributed to his strategy 
for policy innovation in the field. According to my analytical framework, the period
159
before that under examination corresponds to the prior-history and will therefore be 
analyzed since it allows us to understand whether the administrative tradition and the 
policies of the Commission with regard to tourism were pro-innovatory.
In the second section of this chapter, I present the explanadum of the dynamics o f  the 
policy innovation activity observed in the period o f Papoutsis’ administration. As I 
show in the first section, Commissioner Papoutsis and his cabinet act as policy 
innovators in the field. I examine the strategy they followed with respect to the other 
players involved such as other adminstrive units o f the Commission, the various 
tourism-related interests and the state authorities. More specifically, I examine the 
motivations o f the initiators, the strategies adopted towards their policy clients and 
other policy suppliers, and the policy output pursued and achieved. In this way, I test 
my theoretical hypotheses and arguments about the role o f  the Commission's top- 
officials as policy innovators against the empirical findings.
Let us consider the case o f  the Community's policy on tourism from its origins at the 
beginning of the 1980s.
The Historical Tracking of the Policy Initiatives and the Instruments Used by the 
Commission in Shaping the Tourism Policy Domain
Since the beginning of the 80s, the Commission has been searching for political 
legitimacy in order to introduce a Community driven policy on tourism. The first 
attempt was made in 1982 with the issuing o f a Communication to the Council with
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the title "Initial guidelines for a Community policy on Tourism".74 With this policy 
proposal, the Commission made the first systematic attempt to convince the Council to 
adopt such a policy. The Commission presented as an underlying factor for such an 
initiative its own observation that tourist activity in the Community shows an 
"extraordinary expansion" and that there is a growing inter-relationship between 
tourism and a large number o f Community activities.75 Attached to this policy proposal 
was a detailed study carried out by external experts, examining the current trends in 
tourism in Europe; according to the proposal these trends made it necessary for the 
Community to take policy actions at the supranational level. The experts served to 
provide scientific legitimacy to a decision already taken by the Commission to pursue 
such a policy.
The communication was prepared under the supervision o f  the Greek Commissioner 
Georgios Kondogeorgis. Kondogeorgis took the initiative to work more systematically 
in the field o f the tourism industry by acting as a promoter o f  a series o f policies that 
would have a positive impact on his own country. It should not be forgotten that in the 
early 80s, well before the Euroforia at the end o f this decade, European Community 
policy-making most resembled a form o f  stagnant intergovernmental bargaining in 
which member states tried to translate their narrow national interests into Community 
driven policies. The main player in the European decision-making process was the 
Council. The Commission was a relatively weak institution in terms of policy leverage
74 See Commission of the European Communities, “Initial Guidelines for a Community Policy on 
Tourism”, B ulletin o f  the European Communities, Supplem ent 4/82, Brussels, April 1982.
75 Ibid.: 5
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with supranational orientation, and, while the European Parliament had been recently 
elected directly by the citizens o f the member states, it still had only limited power 
from the Treaty o f Rome.
The early 80s saw the process o f enlargement o f the Community, with the new 
members-Greece, Spain and Portugal—moving the borders o f the Community to 
encompass the less developed South. Greece joined the Community in 1980. In 1981, 
the newly elected socialist government under A. Papandreou had a strong national 
agenda that proposed the re-negotiation o f the terms under which Greece joined the 
Community, and asked for redistributive policies in favor o f  Greece and the less 
developed southern European countries. This was the period in which Spain and 
Portugal also with newly elected socialist government in office were waiting to obtain 
membership o f the European Community. The central position o f  these three 
governments with respect to the coming enlargement was that strong re-distributional 
policies were needed in order to reduce the gap in growth rates between the rich north 
and the less developed south.
Tourism was always at the top o f  the economic policy agenda o f  Greece, due to the 
fact that this sector, together with shipping, made the most important contribution o f 
foreign currency to the balance o f payments and was also crucial for the employment. 
Within this policy environment, the Greek commissioner, with the political supervision 
of the Greek government, took up the cause of tourism and initiated a discussion over 
the need for the Community to take action at the European level to boost the tourism 
industry.
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In Athens in November o f 1983, under the first Greek presidency, an informal Council 
o f ministers of tourism was held for the first time in the history o f the Community. The 
Council discussed the Communication on tourism and asked the Commission for 
further consideration:
”A broad measure of agreement emerged on the need for a Community approach 
to certain questions, notably free movement of persons, staggered holidays, social 
tourism, safeguarding the architectural heritage, harmonization of statistics and 
the use of data processing" (Bull. EC11-1983, point 2.1.8: 17)
This was the initiation o f a regular consultation process over tourism among the 
Commission, the newly elected European Parliament, the Council and the Social and 
Economic Committee that continued throughout the decade.
In April 1984, the Council, under the presidency o f  Francois Mitterand, adopted a 
resolution on a Community policy on tourism along the lines o f the Commission's 
communication o f  1983. This resolution emphasized that:
"tourism is an important activity for the integration of Europe ...tourism affects 
or is affected by many of the Community's activities...the coordination of 
Community’s activities relating to tourism and consultation between member 
states and the Commission may facilitate tourism in the Community" (Bull. EC 
4-1984, point 2.1.9:21)
The Council also stressed the need for a tourism dimension in the decision-making o f 
the Community and invited the Commission to present specific policy proposals along 
the guidelines laid down by the earlier communication.
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In January 1986, the new Commission and the Italian Commissioner for Tourism, 
Rippa di Meana, who also came from a country where tourism is one the most 
important industries, repeated the same arguments and stressed the need to adopt 
policy actions for tourism at the Community level. To achieve this, di Meana issued 
another communication to the Council with the title "Community Action in the Field of 
Tourism"76. This was right after the initiation o f the Single European Act, and the 
internal market program was therefore having a strong impact on the tourism business 
across the Community. Within the policy environment o f  Euroforia, the EP and the 
Economic and Social Committee-responding to the Communication o f  the 
Commission—called the Council to adopt a specific action plan in the area o f tourism.
In December 1986, the Council77 adopted the suggestions made by the Commission, 
with the most important element being the approval o f the setting up o f  a permanent 
consultative committee on tourism. This committee was named the "Tourism Advisory 
Committee", and had a chairman from the- Commission, while its members were the 
member states. The committee’s task was to discuss decisions taken at the national 
level which might affect other States or which might be o f common interest for 
tourism. This committee became a permanent institutionalized Community forum for 
discussion and exchange o f information amongst the member states, with regular 
meetings about three times a year.78 This was the first institution at the disposal o f the
76 See Bulletin o f  the European Communities, Supplement 4/86.
77 Bulletin o f the European Communities 12-1986, point 2.1.160, Council decision 86/664/EEC, Dec. 
1986.
78 See Tourism and the European Union, Directorate General XXIII, web page The European 
Community's involvement in Tourism, Brussels, Feb. 1999
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Community that allowed it to work to shape a common consciousness for tourism 
matters amongst all the players involved at the European level.
In December 1986, the Commission also took, for the first time, the initiative to 
publish an advertisement in the United States for the Europe o f twelve as a tourist 
destination.
"A large illustrated advertisement entitled "there is no place like Europe" 
appeared in several prominent American newspapers on Sunday, 7 December 
with the Community emblem and the addresses of the member states tourist 
offices in the US" (Bull. EC-12-1986, point 2.161: 74)
The window o f  opportunity for the Commission was the dramatic drop o f  American 
tourists in Europe in the wake o f the Chernobyl accident, some terrorist actions against 
American targets in Europe and the substantial fall o f  the value o f  dollar. The tourist 
authorities o f the member states were therefore seeking ways in which to assist the 
European tourism industry. The Commission appeared ready to participate in the game 
with a series o f  policy proposals, as well as through the advertising campaign. This 
policy venture was a strong symbolic statement that the tourism business may be a 
Community issue as well as a national one.
One year later, in January 1988, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
intended to remind the Community o f  the need to step up measures for tourism at the 
supranational level. This was not only for the protection o f  the consumer tourist, the 
environment and the natural and cultural heritage, but also "as a way o f  contributing to 
the economic development o f  many parts o f  Europe." (BuIl.EC 1-1988: 54). From that
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point on, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee bought 
into the idea o f a Community policy on tourism and became enthusiastic proponents by 
issuing at least once yearly, at its own initiative, a resolution calling the Council and 
the Commission to work in this direction.
In October o f  1988, the Commission, at the general suggestion o f the resolution o f  the 
Parliament, sent the Council a proposal with a specific action plan to support European 
tourism that involved designating 1990 as "European Tourism Year".79 In this way, the 
Commission tried to take advantage o f  the bonanza o f the internal market program. Its 
main argument for promoting policy measures at the Community level was that 
tourism might be used as an integrating force for the creation o f a Community without 
internal frontiers, where the people o f  Europe might get to know each other better.
In December 1988, within this positive environment for the promotion o f the internal 
market program, the Council once again, under the presidency o f Greece, adopted the 
proposal of the Commission to designate 1990, as the year o f  European tourism and 
allocated 5 million ECU for the proposed action plan.80 The plan proposed by the 
Commission included measures for the following: to improve the knowledge o f 
Community citizens o f cultures and lifestyles in the other.member states, to encourage 
the staggering o f  holidays, to help the development o f new tourist destinations and 
new forms o f  tourism within Europe, to facilitate the movement o f travellers, and to
79 COM(88)413 final.
80 Council decision 89/46/EEC, OJ No LÍ7,21.1.89: 53
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promote tourism from countries beyond the community. This was the first European 
action plan for tourism. In order to carry out this task and manage the allocated 
budget, the Commission set up a specific administrative unit for tourism with a small 
staff under the Directorate-General XXIII.
By the end o f the 80s, the Community had gradually moved towards a more active role 
in the field o f  tourism, with the Commission playing the policy innovator. New 
institutions had been established, including such as the advisory committee and the 
regular meetings o f  the Tourism Council, the administrative tourism unit, and an action 
plan with a specific budget. The European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee had been sensibilized to the positive aspects o f the Commission's proposals 
and the success o f  their own initiatives to promote tourism matters at the Community 
level. By the end o f the decade, the basic institutional framework for a European policy 
on tourism has been established.
Since 1988, with the active support o f  the Parliament and the Social and Economic 
Committee, the Commission has been running an intense consultation procedure 
between the Community's ministers for tourism and the Commission itself. Through 
regular meetings, the Commission exchanges information on tourism matters and 
discusses a long run approach to Community action in that field. The successor to di 
Meana, the Italian Commissioner, in the second Delors Commission from 1989 until 
1993 was the Portuguese Antonio Cardoso e Cunha, he too came from a country 
where tourism makes a major contribution to its GNP. With a strong motivation to 
promote tourism, in November 1990 Cunha introduced to the Council o f tourism
167
ministers, under the Italian presidency, the idea to extent the European Tourism Year 
to a multi-annual action plan. The Council appeared skeptical on the possibility for the 
Community to adopt such a policy.81 Many delegations tried to balance the favorable 
atmosphere for the program by mentioning that in any case the Community walking 
along the road o f  common actions in the area o f  tourism should take into account the 
principle of subsidiarity. However, they did not block the proposal and they issued a 
resolution with which the ministers for tourism ask the Commission to put forward 
guidelines for a specific multi-annual action program in this field.82
In the meantime, the Commission had initiated certain low-profile projects such as a 
multi-annual program for developing Community tourism statistics that involved 
harmonizing the various national systems o f keeping and publishing data concerning 
the tourism industry in order to create a European system.83 In this way, national 
industries would start using a common code which might promote a common identity 
for themselves. Another project to promote innovative forms o f  tourism such as rural 
tourism84 could recognize Brussels as a potentially useful new policy center for the 
industry. In the context of European Tourism Year, the Commission approved a total 
o f 275 projects.85 The measures involved were mainly seminars, workshops, fairs, 
exhibitions, public relations events and competitions aimed at creating a common
S1 For the content of the discussion of the meeting see the press release of the Council of the EC 
(1990).
82 See COM(91) 97 final, April. 1991:1.
83 COM(90) 211, June 1990.
84 COM(90) 438, September. 1990.
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"European Tourism" identity for the various involved players in tourism matters across 
the Community. During the organization the European Tourism Year in 1990, the 
Commission initiated many demonstration projects with this scope. However, the 
progress and the results o f the action plan were not satisfactory, so much so that, at 
the end o f the year, the European Parliament was complaining for the output o f the 
plan. With a tough resolution,85 6 the Parliament stressed that the activities should be 
continued in 1991 with better organization and the allocation o f more resources.
Having the backing continuous o f the European Parliament, and the Economic and the 
Social Committee, as well as the mandate given by the Council through the November 
1990 resolution, the Commission became more aggressive in demanding more 
competence in tourism. In March 1991, the CEU adopted the communication 
"Community Action Plan to Assist Tourism".87 This was a multi-annual plan offering 
practical measures in the field of tourism These measures were to be taken by the 
Community along with the policy guidelines of the "Tourism Year 1990" program, and 
in addition to, and in connection with, those implemented under the framework o f  the 
"European Tourism Year 1990".
Finally, in June 1992, the Council88 under the presidency o f  Portugal accepted the
85 See the main points of the third report on the progress of European Year Tourism submitted by the 
Commission to the Council-Tourism on 29/11/1990 as they are presented in the press release of the 
Council of the EC (1990): 5.
86 See European Parliament (1990)
87 See COM (91)97 final.
88 See Council of the EC (1992)
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proposal made by the Commission and adopted a three-year action plan to promote 
tourism in the Community. It did not finance infrastructure related to the tourism 
industry (which is covered by the structural funds.), but decided to support measures 
taken at the European level that were in line with those taken for the European 
Tourism Year and the policy guidelines issued by the Commission in the 80s. The aims 
were to help policymakers to develop a common and a better view by improving 
knowledge of the industry through studies and other related measures, to improve the 
information available to, and the protection of, tourists as consumers, to promote new 
forms o f tourism such a rural, cultural and social tourism, increasing the scope o f the 
market, and to promote Europe as a destination particularly in the US and Japan. The 
budget approved for the implementation o f the plan was estimated at ECU 18 million 
annually from January 1993 close to the level o f the budget for the European Tourism 
Year.
With the completion of the internal market program in 1991, a series o f  discussions 
took place in order to evaluate the results o f the program and the possibilities of new 
initiatives to boost European integration. The intergovernmental conference in 
Maastricht had as its agenda the revision o f the Treaty o f  Rome, incorporating the 
results o f the above consultation process for a more integrated Community. Within this 
positive environment for policies which would further promote the integration process, 
the Commission—with the strong support o f the European Parliament89 and the
89 In June 1991, the EP, with the resolution OJC 183,15.7.91 suggested that tourism should be 
included in the Treaty as "a flanking policy of fundamental importance", European Parliament 
(1991).
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Economic and Social Committee90--proposed that tourism should be included as a 
policy area o f common concern in the revised Treaty.
The output o f this consultation procedure, in which the EP, ESC and some o f the 
member states with strong tourism sector were pushing for a common policy on 
tourism, was a partial success. The Treaty o f Maastricht, signed in February 1992, 
acknowledged that the European Union should include measures in the field of tourism 
under the conditions and the timetable set out in Article 3t. For the first time in its 
history, the Community was explicitly provided with the legal base to take actions in 
the area o f tourism. The success was partial, because the Treaty did not enter into the 
same degree o f  detail in policy objectives and implementation procedures as it did in 
other cases such as culture (Article 128) or consumer protection (Article 129A). The 
Council had to act under unanimity. Article 3t was the outcome of a very delicate 
compromise based on different and divergent policy preferences o f the member 
states.91 However, this article assigned the Union a specific timetable and procedure 
within which the member states together with the Commission had to examine the 
question o f introducing a specific title for tourism. This would include further 
provisions in the revised Treaty o f the EU in the intergovernmental conference in 
1996. The representatives o f the member states had to decide on the basis o f a report 
which the Commission had to submit to the Council.
90The Economic and Social Committee responding to the proposal made by the Commission for an 
action plan to assist tourism took the view that "tourism should be given a fully fledged policy an that 
it should be included in the Treaty", Economic and Social Committee (1991).
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It is this window of opportunity in the process o f  the revision o f the Treaty that was 
used by Commissioner Papoutsis in order to organize a systematic and intense 
dialogue, starting with a green paper in 1995, amongst the players involved in tourism 
affairs throughout the Community. His aim was to increase the competence o f  the 
Union in the field.
Papoutsis’ innovative strategy was twofold and o f  a piece-meal nature. He tried first to 
improve the legal basr for tourism actions at the European level by incorporating in the 
Treaty o f the Union a specific title for tourism where decisions would be taken under 
qualified majority voting as happens for other policy areas. At the same time, he tried 
to exploit the existing legal framework and the "acqui-communitair" obtained by his 
predecessors as much as he could. Based on the experience o f the Action Plan o f 
1993-5, he tried to replace this plan not with another action plan, but with a 
comprehensive multi-annual program with specific policy objectives. He proposed 
"philoxenia",9: a four-year (1997-2000) program with four objectives:
• To improve the legislative and financial environment for tourism by strengthening 
the cooperation amongst member states, the Commission, industry, and other 
players involved such as associations o f tourism chambers.
• To promote forms o f tourism which are characterized by sustainable and balanced 
modes of growth.
•  To increase the number o f  visitors from third countries. 912
91 See green paper, "The Role of the Union in the Field of Tourism” COM(95)97 final: 3
92 See COM(96)168 final.
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• To give the opportunity to all Community policies which influence tourism to take 
this sector into account by providing data and information sources which make it 
easier to assess the impact on tourism o f  various Community measures.
With this proposal the Commission was aiming to build a coherent reference 
framework for policy priorities and alternative solutions to tourism related problems 
for both public authorities and the industry. In this way, the Commission would 
promote in practice a common policy on tourism by making all the players involved 
work in cooperation on common priorities on a problem-solving basis. The 
Commission was thus trying to legitimize its role by providing a policy framework 
which enhances the effectiveness and positive impact o f all other Community and state- 
run policy schemes related to the sector.
None o f  the targets pursued by Papoutsis were achieved. The Council did not approve 
the policy proposals, however, after all this intense and sustained effort for five years, 
tourism had managed to gain a higher position in the policy agenda o f  the member 
states. Moreover, the tourism industry started identifying itself with a European 
dimension. At the same time, the tourism unit, which had previously been held in low 
esteem within the structure o f the Commission, managed to transform itself without 
increasing its staff but by restructuring its organization. It became an autonomous 
direction in Directorate-General XXIII, and gained in status in the eyes o f both the 
tourism industry and, via the inter-consultation process, the other departments o f  the 
Commission. The new tourism direction was thus entitled to have a say in other 
policies which had a tourism related dimension.
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Looking at the historical tracking o f  tourism policy-making o f  at the Community level 
we can conclude that innovation was the favored policy o f the Commission. At first 
glance, this may be attributed to the fact that all the commissioners in charge come 
from southern European countries with strong interests in the tourism industry. 
However, throughout the 80s this effort was fragmented and was never pursued 
through a strategy of continuous and concerted actions. Before Papoutsis, the 
commissioners in charge o f tourism did not pursue a Community policy in a systematic 
wray. However, they managed to introduce tourism onto the negotiating agenda o f the 
member states as a policy area which might come to be o f  common concern. With the 
adoption of the revised Maastricht Treaty, a specific timetable was set within which the 
Council had to decide on the type o f  involvement the Community would have in this 
field. This was the window o f  opportunity for Papoutsis to initiate his efforts for policy 
innovation in tourism by launching a high profile strategy, and a series o f  continuous 
and intense consultation procedures and policy initiatives. In addition to article 3t o f 
the Maastricht Treaty, Papoutsis' predecessors managed to launch at the Community 
level a three-year action plan, from 1993-5, o f an experimental and demonstrative 
character. In order to assist tourism they obtained a small budget o f  10 Million ECU 
per year for the plan and a small administrative unit to implement it. By 1995, the final 
year o f the plan, and just before Papoutsis took office in Brussels, this unit was 
seriously undermined by allegations o f  fraud and mismanagement o f the resources. It 
was with this inheritance, and a mix o f degrees of freedom and policy constraints, that 
Papoutsis started his innovative policy in the field. Let us continue in our examination 
o f the dynamics o f this process in order to obtain a better understanding o f the 
positions and the roles o f the various actors involved.
174
an™*TBaamiHHBanmmw « —m a M r— — —
The Dynamics o f Policy-Making Concerning Tourism a t the EU level
National Policies on Tourism, the Policy Preferences o f  the Tourism Industry, and 
the Challenge fo r  a European policy on Tourism, The Commission Searches fo r  a 
Window o f  Opportunity fo r  a New Policy at the European Level
Theories of liberal intergovemmentalism may explain the failure o f the Southern 
European member states to promote a common policy on tourism, but they cannot 
explain the twenty years o f  continuous activity in the field on the part o f  the 
Commission, and, to a lesser extent, on the part o f  the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee. We can observe a slow but persistent building up, 
not only o f institutions with a specific policy agenda, but also o f a common language 
o f communication and o f an identity shared by the whole spectrum o f  the players 
involved in European tourism affairs.
The role o f the Commission in this process is central. It should be noted that 
throughout this period the commissioners in charge o f tourism matters were from the 
southern member states, where tourism is an important economic sector. As a result, 
all these commissioners took to Brussels a positive bias for tourism matters. They had 
the prior belief that, working for tourism at the Community level, any additional 
budgetary or non-budgetary action complementary to national policies would provide 
significant benefits to the member states from which they came. At the same time, the 
tourism industry itself did not appear to lobby these commissioners to take such 
actions. The member states appeared divided on whether tourism should be treated as 
a policy domain with a strong supranational dimension. Indeed, the majority o f  the
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member states had not rated tourism high on their shopping list when they searched in 
Brussels for complementary policy instruments to tackle their domestic problems. 
Tourism seemed to be regarded as more of a domestic affair for the member states 
which are tourism senders. On the other hand, the member states which are tourism 
receivers and where tourism industry makes a major contribution to their economies, 
started voicing opinions in favor o f  a European policy concerning tourism from the 
mid-80s. However, these opinions never made tourism a top priority in their 
negotiating agenda.
Against this policy preference background, where there were no strong national or 
economic interests behind the innovative activity o f the commissioners concerning 
tourism affairs, the effort made by Papoutsis' administration in Brussels appears to be 
particularly puzzling. What was the motivation o f the policy entrepreneur to embark 
upon a policy innovation activity? After all, his administration was operating within the 
most negative policy environment for policy-innovation in European tourism affairs. At 
this time, European policy on tourism was synonymous with corruption. Despite all 
this, Papoutsis proved to be the most active commissioner in pursuing policy 
innovation for tourism matters at the Community level.
Papoutsis took office in 1995, succeeding the Italian Raniero Vanni d' Archirafi, who 
had replaced Chuna in 1993. This period o f time was a particularly difficult one for the 
tourism unit o f Directorate-General XXIII which was in charge o f the implementation 
o f the multi-annual program 1993-5. The unit was accused o f  misuse o f the program 
budget and bribery, and tales o f  alleged fraud and bribery within the unit's ranks hit
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newspapers in 1995.93 Two senior Commission officials were dismissed and the 
Belgian police and justice were called in. This was therefore a period in which tourism 
was in extreme disrepute in Brussels.
Given this negative environment for tourism, it is hard to believe that Papoutsis 
decided to initiate, with the green paper, a comprehensive and long-term strategy to 
increase the competence o f the Union in tourism affairs. Without strong industrial 
interests behind him, .nd with most o f  the member states indifferent to, if not openly 
against, and with this administration which had had its image so seriously damaged, he 
embarked upon a process o f policy innovation which seemed doomed to fail from the 
outset. It is on this policy initiative that I will concentrate my research. I will examine 
the way in which a policy innovation process "behaves” when there is no strong 
interest support and it is not backed by an administration with a long history and a 
well-established position amongst the various players involved, as was the case for the 
maritime industries. Here, the driving force o f policy innovation appears to be solely 
the Commissioner and his cabinet staff.
The Window o f  Opportunity fo r  Commissioner Papoutsis to Pursue Policy 
Innovations in the Field o f  Tourism
In the 1990s, the tourism industry faced a significant shift upwards on the demand side.
93 For an extended presentation of the accusations see "the first report on allegations regarding fraud, 
mismanagement and nepotism in the European Commission" produced by the Committee of 
Independent Experts set up in February 1999 by the Commission after the suggestion of the European
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This decade was characterized by a boom in travelling, and an explosion in the number 
of tourists. Reasons for this development were more free time for the population o f  the 
industrialized countries, aging population structures, shorter working hours, the 
widespread existence o f paid leave, an increasing level o f education and the reduction 
of the cost o f travel due to the liberalization o f air and rail transport services.94 More 
specifically, the demand side o f European tourism also received a boost because o f  the 
setting up o f the internal market, the materialization o f the Single Act, and the 
introduction o f EURO. This shift in the demand for tourism services was also 
accompanied by changes in the tastes o f tourists. We can note a shift from forms o f 
mass tourism to less impersonal services with specific themes such as rural, sport and 
conference tourism. These developments on the demand side led to a rearrangement o f 
the world market shares. According to trends published by the Commission95 and 
presented in the green paper for tourism, the European tourism industry showed 
difficulties coping with these changes and began to lose its share o f the world market 
at the benefit o f  other destinations outside Europe. This happened despite the boost 
received by intra-Europe tourism from the abolition o f cross-border controls and the 
promotion o f the trans-European transport and communication networks:
"All the economic analyses confirm that Europe remains the main driving force 
behind international tourism in terms of arrivals, revenue and flows to non- 
Community countries. Nevertheless, the loss of market share (approximately 
11% between 1970 to 1994 in terms of arrivals and 14% in terms of receipts) to 
the emerging destinations in Eastern Asia and the Pacific illustrates the capacity 
of these countries to respond to the requirements of the growing demand for
Parliament to examine several cases of fraud within the Commission, Brussels, 15/03/99. European 
Parliament/ Committee of Independent Experts (1999).
94 For a fuller presentation of the travel trends in the 1990s see the green paper on tourism and also
the European Commission publication Tourism in Europe", DGXXIII-Eurostat, 1995.
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tourism in the world market which is now open to more competitors." (Green 
Paper on the Role of the Union on Tourism, 1995:5)
From the early 90s, this loss in market share led some from the side o f  industry, as 
already mentioned, to start asking state authorities and Community institutions for 
additional measures to help them adjust to these new circumstances. The Commission 
used this fashionable argument from the 1980s, which, in the opinion of many 
commentators led to the adoption o f the internal market program, as a window of 
opportunity to propose that the Community needed to do something to promote its 
position in the world market, since it was losing its position to the new, aggressive 
challengers from the Far East. The Communication o f  1991 with which Commissioner 
Chuna managed to convince the Council to adopt the first action plan to assist tourism 
used this type o f  argument in the following form:
"Europe as a whole is steadily losing world market share...the resulting problems 
require specific solutions which can longer be confined within a regional 
framework" (COM(91) 97 final, Brussels, 1991: 3)
However, this argument for legitimizing large scale policy innovation at the 
Community level and encouraging the introduction o f a coherent policy, did not appear 
convincing, especially by the mid-90s, by which time it was beginning to look out o f 
date. Moreover, most o f the above adjustments were pursued within the competence 
o f the member states, which were active in the field, while the Commission assigned 
itself only a limited role in the Action Plan for 1993-5. In the green paper, Papoutsis, 
the new Commissioner recognized the complementarity and, indeed, limited scope o f
95 Ibid.
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the Community measures undertaken so far:
"...as a number of experts suggests, the attention paid to tourism in Community 
policy-making assumes greater importance. The measures undertaken by the 
Comm unity...have been implemented taking full account of existing national 
measures. The member states are taking steps to stimulate tourism...A broad 
range of measures is involved.... reflecting the volatile nature of tourism and the 
way supply can adapt considerably to meet demand." (Ibid.: 12)
In the green paper, Papoutsis did, in fact, repeat the same arguments for adjustments 
that the tourism industry had to make due to changes on the demand side of tourism 
market on which tne Community has a role, but he also tried to broaden the basis for 
the legitimacy o f such a role by connecting it to changes in the regulatory framework 
of business which had to be carried out at the supranational level.
These policy challenges to the regulatory framework were identified by the 
Commission as windows o f  opportunity to embark upon policy innovations in the case 
of tourism. They were related to a policy failure at the state level to cope with the need 
for new regulations on taxation and cross-border control, and on consumer and natural 
heritage protection due to the new conditions created by the Single European Act and 
the introduction o f  the EURO. In the wake o f these changes, tourism was more than 
ever a cross-border activity. This need for regulation could be tackled by a minimum 
coordination o f  national policies at the Community level. These challenges could be 
met by the Community through measures o f minimum intervention o f  basically a 
regulatory and non-budgetary nature under legal provisions then am en t in the Treaty 
o f Maastricht for Tourism (Article 3t).
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This policy possibility, which would lead to a minimum role for the Union in the field 
of tourism. led the new Commissioner to consider the possibility that innovative 
strategy need not be linked exclusively to the policy failure o f the member states to 
tackle regulatory tasks in the field o f  tourism. In addition to these challenges, the 
Commission, in the first section o f the green paper on tourism, claimed that there were 
also central Union objectives, decided unanimously by the member states, which might 
be served if the Community decided to follow a comprehensive policy for tourism. 
Specifically, it was the objectives o f the creation o f a European identity, the fight 
against unemployment and the reinforcement o f economic and social cohesion in the 
Union that might be promoted by taking concerted actions at the Community level to 
promote tourism.
In the revised Maastricht Treaty of the Union, the member states, in order to better 
serve the interests o f  the people o f the Union, decided to establish the concept o f 
citizenship o f the Union alongside national-citizenship. The content of this citizenship 
is defined by a number o f rights which the Union and its institutions and policies have 
to satisfy. These common rights, which any citizen o f a member state obtains at the 
Union level, makes him or her to identify themselves as part o f a broad community o f 
people with common rights and policy objectives. One o f the most important rights is 
that of moving and traveling freely within the territory o f the member states o f  the 
Union (Article 8a). The more the citizens o f the member states travel, the more they 
exercise their Unions rights, the more they get to know the preferences o f each other 
for private and public goods, and so develop common or convergent tastes for goods 
and policies. In this way the volume o f  intra-trade within the internal market will rise,
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and the possibility to agree on problems which should be tackled with common policy 
actions will also increase, as will the possibility o f solving these problems. As the 
Commission argues:
"tourism can be a means of reducing the differences between the multifarious 
realities which constitute the Union, and by a continuous process of these 
differences being perceived in a non-confrontation a I context, can facilitate 
communication amongst citizens, and thus improve the basis on which 
exchanges, both cultural and economic, are made between the member states" 
(COM(95)97final: 16).
Through complementary actions to those of the member states, the Community could 
increase the volume o f travelers within its borders and promote in this way the 
construction o f a European identity for its citizens.
Articles 130a and 130b o f  the Treaty o f the Union clearly state the direction o f  the 
Community's actions to promote economic and social cohesion for the regions o f  the 
Union, which are characterized by large differences in their levels o f development. A 
series o f  common policies and budgetary instruments such as the structural funds have 
been allocated to the Community level in order to help the less-developed regions to 
catch up. The Commission argues that, with the active support through a number o f 
resolutions and opinions o f  the Parliament and the Committee o f the Regions,96 the 
Community practice has, so far, demonstrated that:
"tourism can assist in bringing about a better distribution of activities and jobs in 
the Union...by diversifying tourism on the supply side...it has been possible to 
enlarge the range o f services to cover activities described as cultural or
96 Committee of the Regions (1995).
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rural...The result has been to make tourism an alternative source, or even a prime 
source of economic activity in rundown areas..." (Ibid.: 13)
To date, tourism has realized its potential to affect the development o f the regions of 
Union; and at the same time it too is affected by this development. The need to 
develop areas that are in decline or are under-developed areas through rural or other 
forms o f tourism, has often led to misuse o f the environment, the natural and cultural 
heritage o f these areas. According to the Commission, this constitutes a policy failure 
which has to be remedied by a new style o f policy formation at all levels of 
governance:
"tourism in the Union could from now on be planned and implemented on 
principles of sustainable development" (Ibid.: 14)
It was to meet these objectives o f the Union that the Commission proposed a higher 
profile policy for tourism at the Community level. This policy was to complement, 
where necessary, the existing national policies, but mainly it was to promote the 
objectives o f the Union as outlined above. The policy proposals did not, however, 
include more budgetary instruments dedicated to tourism in the hands o f  the 
Community. Rather, they constituted a complete policy program, with clearly defined 
policy objectives and formal policy-making procedures with which the member states, 
together with the Community institutions, should align themselves while making use o f 
the already existing policy resources.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the underlying factors which were 
recognized by Commissioner Papoutsis as windows o f opportunity for the pursuit o f
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policy innovations for tourism at the Community level were twofold: First, there were 
a number o f reasons which may be attributed to structural changes in the demand and 
supply side o f tourism industry. The tourism industry's adjustment to these changes 
was to be supported by a Community-driven policy which would act in a 
complementary way to national policies. The latter also had to be reorganized and 
assume a part o f the burden. The second set o f reasons for which a Union-driven 
policy for tourism was to be established was to do with the possible use o f tourism as 
an efficient instrument by the Union to promote the broader common objectives set by 
the revised Treaty o f the Union in Maastricht in 1992. These latter reasons justified a 
more interventionist role to the Commission than the former. I observe that my 
hypothesis stated at the macro-level, that a policy failure at the state level constitutes a 
window of opportunity for the Commission to embark upon policy innovation in the 
field, holds as a necessary condition. However, I could argue that, in the case o f 
tourism, in order to promote policy changes in the field Commissioner Papoutsis 
expanded the definition o f policy challenge beyond the borders o f the policy failure o f  
existing national and Community policies to tackle structural changes in the policy 
domain. He incorporated in the concept o f policy challenge a positive dimension, 
namely that policy change was needed to serve new policy objectives set by the states.
It should be noted that what is defined by the Commission as challenges for policy 
innovation at the Community level is not necessarily perceived in this way by the 
others involved in tourism policy-making. As 1 will discuss in the next section, the 
Commission embarked upon a piecemeal and top-down policy strategy to convince the 
member states, the industry and the other parties interested in tourism affairs that the
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above reasons were motives for a Community-driven policy.
According to the typology o f Community policy-making proposed in this dissertation, 
since tourism issues show lowr salience in the domestic arenas and the Commission 
expresses a high interest to become involved in the field, it is expected that tourism 
policy-making should resemble bureaucratic politics. In this structure, the Commission 
has a large amount o f room for maneuver, acting not only as policy coordinator, or 
broker o f best practices, but also as policy innovator.
In the following sections I examine in more detail this process whereby the 
Commission seeks to obtain for itself the roles o f policy coordinator of all national and 
Community policies which may affect tourism, o f the broker o f  the best practices in the 
field and o f the privileged interlocutor with all the parties involved in the policy­
making. The CEU's objective is to channel to the appropriate level of governance the 
various policy demands o f the parties involved and to fine tune, through the concept o f 
sustainable development, their conflictual policy preferences (i.e. consumer and natural 
and cultural heritage protection vs. growth and employment interests).
The Role o f the European Commission
The Motivation of Commissioner Papoutsis and his Cabinet to Act as Policy Innovators
I will examine the motivation o f  Papoutsis and his cabinet to pursue policy innovation 
according to the theoretical hypotheses for the profile o f the Commissions’ top-officials 
who act as policy innovators. According to these hypotheses, the motivation o f the
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Commissioners to embark upon policy innovation is directly linked to their personal 
career ambitions as politicians, and their ideological and political beliefs for the role o f 
public authorities (more or less interventionist). It is also influenced by the policy 
priorities o f their national domestic arena.
Commissioner Papoutsis is an active politician, member o f  the European Parliament for 
eight years, and prominent member o f  PASOK, the Greek socialist party which has 
held office for almost 17 years since 1981. Papoutsis was a young, highly ambitious 
politician who saw his post in the Commission as a step which provided him with a 
higher international profile, a necessary element to realize his ambitions to become a 
future challenger o f  the leadership o f  his party.97 Papoutsis’s profile made him keen on 
pursuing policy innovations which will give him greater prestige and reputation as an 
effective innovative policy-maker. He also wanted to pursue new policies to help his 
own country since his intention was, ultimately, to go back to domestic politics. As 
already mentioned, tourism is a sector o f central importance for the Greek economy in 
terms o f  balance o f payment, volume o f returns and employment. At the same time, as 
a socialist, Papoutsis was more sensitive to redistributional policies, and regarded 
tourism as an excellent instrument to reduce regional disparities and to increase the 
economic and social cohesion o f the Community, as well as a means to fight 
unemployment, a top priority policy target for Europe's socialists. Most o f  the 
members of his cabinet staff were also his staffers when he was a member o f  the 
European Parliament and shared the same political beliefs as their boss. The staffers in
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charge o f the tourism portfolio was working for the European Socialist Party prior to 
taking this post and is an active member o f  PASOK. Looking at this evidence, it is 
easy to understand why Commissioner Papoutsis proved so motivated and active in 
pursuing a European driven policy for tourism.
The Commission Embarks Upon a Piecemeal Strategy to Introduce an EU-Wide Policy for 
Tourism
As discussed above, Commissioner Papoutsis initially made a maximalist proposal for 
the introduction o f  a specific title for tourism in the revised Treaty o f  the European 
Union during the process o f the Intergovernmental Conference o f Amsterdam. In his 
speech in the public hearing at the EP on January 9, 1995, and then again one month 
later on February 16 in Strasbourg, in front o f the "Inter-Group Tourism”97 8 of the EP, 
he officially announced to the EP and the players involved in tourism affairs, his policy 
intention to propose the inclusion o f tourism in the revised Treaty:
" the revised Maastricht Treaty, which will be negotiated by next year's IGC 
should contain a special reference to tourism, so that the issues that are related to 
this sector can obtain the weight that they merit in the decisions taken in the 
framework of the general political activity of the European Union...Without 
putting into question the competencies of the regions and the member states with 
regard to tourism policy, I believe that it is important to reinforce the role of the 
European Union in the field." (Porte-Parole of the European Commission 1995 
IP/95/142)
97 After his session in the Commission, he had a successful return to domestic politics in Greece, and 
became member of the Greek Parliament and minister for first time in his career.
98 The "Inter-Group Tourism" created by the European Parliament in the 1980s as a discussion group 
when tourism started to become an area of policy interest through the proposals of the Commission. It 
consists of Members of the European Parliament who have an interest in tourism, and representatives 
of the tourist industry and other bodies participate in its regular meetings.
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He then opened the widest possible discussion and consultation procedure, asking all 
the players in the field —private and public, national and supranational— to take a 
position on whether such a policy was necessary at the Community level. This process 
was used in order to both shape the preferences o f the players in favor o f a 
Community-driven policy, and, at the same time, to  provide a way for the Commission 
to measure the policy cost o f this top-down innovative policy enterprise. It is for this 
reason that, in the same speech in Strasbourg, he emphasized that:
" the specific way in which reference should be made in the Treaty is an issue 
which should be examined after the completion of the consultations which will 
follow the adoption (by the Commission) of a Green Paper with the aim of 
recognizing tourism as a special policy of the Union" (Ibid.)
This process was initiated with the issuing o f the green paper on the role o f the Union
in the field o f tourism two months later, on 4 April, 1995. Papoutsis accepted publicly
that it was his personal achievement to have convinced the Commission to adopt, the
green paper for the future o f tourism in the Union within three months since his taking
office, and to have introduced the debate on the central floor o f  the Intergovernmental
Conference in Amsterdam. In his speech to the most important association o f  the
world tourism industry, the World Travel and Tourism Council, he stressed his
personal determination to promote tourism in the Community’s policy-making:
"I am really happy to have managed, not without difficulties, to have the Green 
Paper adopted by the Commission on 4th April. It is the first time that the 
Community is going to engage in a dialogue about the role and the possibilities 
of tourism for Europe...we want to examine further how everyone can have his 
proper place in this partnership and what the role of the Community will be in 
this process..." (Papoutsis 1995, Speech a t the M eeting o f  the WTTC, 20/04/95).
The green paper reviewed all the existing measures and policy instruments which were
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running at that moment at the Community level and gave four policy options for the 
future role o f the Union. These options were presented in the light o f an analysis made 
by the Commission on the potential value added to tourism. The options run through 
the whole spectrum o f alternatives. In this way they gave all the participants in the 
consultation procedure the chance to reveal their policy preference no matter what this 
meant. The first option involved a step back from the current situation o f  the 1993*5 
action plan. In this option, tourism would continue to benefit from measures in other 
fields as it had done before the adoption o f  the plan. In the second option, someone 
might advocate the retention o f  the current framework and level o f intervention as 
established by the 93-5 action plan. The third option envisaged strengthening current 
practices by providing, on the basis o f the existing Treaty (Article 3t), a comprehensive 
policy framework with clearly defined policy targets and the allocation o f  sufficient 
resources for their achievement. The fourth option posed the question o f the inclusion 
o f a specific title in the Treaty which would give the Community the right, under 
qualified majority to have a permanent policy on tourism complementary to those o f 
the member states."
At the presentation o f  the four policy options the Commission did not adopt a neutral 
position. Rather, it showed itself clearly favorable to third and fourth options, with 
more support for the fourth. It considered that option two was insufficient: " the plan 
itself was not sufficient to ensure that the full potential of tourism and related actions 
was harnessed to the benefit o f  the Union's measures" (COM(95)97 final: 21). It 9
99 For an extensive presentation of the four options see the third section of the Green Paper,
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identified, as a possible response to this insufficiency, the strengthening o f existing 
measures which had an impact on tourism and an increase in the funding allocated to 
them. In general, the Commission, as will be discussed below, characterized option 
two as an experimental type policy exercise limited in scope and duration, which was 
in need of upgrade ( COM(95)97 final: 21). It took the position that:
"However, higher profile Community action might also create a multiplier effect 
for the value-added of each of the policies, since it encourages coordination 
between the various types of policy (which affect tourism) and between the 
various levels of action (Community, national, regional, local)." (COM(95)97
final: 21)
Concerning the fourth option, the Commission posed the question o f  increased 
Community intervention to assist tourism to the parties involved in the consultation 
procedure, in a way that made it clear, that it was ready to support, by all means, 
policy developments in this direction:
" The Commission could also take any initiative it considered useful in 
promoting coordination (with a view to balancing the various diverse interests at 
play in the field of tourism)... filling in any gaps left by national policies 
- whenever they might be damaging to European tourism as a whole. It is also
possible to envisage a Community policy, complementary to the policies of the 
* member states, which could be drawn upon in defining the other Community
actions with potential impact on tourism." (Ibid.: 21)
According to the presentation made in the green paper, both options three and four
correspond to a coherent policy. This policy for tourism would be operated with more
difficulty in case that the revised Treaty did not include a separate title for tourism with
decision rule under qualified majority. In any case, no matter what the member states
would decide in Amsterdam, the Commission introduced the alternatives in the
consultation procedure in order to try to  create a focal point around the maximum
COM(95)97 final.
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scenario which involved a commitment to a comprehensive policy program of a higher 
profile than that which already existed. Its piecemeal strategy from then on was to help 
the other parties to arrive at this focal point. What Papoutsis stated a few months later, 
opening the forum on European tourism in Brussels, is characteristic:
"your reactions during the public dialogue on the Green Paper made clear that 
there are a number of fields in which Community action can offer an added 
value. There is a general agreement on three objectives: there is a need for 
coordination (existing policies which affect tourism in levels of govemance)...ln 
certain fields the Community can and must take supplementary, additional and 
coordinating action in relation to national policies....But we should bare in mind 
that, however successful, no action plan is a substitute for policy. And what 
tourism needs today is a policy. A political commitment, a political will, that we 
will define in common the framework of that policy on a European level."
(Christos Papoutsis (1995) European Commission, EN/CA/95/01510000.P01: .6)
The main instruments in the creation o f an institutionalized communication channel 
were a series o f  workshops, conferences, such as the meeting o f  the directors-general 
responsible for tourism in the member states o f the European Union100in Brussels on 3 
July, 1995, and the Forum on European Tourism in Brussels in December, 1995.101 
After the failure to have a new title for tourism established in the intergovernmental 
conference in Amsterdam, the Commission carried on and held the conference on 
employment and tourism in Luxembourg in November 1997. An institutional output o f 
this conference was the set up, o f the high level group on tourism and employment in 
1998. In all these forums the Commission invited the most eminent external experts to 
participate with the aim o f producing and discussing studies which attempted to
100 See the related report published by the Commission, Commission of the European Communities 
(1995b)
101 See the minutes of the forum in the European Commission/DGXXlII/Tourism Unit (1995).
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identify the failures o f national driven policies and to reveal the need for a EU-driven 
public policy on tourism, A campaign, based on the above-mentioned type o f activities, 
was carried out throughout the member states with the aim o f  sensibilising the capitals, 
the organized interests and the private sector.102
The Commission was ready to count the cost in order to modify its policy proposal in 
such a way as to finally achieve some form of European policy for tourism, even at the 
minimum level. Its concern was to at least maintain the communication channels 
among the players and to prepare the ground for future policy innovation in the field 
when the policy environment becomes more favorable such that the cost for carrying 
out the policy was reduced.
At the same time, in Strasbourg in February 1995, as mentioned, the commissioner for 
tourism also wanted to take advantage o f  the existing legal framework and to promote 
a Community policy for tourism. He announced a proposal which the Commission 
adopted in April 1996, for the replacement o f the 1993-5 Action Plan with 
"philoxenia", a comprehensive four year (1997-2000) program. The green paper along 
with the maximalist strategy for a specific title dedicated to tourism in the revised 
Maastricht Treaty and the ‘‘philoxenia” were decided simultaneously and the
102 An example is the participation of the Commission in the Borsa internationale del Tourism o, held 
in Milan 28/2*3/3/1996. Papoutsis introduced the opening session with the theme "Culture and 
Tourism: opportunities and perspectives" where he argued once again that " I’m fully aware of and I 
support calls for Community coordination and for a European policy on these matters. For the time 
being, the Community does not have a formal tourism policy. A reference in the Treaty on Tourism 
policy could spell out Community objectives in the fields of tourism and cultural tourism" (Related 
information memo, Porte-Parole of the Commission of the EU, Speech/96/52, 1/3/1996).
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Commission wanted to pursue both o f  them. The key to this policy innovation strategy 
was the level o f  hostility expressed by the member states, since the tourism industry 
and the other institutions o f the Union were in favor. In the case that the cost for the 
maximum target was prohibitive, due to high hostility, then elements o f  a 
comprehensive policy to assist tourism would survive within a multi-annual minimum 
policy program, since there would be less hostility towards such a low profile proposal. 
The action plan was characterized as being o f an experimental nature and limited 
scope,103 and the Commission argued that, now was the time for a comprehensive 
policy strategy.
In order to increase the objectivity o f  his proposal for the "philoxenia" multi-annual 
action plan, Papoutsis invited external experts to evaluate the previous Action Plan,104 
which had run for the years 1993-5, and to make the policy-making more efficient. In 
its COM(96) 166 final, the Commission sent a report to the Council and the Parliament 
in which it responded to the external consultant's report:
"This report has shown that the Plan has had both shortcomings and positive 
effects. It has served as a useful basis that has indicated the type of future actions 
which may assist this vital industry. The commission therefore is submitting with 
this report, a proposal for a first Multi-annual Program in favor of tourism." 
(COM(96)166 final: 12).
The proposal for the “philoxenia” multi-annual program was the outcome o f positive
103 See the content of the second option for the Union presented in the Green Paper: “it (the plan) 
represents an experimental platform for comparing ideas and experience, building common projects 
and developing common strategies. However, this action plan is limited in both duration and scope” 
IP/95/330, Brussels 04/04/1995.
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response to the suggestions made by the external experts.
Bearing in mind that the current trend in the Council was against new Community 
policies, the commissioner, in order to minimize hostility to his expansionist policy 
proposal, systematically presented in the "Green Paper" all the measures already taken 
by the Community which indirectly affected tourism. The aim was to show the Council 
that the decision which had to be taken was not whether the Community should get 
involved in policy actions affecting tourism, but what type o f actions it should pursue, 
since policy measures affecting tourism were, in place. In this way, Papoutsis was able 
to keep the negative reaction to, and therefore the cost of, such a policy proposal at 
the lowest possible level.
Commissioner Papoutsis considered that the initial constraints on a proposal for an EU 
tourism policy were flexible and could be relaxed in the course o f  his efforts for policy 
innovation at the Community level. For the maximum scenario o f his strategy -to 
pursue a title for tourism in the Amsterdam negotiations for the revision o f the EU- 
Treaty, he tried to take advantage o f  the different positions concerning his policy 
proposal between the ministries of foreign affairs, who expressed their opposition, and 
the favorable domestic tourism authorities and to build on an alliance with the latter. 
Through this strategy Papoutsis tried to push from within the domestic arena o f the 
nested bargaining game and to reshape the final policy preferences o f the member 
states on the intergovernmental bargaining table in favor o f  a Europe-wide policy on 104
104 See report on the evaluation of the Community action plan to assist tourism (1993-5) adopted by
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tourism. This is a typical case where the CEU was acting as a preference-shaper and 
not as a preference-accommodator. The outcome o f this strategy was not. as had been 
wished, to convince ail the negotiating parties, however, several member states did 
change their position in favor o f the proposed new European policy. At the beginning 
of the negotiations, all the ministries o f foreign affairs, with the exemption of Greece, 
were against the proposal o f the CEU. At the end, the majority was in favor, with the 
exception o f the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands.105 This outcome became a 
positive starting point for the next step in Papoutsis’s piecemeal approach to achieve 
elements of an EU-driven tourism policy within the framework of the existing legal 
legitimacy, through his proposal for the "philoxenia" multi-annual program.
Another strategic choice Papoutsis made was to try to introduce a European policy for 
tourism as a job-creating policy encompassed within the employment policies o f  the 
Union. In this way, such a policy proposal could go high on the policy priorities o f  the 
Union since unemployment was marked as top priority for the Intergovernmental 
Conference in Amsterdam, especially after the publication o f  the related White Paper 
o f the Commission.106
After his failure to achieve the maximum scenario with the introduction o f  tourism as a
the Commission on 30 April, 1996, COM(96) 166 final, Brussels 1996.
105 See Commission of the European Communities (1995b) and the Commission of the European 
Communities/ DGXXIII/A/3 (1995) documents which show the position of the member states at the 
beginning of the consultation process, and the European Pari iament/Intergovemm entai Conference 
Task Force (1996) for the final position of the member states on the possibility of having tourism as a 
title in the Treaty.
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specific title in the revised Treaty, the support of tourism as job-creating policy became 
Papoutsis’ main argument. Together with the monetary stability agreement, the 
Amsterdam Conference adopted a resolution that the member states should, as a 
priority, work together to tackle the problem o f growing unemployment. Based on the 
fact that the mandate taken by the Treaty o f Amsterdam for the Union's institutions 
and the member states was to fight unemployment in concerted way, Papoutsis 
organized in November 1997, shortly after the signature o f  the revised Treaty, a 
special conference with title "Employment and Tourism". This was two weeks before 
the Luxembourg summit scheduled by the Amsterdam conference to discuss 
unemployment. Addressing the conference, Papoutsis stated:
"Personally, I believe that tourism is the ideal sector for the implementation of 
integrated strategies for job creation...We decided to organize this Conference at 
a critical moment. Right now, employment is the subject of a more general 
discussion and reflection in the European Union" (Speech, 4/11/97: 3).
From this point, the minimum scenario, that is, at least a coherent multi-annual 
program to assist tourism (in other words the “philoxenia” proposal) was introduced 
principally as a job creation program. In the same speech Papoutsis argued:
"In 1996 we proposed philoxenia...its aims are the quality and the 
competitiveness of European Industry. Objectives which aim, amongst other 
things, at boosting employment and creating new jobs. ...Unfortunately at 
Council level there have been serious delays." (Ibid.)
On 26 November, 1997, the Council, under the presidency o f  Luxembourg, foiled to 
adopt the program, since the decision rule was "unanimity" and Germany and the UK 106
106 Commission of the EC (1993), Growth Competitiveness, Employment, the Challenges and Ways
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were unable to support the presidency's compromise.107 However, in this Council. 
Papoutsis managed to gain a resolution in which the member states unanimously 
identified the tourism sector as a major sector in which both the states and the Union 
should promote programs to create new jobs:
"The Council, aware of the significant part European tourism might play in 
. combating unemployment, recognized the need to exploit the industry’s job 
creation potential through a variety of programs and Community policies, 
particularly by improved coordination and cooperation and optimum use of the 
means availaf le...." (Bulletin EU 11-1997, point 1.3.96).
The Council did not agree upon a specific program, which was the maximum scenario, 
but accepted the minimum version that, on principle, tourism is an important job 
creating sector which deserves more attention and a systematic examination o f its labor 
potential by the Union. The Council asked the Commission to work further on the 
findings and the policy direction given by the Conference on Tourism and 
Employment:
"The Council called on the Commission,-in cooperation with the member states, 
to investigate more closely the findings of the conference on employment and 
tourism...and to inform it on the progress made."(Ibid.)
k :■ ;t*V
The least-common-denominator o f the positions o f  the member states was that tourism 
was a priority sector o f common interest and that the Commission should be given a 
clear mandate to keep searching for better policies to assist this sector. The success for 
Papoutsis was that he managed to insert the tourism policy agenda in the high profile 
and, after the mandate of the Amsterdam Summit, priority agenda o f  policies for
Forward into the 21st Century, Brussels COM(93)700 final.
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fighting unemployment throughout the Union. The gain was that, from then on, the 
terms o f  reference for any policy proposal o f the Commission to assist tourism could 
include the Council’s resolution that tourism is a job creating sector, and therefore the 
Council could never go back to argue that tourism was not a priority area o f European 
policy concern. This result is a typical example o f Papoutsis' piecemeal strategy in the 
search for policy innovation in the field.
Despite policy results that were consistently less satisfactory than expected, Papoutsis 
did not stop his efforts to achieve policy innovations in the field of tourism. On the 
contrary, he further promoted the image o f tourism as a job creation sector, since he 
knew that unemployment would be the top priority issue for the Union's policy-making 
in the coming years. At the beginning o f 1998, Papoutsis introduced another policy 
instrument, the High Level Group on Tourism and Employment,108 in order to 
strengthen the common identity o f the major players in the policy arena and to further 
shape and push the policy preference o f  the member states towards tourism as an area 
for in, which to introduce major projects to fight unemployment. The task o f  the group 
was to examine and identify opportunities and the policy environment for the tourism 
sector to step up its contribution to employment. The group was composed o f the 
most prominent and influential members operating in the various sectors o f the 
industry, members o f public authorities, and academic scholars. Papoutsis wanted to 
use the influence o f  these parties on their respective governments in order to raise the 107
107 See Council-Tourism press release, Nr. 12664/97revl (presse358), 26/11/97.
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later’s awareness o f tourism affairs. He had hopes that these voices could raise the 
prestige, and the bargaining leverage, o f tourism as a policy area with a strong 
European dimension.
Dr. Corsten. the chairman o f the group, being himself an industrialist (TUI tour 
operators), stressed clearly that the aim o f the group wras to further sensibilize the 
member states and to convince them to finally adopt common measures to assist 
tourism:
"The Group is firmly convinced that:
• the contribution of tourism to growth and employment requires greater 
political recognition at all levels, and that this should lead to positive action 
which will reinforce the potential of the tourism industry to bring further and 
sustainable growth
• the greater integration of tourism preoccupations and priorities into the 
development and implementation of Community programs and policies 
presents a unique opportunity for the Community to contribute to greater 
competitiveness of the European industry...
The early publication and dissemination of the Group's conclusions and 
recommendations would be helpful, and we look forward with interest to the 
reactions of the Community institutions, the member states, the industry and 
other organizations concerned, in the context of establishing a consensus on the 
follow up needed to ensure that the recommendations will be put into practice" 
(Report, of the high level group, October 1998: 6)
Responding to the report, Papoutsis stated:
"The conclusions and recommendations of the High Level Group will be a 108
108 See the report produced and sent by the High Level Group on Tourism and Employment to the 
Commission with the title: “The Economic Impact of Tourism and its Potential for Further Growth”,
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valuable instrument for our future work. The European Commission will
examine the extent to which these recommendations can be implemented.... I am
grateful to the President of the Group, Dr. Corsten, and to all its members, for 
the important contribution they have made to the identifications of the main 
challenges to be faced by the European tourism industry to improve its 
competitiveness.„.The direct commitment to this process by leading decision 
makers from all the member states encourages us to continue to work together 
towards a wider political recognition of the contribution of tourism to growth and 
employment, and towards the development of a policy which reflects the 
importance of  the industry" (ibid.: 3)
This report came out in October 1998, little more than one month before the Council 
o f December 1998, under the Austrian presidency. The Austrian presidency was in 
favor o f "philoxenia" and had the issue on the discussion agenda. This was in contrast 
to the UK, its predecessor in the presidency, which was not favorable to the program. 
Therefore, the Austrian presidency was the first opportunity, after the unsuccessful 
effort o f the presidency o f the Luxembourg in the summit o f  November 1997, for the 
Commission to push for a Council decision for "philoxenia". It was this timing that led 
the Commission to throw on the table the report o f  the high council, in order to create 
a policy momentum for tourism. However, once again the Council failed to overcome 
the disagreements o f Germany and the UK and, under the unanimity decision rule the 
program was not adopted.109
Papoutsis continued his preference shaping strategy by playing the card that tourism
Brussels: October 1998.
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was an ideal sector for operating concerted European and state driven job-creation 
projects. He worked in this way to step-up the impetus derived from the European 
Conference on Tourism and Employment held in Luxembourg in 1997, and the report 
o f the High Level Group on Tourism published in 1998. He again spread their 
recommendations and conclusions by means o f an extensive program o f  discussions 
throughout the Union, as he had done with the green paper on the role of the EU in 
tourism. In 28 April, 1999 he concluded this process, by sending a communication 
entitled "Enhancing Tourism’s Potential for Employment; Follow-up to the conclusions 
and recommendations o f the High Level Group on Tourism and Employment" to the 
Council, the European Parliament, and for its information to the Economic and Social 
Committee and to the Committee o f  the Regions.109 10 With this communication, the 
commissioner for tourism concluding his five years in charge o f the portfolio o f 
tourism affairs intended to leave a shopping list o f  policy objectives for the next 
administration. Centrai to this was the assertion that helping tourism, could lead to, "an 
additional 2.2 to 3.3 million extra jobs being created by the end o f  next decade". This 
communication also identified the policy priorities for the next Commission:
"The Commission identifies the main elements which could reinforce tourism's 
contribution to the European employment strategy, particularly the pooling and 
dissemination of qualitative and quantitative information, including best 
practice, the creation of user friendly information tools on European Union 
programs and initiatives on tourism, and the creation of a structure for 
consultation and cooperation with public authorities, the tourism sector and the 
other parties concerned." (Bulletin of the EU 4-99, point 1.3.85)
109 See press release of the Council-Internal Market: "While most delegations supported the 
programme, a number of member states still voiced strong objections referring to the principle of 
subsidiarity (UK) and ongoing discussions on the EUs financial perspectives (Germany)", Press 
Release: Brussels (07-12-1998)-Nr. 13680/98 (Presse 434).
1,0 COM(99)205 final.
The shopping list repeated the policy directions of the "unfortunate philoxenia" 
program. It was a list o f  policy proposals which aimed to create a Union-wide 
institutional framework for the policy domain of tourism affairs. It did not propose 
budgetary instruments such as subsides schemes. Rather, the idea was to create a 
permanent communication channel through which the players involved could exchange 
information and policy experience which in turn might lead to institutionalized policy 
learning. The Commission wanted to keep the role o f  broker and o f mediator-catalyst 
in the process, in order to help actors in the field to pick successful programs as policy 
solutions. It stated clearly that:
'There is a general recognition also that this common goal (to enhance 
competitiveness of European tourism) could be better reached by improving the 
exchange of information and by development of greater synergies amongst the 
wide range of national and Community initiatives which are being taken in 
relation to tourism...this process could be helped by a coherent Community 
framework for consultation and cooperation in tourism allowing for the 
identification and dissemination of information of best-practice." (COM(99)
205:10)
The Commission proposed to the future Commission to proceed to the 
instutionalisation o f  the ad hoc operating, consultation and cooperation structure on a 
regular basis:
" The future Commission may wish to consider the opportunity to review the 
existing arrangements for ad hoc consultation involving some 40 different 
European organizations and create a single new European Tourism Advisory 
Board. The board, which could advise the Commission on developments in 
European tourism, could be representatives of major stakeholders and could 
include decision-takers of stature in the private and the public sectors." 
(COM(99)205finaI: 7)
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In this way Papoutsis tried to safeguard the continuity in the Commission's innovative 
policy in the field o f tourism, and sent his personal policy conclusion for his years in 
office as a clear political message:
"The European Commission's reaction to the report of the High Level Group is a 
positive message to the tourism industry and it recognizes that it has a key role in 
the creation of extra jobs. The Commission is working towards creating a 
favorable framework which will enable the industry to flourish even further. It 
remains now for the Council to play its part in the political recognition of 
tourism and to agree on a renewed strategy framework for improving the quality 
and competitiveness of European tourism.” (Press Release IP/99/267, 
28/04/99:1).
The foregoing failure o f the Commission to convince the Council to adopt a coherent 
policy framework for tourism demonstrates, once again, the interactive nature o f  EU 
policy-making. In this environment, the fact that a player, in our case Commissioner 
Papoutsis acted as a preference shaper does not safeguards the success o f  the effort. It 
is dear that Papoutsis played a pro-active role, using various methods to promote 
policy innovation in tourism. He tried to shape the policy environment and to lead it to 
accept his policy proposals. He also tried to mobilize policy resources such as 
industrial interests and experts and to create a strong European policy identity for 
tourism. The result o f  his strategy might not have led to a new European policy for 
tourism, however, it did have a strong institutional impact. In almost five years o f 
intensive effort, he managed to create a European policy community for tourism, 
which identified itself as such and had its own regular meetings and a common policy 
agenda. It is clear that the European tourism community, which was formed top-down, 
now has a sound foundation and clear policy objectives to pursue in EU policy-
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making. What the Santer Commission expressed to its successor Prodi Commission, in 
its concluding remarks to its last communication for tourism to the Council and the 
Parliament, is characteristic:
"The foregoing analysis underlines the appropriateness of the conclusions of the 
High Level Group in relations to the conditions for maximizing the contribution
of tourism to growth and employment_»(underlines) the need for an improved
framework at Community level bringing greater effectiveness to Community 
actions in the field of tourism. It will be for the future Commission to consider 
the opportunity to examine progress made towards the implementation of the 
High Level Group's conclusions and recommendations" (COM(99)205 final: 18).
The Position o f the Member States on the Proposals Made and the Strategy 
Followed by the Commission to Introduce Tourism Policy Measures at the EU  
Level
In order to better understand the configuration o f  policy preference o f  the member 
states, these can be divided into two analytical categories according to the criterion o f 
whether, proportionately, they receive or send tourists. The countries which mainly 
host tourism, which the Commission, in the green paper for the role o f the Union on 
tourism, called destination countries, are basically Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland. The countries which send tourists abroad, which the Commission calls source 
countries, are basically Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France and Denmark. 
However, this is not a clear division, since all the member states are to some extent 
both, source and destination countries. Therefore, for analytical reasons, we keep the 
same division as that followed by the Commission, which refers to the dominance o f  
the one or the other characteristic in each country. A country currently characterized 
as a source country, may, in the near future, change to a destination, since the main
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characteristic o f  the nineties was that traveling became a global operation, and more 
and more people traveled abroad. Within the Community, this trend is expected to be 
particularly intense, due to the abolition o f border barriers, the introduction o f  the 
Euro and the reduction o f the cost o f traveling as a result o f the liberalization o f  the 
travel markets. Therefore, the underlying policy factors which influence the policy­
making o f a source country may also be complemented by those o f  a destination 
country, as soon as this country begins receiving a growing number o f  tourists and 
developing a host industry to provide services to its visitors. In this case, it is possible 
that the current least-common-denominator for the role o f  the Union on tourism will 
move towards the maximum scenario for a coherent Community policy on tourism.
With the above points in mind, let us examine in more detail the status quo in the 
position o f the member states at the moment when Papoutsis initiated his policy 
innovation strategy with the introduction o f  the green paper on the role o f  the Union 
on tourism. Looking at the results o f  the consultation process run for the green paper 
we observe that, source countries care more for consumer protection policy measures 
and appear to prefer the minimum scenario proposed by the Commission. 111 
Destination countries care primarily about the competitiveness o f  the tourism industry 
and appear to be favorable to the maximum scenario proposed by the Commission for 
a comprehensive Community policy on Tourism based on measures to promote 
investment in infrastructure and to create a business environment which safeguards a 
sustainable development for European tourism  From the beginning o f the consultation
1,1 See the Commission of the European Communities (1995a)
over the green paper» the position o f most of the source countries leant towards a 
more active role for the Union on the field of tourism, though it was not far from the 
minimum scenario for policy innovation. More specifically, they recognized the need 
for better coordination o f the various indirect measures undertaken by the Community 
which have an impact on tourism, such as consumer and environmental regulations and 
border control.
Following the proposed analytical framework, we obtain a better understanding o f  the 
position o f the member states by examining the configuration o f industry’s interests at 
the micro-level o f  analysis and inside the national arenas. Interests in tourism policy­
making from the source countries mainly belong to the demand side o f the tourism 
market and interests from the destination countries to the supply side. The demand 
side, consisted o f  consumers, was interested in more Union regulation and protection 
o f the quality o f  tourism services, whereas the supply side, consisted o f tourism 
industry, wanted a more active role o f  the Union in overcoming the shortcomings and 
failures o f national policies to support their industry. Therefore, destination countries 
appeared to favor a more interventionist role for the Union in tourism affairs and 
source countries were only keen in regulations for the protection o f the consumers and 
the environment. Moreover, the source countries did not have a common position for 
the degree o f regulation, since governments had to balance at the Community level the 
demand o f their consumer interests for maximum regulation and the demand of tour- 
operators for minimum regulation on tourism industry. The fear o f over-regulation on 
the matters o f consumer, environment and heritage protection and therefore, the 
possibility of an increase in the cost o f  tourism packages, sensibilized the big tour
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operators, a key factor o f the tourism industry, based in source countries to start 
pushing their governments for concerted action for minimum regulation at the 
Community level. According to the positions o f  national tourism interests outlined 
here, there was not a common policy agenda promoted for support by all the member 
states. The interests across the Community recognized the role o f the Union on 
tourism, but they did not share a common position on the scope o f this role. The 
source countries did not appear to have a particular interest in promoting the maximum 
scenario for a Union policy on tourism, while this was the strong preference o f 
destination countries. As we will see below, examining the position o f  the tourism 
industries across the Union in more detail, there was no a capable organization o f 
interests o f the destination countries. This was because their fragmented nature as 
SMEs made it difficult to lobby and promote effectively a tourism related common 
policy agenda at the Community level. The result was that the maximum scenario 
proposed by the Commission had no strong supporters at the national level o f source 
countries.
It is also important to consider the strong, ideologically based position o f  the 
governments in many o f  the source countries, such as the UK, France and Germany in 
the mid 90s, that the Union did not need new policies, but rather should deepen those 
in existence. This view, combined with the low political leverage o f  the tourism 
industry in these countries, can lead us to conclude that the status quo with respect to 
the underlying policy factors was very negative with regards the maximum scenario 
becoming dominant in these capitals.
207
It is not only the source countries that were against the maximum scenario; some of 
the destination countries, such as Spain, also showed little enthusiasm at the beginning 
of the process for including a new clause for the European tourism industry in the 
revision of the Treaty o f the European Union. Other source countries such as France. 
Denmark, and the Netherlands changed their position and moved towards the 
maximum scenario. Therefore, the configuration o f  the position o f the member states 
was more complex than it might have at first appeared according to the underlying 
tourism industry and consumer interests.
According to the analytical framework o f bureaucratic politics, another perspective, 
that helps us to throw light on the role o f the states in EU policy-making, is to examine 
at the micro-level the positions o f  the various government departments involved to 
tourism matters. The member states did not act as unitary actors in the EU policy­
making, but rather there were several players from different public authorities within 
the domestic arena. Each o f  these was involved in consultation in order to form the 
position of the member states in their negotiations with the other member states in the 
Union's fora.
The ministries o f European Union affairs or the foreign ministries o f the member states 
were basically against any delegation o f  elements o f  tourism policies from the domestic 
to the Community level. Their negotiating position within the framework o f the 
Amsterdam intergovernmental conference, which had the mandate from the Maastricht 
Treaty (Article 3t) to reconsider tourism together with civil protection and energy as 
possible new areas for concerted policy actions by the Union, was, under the principles
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of subsidiarity and proportionality, to push for the deepening and not the widening o f  
the existing EU-driven policies. Hence, the foreign ministers o f the member states as 
chief negotiators at the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference did not have tourism 
policy at the EU level on their agenda, since such a policy contributed towards the 
widening of the Community's policy competence.112
The tourism ministries and the other public authorities relevant to tourism were more 
sensitive to tourism matters because they had to tackle the serious problems o f  their 
"client”, the European tourism industry. This industry had, from the beginning o f the 
90s, been demonstrating a continuous decline in market share in comparison with the 
tourist destinations outside Europe. Under these conditions, national tourism 
authorities were more inclined to improve mutual cooperation and take action at the 
EU level in order to reverse this trend.
The fact that the ministries o f  EU foreign affairs were the main top-negotiators in the 
intergovernmental conference for the review o f the Maastricht Treaty gave them a 
distinct advantage over the other public authorities o f  the member states. Additionally,
112 The Corfu European Council o f24-25/06/94 agreed to the setting up of a "reflection group" to 
prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, to consist of representatives of the Foreign 
Ministries of the Member states and the president of the CEU. It has the tasks of examining the 
provisions of the Treaty on the EU, which needed to be revised, and proposing possible changes. From 
this position the Ministries of Foreign Affairs could act as dominant players in relation to other 
domestic state bodies and institutions in the consultation process for the revision of the Treaty of the 
EU, since they had the responsibility to collect and search for the syntheses of the domestic policy 
preferences. This position of the foreign ministries in the preparation of the negotiating documents of 
the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference was later enforced still further, when the Madrid 
European Council decided on 15-16/12 /95 that the report produced by the Reflection Group on the 
revision of the Treaty should be the base for discuss in regular meetings of the foreign ministers, to be 
held, in principle, once a month.
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the leverage o f government departments concerned with tourism is much less than that 
of foreign affairs departments in influencing the domestic agenda of policy priorities o f 
the member states. Therefore, in the intergovernmental conference o f Amsterdam, the 
hostile position o f most o f EU foreign affairs ministries to any further expansion o f  the 
EU in new policy domains, combined with their interpretation o f the principle o f 
subsidiarity as meaning less Europeanization of public policies, increased the cost o f 
policy innovation at the EU level. The outcome was that tourism—despite the efforts of 
the Commission and some o f the member states, such as Greece and Itaiy-was not 
discussed at all as a possible new title in the revised Treaty.
After this unsuccessful effort o f the Commission to introduce a specific title on 
tourism, Papoutsis, as mentioned above, concentrated his piecemeal innovative 
strategy on having "philoxenia" adopted as a complete multi-annual action plan with 
specific policy guidelines and resources dedicated to promote tourism at the EU level. 
This program was issued in June 1996, and was extensively discussed under the Italian, 
the Irish and the Luxembourg presidencies. All three of these member states had been 
in favor o f the maximum scenario in the discussions over the green paper. In accord 
with the Commission, they included the program on their presidential agenda and 
pushed to have it adopted. As we will see below, Papoutsis attempted to employ a low 
profile strategy to convince the member states that their task was not to decide on a 
new policy, but to continue and improve the existing policies introduced under the 
action plan o f 1993-95 to assist tourism. In these sequential discussions the UK and 
Germany refused to support the various compromises proposed by the presidencies. 
The reservations expressed by these two delegations were based on the argument that,
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according to the principie o f  subsidiarity, all the proposed measures could and should
be dealt at the national and the sub-national level.113
The German delegation was blocked by the opinion o f the Laenders. which believed 
that tourism matters lay mainly in their domain and that what was needed was more 
power allocated to them at the sub-state level rather than the delegation of power to 
the supra-national. According to the opinion o f a member o f staff in charge o f 
Papoutsis" cabinet expressed in an interview in May 1999,114 the position o f the 
German Laenders was based on a clear misunderstanding which resulted from wrong 
information concerning the program. All the other member states agreed to adopt 
"philo xenia", which itself indicated that the Commission had made progress.
One year later, the discussion on the program was revived under the presidency o f 
Austria, which was not in favor o f  the maximum scenario to introduce a tourism title in 
the Treaty, but which was ready to accept measures to support tourism such as 
operational solutions proposed by the "philoxenia" program. This time, Germany's 
tourism department changed its position and agreed to drop its reservation that the 
program was not in accord with the principle o f  subsidiarity. However, the ministry o f 
finance blocked the program by expressing reservations on the budget. Initially a 
budget o f 18 Million ECU for four years was proposed, more or less the same amount 
allocated in the 1993-95 action plan. In order to achieve a compromise, the Austrian
113 See the press release of the Council Tourism, Nr 12664/97 (Presse 358), Brussels, 26/11/97
114 Interview with L.ltzipeoglou, May 1999
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presidency proposed for the same time span a budget o f  8 Million ECU. Germany, 
however, did not withdraw its reservations, and connected this possibility o f  funding 
with future positive developments in the financial prospects o f the Union.115 It was at 
this time that the new Schreder administration raised the issue o f the reform o f  the 
total budget o f the Union, claiming that Germany was paying too much. It was 
therefore one o f  the top-priorities o f  Germany’s general agenda that prevented the 
adoption o f "philoxenia" on this occasioa
Apart from the UK and Germany, the usual suspects, Sweden also took a stance 
against the adoption o f "phi]oxenia" for the first time. The reason for the Commission 
losing a favorable voter was the change o f government in Sweden. The newly elected 
government coalition flew the flag o f  "less European integration", and therefore, like 
the UK, with its traditional Eurosceptisism, Sweden moved into the camp o f those 
who opposed any new policy proposal for more Union competence in policy issues.
The above analysis o f the position o f the member states throughout the efforts made by 
Papoutsis to promote innovations in tourism policy at the European level, reveals the 
level o f  complexity underlying the positions o f  the member states. The position 
adopted was the equilibrium point o f  the policy preference o f  a number o f actors 
operating within the state arena. It has been shown that the position was not static 
throughout the process but underwent change. It was his belief that the initial 
constraints were flexible and may be relaxed which led Papoutsis to try his piecemeal
us See the press release of the Council-Internal Market, Nr. 13680/98 (Presse 434), Brussels I f  12/98
policy strategy, despite the very negative starting point. This structure o f  policy­
making is, in keeping with the predictions o f the proposed theoretical framework, a 
two-level nested game. In this structure, the issue at stake was of low salience at the 
domestic arena, with the states initially being polarized at the Community level, while 
the Commission showed high interest in intervening and in influencing the output o f 
the game both by trying to reshape the preference o f  the negotiators and by making 
strategic use o f  the timing o f the launch o f  the innovative proposals.
The Position o f  its Policy Clients (Tourism Industry etc,) and the Strategy Followed 
by the European Commission: The Commission Creates a Common Policy Identity 
fo r  the Unions * Tourism Interests
In order to understand the dynamics o f  EU tourism policy-making it is important to 
examine the role o f various societal interests, and not only those within the state- 
arena but also those who by-pass the state and interact directly with the institutions 
o f the Community. According to the proposed analytical framework these actors 
constitute the potential policy clients o f  the Commission and the other Community 
institutions in carrying out tourism policy.
As demonstrated elsewhere, there were a number o f policy measures which directly 
or indirectly influenced tourism. With the green paper the Commission tried to 
systematize its policy clients around three poles o f  policy action run at the 
Community level:116
•  Policy measures to promote and ensure tourist satisfaction.
• Policy measures to protect, reveal and renew the cultural and natural heritage o f
116 See COM(95)97 final: 18
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the various regions o f  the Community.
• Policy measures to promote a sustainable enterprise growth o f the various 
tourism services.
Behind the pole of enterprise growth there were mostly private interests from the 
side of the tourism industry. The representation o f these interests, as we will discuss 
in greater detail later in this section, is organized either directly through, the 
lobbying activities of individual firms, or through the collective action of tourism 
industry associations at all levels o f  governance. Behind the objectives o f tourist and 
heritage protection there is the public interest expressed through the collective 
action o f relatively large consumer and environmental organizations and public 
authorities.117 The growth interests o f industry are not, o f  course, always in accord 
with consumer and environmental protection. On the contrary, consumers call for 
more regulation to safeguard the quality of services and their satisfaction as tourists, 
whereas tourism service providers are afraid o f over-regulation and consequent 
increases in costs to their business with a major impact on their competitiveness in 
comparison to other tourism destinations.
Based on the above analysis, we can arrive to the conclusion that the policy clients 
o f both the member states and the Community on tourism matters, often appear to 
have divergent, if not conflictual policy preferences. At the state level, member 
states respond to the policy demands o f the two opposed groups according to 
whether there are principally net tourism receivers or senders. As already discussed, 
a receiver country is more sensitive to accommodate the preferences o f the tourism 
industry than to accommodate the preferences o f consumer and environmental 
groups, whereas a sender country prioritizes the other way round. However, as 
shown, it is not difficult for the classification o f  a country as sender or receiver to 
change according to the changing capacity o f its citizens for travel. In this case, the 
satisfaction o f the policy preferences o f consumers and environmentalists may be
117 For a detailed presentation of the organizations operating at the member state and Community 
levels see annex 3 of the green paper on tourism, COM(95)97 final.
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more seriously taken into account by the governments o f "host" countries since they 
become also senders. This trend may lead to a convergence o f the policy mix which 
is followed by the member states and the Union concerning tourism. However, in 
the green paper the Commission recognizes that:
" After studies conducted in each of the member states...con dieting priorities 
frequently exist within each tourist area, so that the Community could serve as a 
point of reference for the reconciliation of such opposing viewpoints." 
(COM(95)97 final: 18)
As in the case o f  maritime industries, tourism industries did not have a policy 
agenda and nor had they ever considered such a possibility. It was the Commission 
that tried to identify overlapping o f  interest and to highlight the need to reconciliate 
interests that were initially opposed. Since tourism is a cross-border activity, this 
reconciliation could be achieved more efficiently at the Community level. The 
Commission, following a top-down strategy, tried to shape rather than 
accommodate the preferences o f  the policy clients involved in order to move from 
zero-sum policy outputs to "Pareto optimal solutions", in which everybody would 
be better off. It kept for itself the role o f policy coordinator and broker o f the best 
policy practices.
It is well known from the work o f Mancur Olson on "The Logic o f  Collective 
Action”, that public interests, such as consumer, environmental and natural heritage 
interests, are, since they represent large groups o f  citizens, less efficient in pursuing 
collectively public policies for their own interest than the private interests opposing 
them, which are represented by small and affluent groups. However, in the case o f 
tourism affairs, neither o f these groups was efficient in pursuing policies at the 
Community level.
It was the World Tourism and Travel Council (WTTC), representing the biggest 
tourism businesses operating worldwide and not only at the Union level, which, at 
the beginning o f  the 90s, first realized that the tourist industry was affected, within
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the framework of national legislation, by environment, transport, consumer, and 
other laws. This, they considered, made it essential for the industry to have a say in 
the drafting o f  these laws. The big tour operators started favoring a regulatory 
regime o f minimum involvement for tourism. However, at that point they had not 
lobbied state or EU authorities to push in this direction. The inertia o f  the tourism 
industry can be attributed to the fact that, thus far, tourism had still remained a 
relatively unregulated business worldwide.
Private tourism companies, contrary to other industries such as car production or 
information technology, do not have lobby offices in Brussels. According to 
information obtained from the member11* o f Papoutsis' cabinet in charge o f  the 
tourism portfolio, the industry is not engaged in consistent lobbying activities and 
does not have the prestige o f  other industries within the EU institutions. It 
demonstrates a more re-active than pro-active behavior. Most o f the representatives 
of the European associations are already retired or close to retirement, and their 
posts are mostly honorary, in recognition of their career achievements, rather than 
their potential to work on a specific plan to promote the interest o f the tourism 
industry in Brussels.
The Commission invited all the above associations to participate in ad hoc 
consultation procedures throughout the various stages o f  its effort to establish a 
specific title for tourism in the Treaty o f Amsterdam, and later to have "the 
philoxenia" multi-annual program adopted. However, as I was told by the same 
member o f Papoutsis' cabinet, the cabinet and the Commission's unit for tourism try 
to establish direct communication with prominent leading individuals in the field. As 
we will discuss below, the Commission, in its final policy proposal for the 
replacement o f  the ad hoc consultation procedures with one regular consultation, 
proposed that individual decision-takers o f stature in the private and the public
1,18 Interview with L.ltzipeoglou member of Papoutsis' cabinet on charge of tourism matters, Brussels 
Feb 1997
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sector should also participate in the process together with the various tourism 
associations or organizations.119 In this way the cabinet tried to establish a direct 
link with the most influential and active figures o f  the field. They want to consult 
them on a formal base, but also be able to communicate with them whenever they 
needed to obtain an opinion or information prior to an official announcement or 
formal action.
At the same time, industry prefers to have the Commission’s unit for tourism as its 
privileged interlocutor who has to  represent its interests to the rest o f the 
Commission’s departments whenever required. As we will discuss in more detail in 
the section for the role o f the unit for tourism, the role o f  privileged interlocutor is 
also the preference o f the unit, but so far neither the unit nor the industry have 
demonstrated that this to be the case. So far industry has tended to bypasses the 
unit and talk directly to the relative departments whenever it has had to discuss with 
the Commission on issues such as infrastructure investments through the Structural 
Fund, environment regulations, implementation o f new technologies such as 
information etc. The tourism unit has to earn the role o f privileged interlocutor, and 
until it does, the industry is likely to remain unenthusiastic about using this channel 
to pursue its policy requests at the Community level. What the majority o f industry 
representatives suggest in the consultation process for the green paper on the role 
o f the Union on tourism is characteristic:
"There is a need for increased resources, both financial and human resources at 
DGXXIII. Take on a more prominent role so as to facilitate better, to work better 
in partnership with the private sector so you may intervene firmly across the full 
spectrum of the activities of the European Union" (Commission of the European 
Communities/DGXXIII/Tourism Unit 1995: 10)
Overall, it could be argued that the tourism industry’s interests have been 
underrepresented in EU policy-making up to now. The fragmented structure o f  the 
industry, due to the fact that most o f  the companies are SMEs, makes the cost o f
1,9 See COM(99) 205:7.
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collective action for this part o f industry very high. The high profit margin, together 
with a relative unregulated business environment, which big tourism companies 
obtain operating in the global, and not only at the European and state-wide market, 
encourages them to show little or no interest in acting collectively at the 
supranational level. The CEU recognizes the above weakness of tourism industry to 
act as a collective actor with a clear identity and sees this as the major reason for 
the failure o f the industry to successfully pursue an increased role in EU policy­
making:
"This (Communication) will contribute also to facilitate the establishment of a 
clear sectoral identity in the industry, which has been lacking in the past due to 
the fragmented nature of its components, explaining in some way why in 
political terms tourism has been neglected as an employment creator." (COM 
(99)205 final: 4).
Papoutsis, by ordering studies from external experts and by organizing forums, 
seminars and events first tried to give the European tourism industry and his other 
potential policy clients —consumer, natural and cultural heritage organizations— the 
opportunity to set up a common policy agenda, to identify common problems and to 
search for common solutions. He introduced the "green" policy idea of sustainable 
growth in tourism as a solution which reconciled green and enterprise and employment 
interests, which were often conflictual. In 1995, he launched, as a regular event o f 
symbolic content, the "European Tourism and Environment Prize" in order to show 
"how important it is for the tourism sector to take account o f  the environment":
"Tourists flock to Europe from all over the world to enjoy the natural 
environment and discover the cultural diversity and heritage of our continent, 
our countries and our regions." (European Commission, Europe goes green with 
the fir s t European Tourism and Environment Prize, IP/95/1267, Brussels, 
21/11/95:1)
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At the same time, as above-mentioned, the Commission tried to create a focal point 
for its role as coordinator, reconciliator and broker amongst the various positions o f 
all the parties involved to tourism. It tried to achieve this through the introduction 
of the green paper. Prior the organization o f this consultation process, these parties 
had never expressed, in an open and consistent way, their opinions on the role of 
the Union in the field of tourism. At the forum in Brussels in December 1995, which 
was the concluding event o f  this discussion over the green paper, the Commission 
stressed, in its presentation o f the results o f the forum, that despite disagreement 
over several issues, the vast majority o f  the participants agreed upon the desired 
role o f the Union:
"The desired role of the Union is that of assisting the development of tourism, in 
other words, providing information and incentives, experimentation and 
evaluation and functioning as an active interface capable of contributing to 
preventing and solving problematic situations, eliciting appropriate responses of 
common interest, assessing their impact and providing their dissemination." 
(Commission of the European Communities/ DGXXIII/ Tourism Unit 1995:2)
In this way, the Commission tried to gain legitimacy to embark upon Union-driven 
policies to assist tourism, since this was a policy request o f  the majority o f the players 
involved. As explained above, Papoutsis identifying, the failure o f tourism interests to 
meet, discuss and organize around a common policy agenda with a Community 
dimension, tried to fill the organization gap and provide these interests by means o f  the 
communication and initial policy issues platform. In giving a strong Community 
identity to tourism community through an agenda o f  common problems and possible 
Union-driven solutions, the aim of the Commission was to raise tourism's prestige and 
policy leverage in the various decision-making centers at both the Community and 
state levels. In turn, an awaken industry could sensibilize the capitals to the idea that 
tourism matters have a Community dimension. Then, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, member states could enable the Union and therefore the Commission, to
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act with policy instruments where these are needed, and the states themselves cannot 
act.
Through the continuous and extensive consultation procedures which Papoutsis 
organized throughout his administration, first around the green paper and then the 
consideration o f tourism mainly as a job-creation sector, he managed to increase 
awareness o f  a common identity amongst the players involved in the field o f Unions' 
tourism affairs. Within this string o f  actions, in early 1998 he took the initiative to 
consult the member states and to establish the High Level Group on Tourism and 
Employment,120 which was made up o f the most eminent representatives o f all the 
operating parties and policy makers in the sector. The aim o f the group was to examine 
and propose to the Commission ways o f promoting the competitiveness of the sector 
at the Community level. In its influential report to the Commission, the High Level 
Group on Tourism and Employment declared its support for an upgraded role for the 
Union in the field. The most important figures in the tourism industry and tourism 
policy-making appeared committed to the task o f promoting Union-driven tourism- 
related policies to boost growth and employment in this sector:
"The direct commitment to this process by leading decision-makers in tourism 
from all the member states encourages us (the Commission) to continue to work 
together towards a wider political recognition of the contribution of tourism to 
growth and employment, and towards the development of a policy which reflects 
the importance of the industry." (The High Level Group on Tourism and 
Employment 1998:3).
130 For the composition of the Group see the preamble of the report published by the group on the 
economic impact of tourism and its potential for further growth (The High Level Group on Tourism 
and Employment 1998:7), and also in the COM (99)205 final: 5.
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Awareness o f a European tourism community seems finally to have taken root. In the 
same report the High Level Group also invited the Commission to institutionalize a 
meeting o f the whole tourism community on a regular basis:
"with a view to ensuring a regular and comprehensive exchange of views on the 
issues involved, to organize an Annual Tourism Summit, involving 
entrepreneurs, employees' representatives, policymakers and public authorities, 
researchers and professionals in education and training." (Ibid.: 23).
Immediately after the publication o f the report, the Commission disseminated its policy 
recommendations, thus opening a second phase o f action in order to introduce the 
report as the common problem and policy-solutions agenda to all the interested 
players:
"The Commission opened a second phase of action designed to encourage public 
authorities, professional associations and tourism businesses to consider the 
problems raised in terms of their own experiences, and implement practical 
measures accordingly." (COM(99)205 final: 6).
The final step o f  this process was the issuing o f  the communication to the Council and 
the Parliament, "Enhancing Tourism's Potential for Employment".121 The 
communication provided, in a systematic way, policy recommendations based on the 
conclusions o f  the discussion over the recommendations o f  the High Level Group. One 
o f the aims o f  this Communication is to provide the tourism industry with a well- 
defined policy agenda in the hope that: "this will contribute also to facilitate the 
establishment o f the (so far missing) clear tourism sector- identity." (COM(99) 
205final: 4).
121 COM(99)205 final.
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However, despite the success o f the Commission in bringing the various fragmented, 
and to some extent, conflictual interests operating in the field o f European tourism 
under the same policy agenda, at the end o f the Santer administration tourism 
continues to lack a common vision among all the member states. These continue to 
deny to tourism political recognition for a potential role and place in the construction 
of Europe. The top-down exercise o f the Commission to sensibilize its potential policy 
clients and, through them, the member states, has only partially achieved its target. 
This may be explained by the limited power which tourism interests have within the 
national arenas. The fact that these interests have begun to feel that they have a 
European dimension in their identity certainly makes them more influential. However, 
it does not necessarily mean that they have become powerful enough to override other 
more influential interests and so become o f a top priority for the national policy 
agendas. The starting point in national policy-making for these interests is clearly low, 
and therefore there is long way to go before they gain their political recognition. The 
next Commission clearly has at its disposal—should it happen to be as determined as its 
predecessor--a better organized consultation platform and a set o f  more aware 
potential clients-partners ready to pursue policy measures at the Community level to 
facilitate Europe's tourism.
, The outcome o f  this analysis concerning the relationship between the Commission and
' its potential policy clients and the strategy followed by the Commission, is that the»
f Commission emerges as having a pro-active role and tries more to shape rather than
i
’ accommodate its clients’ policy preferences. The Commission mobilizes resources such
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as demonstration projects (pilot projects for green, rural cultural tourism etc.), 
organizes workshops and fora, sets up prizes, such as the Green Prize, to motivate 
industry to move in this direction, forms prestigious, high level consultation groups 
and orders studies from external independent experts, in order to demonstrate the need 
for. as well as the legitimacy of, its proposals for policy innovation in the field and to 
promote its own potential role in the revised tourism policy-making.
The Role o f  DGXXIII
As already mentioned, tourism was dealt with at the Commission level by a special unit 
set up within DGXXIII, in 1990 in order to implement the projects for the European 
tourism year 1990 and the first multi-annual program 1993-5. In 1990, according to 
the "Establishment Plan",122 the staff o f this unit consisted o f  10 permanent members: 
three o f them, including the head o f  the unit were grade “A” superior officers, while 
the other seven were auxiliary staff. To offset this lack o f  expertise, the Commission 
recruited a temporary member from an employment agency, attached three national 
experts to the Unit, and outsourced the technical management for projects o f the 
European Year o f Tourism from May 1989 to October 1990. The tourism industry, the 
European Parliament and Commissioner Papoutsis himself all stressed that the unit was 
understaffed and, without the adequate human resources, could not operate efficiently. 
The Committee o f  independent experts formed by the Parliament and the Commission 
ten years later to examine a number o f  allegations regarding mismanagement and fraud
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in the unit, arrived at the conclusion that the Commission should not have proposed 
these program to assist Tourism at all, since it did not have the human resources to 
implement them:
"The Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers the implementation of 
projects in which it intended to play an active role (for example EYT) without 
having the human resources needed to organize them." (European 
Parliament/Committee of Independent Experts (1999): 15).
Since the mid 90s, the Commission itself has accepted that the unit was understaffed 
and more human resources should be allocated to cany out tourism policy at the 
Community level. As I have discussed elsewhere, as soon as Papoutsis took office, 
under the pressure o f allegations o f  mismanagement and fraud in the tourism unit, and 
in order to give an objective assessment o f the efficiency and the performance o f  the 
unit in the implementation o f the Action Plan 1993-95, ordered an evaluation to be 
carried out by external experts. Their report also raised the point of the poor 
performance o f  the staff: "There has been high staff turnover, a lack o f tourism 
expertise, poor staff training and understaffing o f the financial administration." 
(COM(96)166 final: 9).
However, Papoutsis stressed that the big obstacle was the lack o f a clear definition o f 
the policy targets of the Unit. Throughout this period it was the Council which was 
blocking the adoption o f the various proposals for a coherent policy with clearly 12
122 For the composition and the structure of the tourism unit see the tourism section in the first report 
published by the committee of independent experts set up by the European Parliament and the 
Commission to examine allegations regarding fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism in the European 
Commission in March 1999. European Parliament/Committee of Independent Experts (1999).
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defined priorities and policy instruments to promote them. According to the 
Commission, the cause o f the administrative inefficiency was, first and foremost, the 
vague scope o f  the policy, and then staffing:
"The widely diverging views of member states and European Parliamentarians 
on how best to develop policy in this area, and the requirement for unanimity 
within the Council, made it difficult to maintain coherence within the Plan." 
(COM(96)166: II).
Papoutsis followed a bureau-shaping and not a bureau-expanding strategy for the 
tourism unit. His intention was not to gain more human resources but, first and 
foremost, to provide a well-defined policy task for the administration unit and to 
change its structure. Despite the fact that there were voices claiming that the tourism 
unit was understaffed and the budget at the disposal o f the Unit was very poor for the 
objectives specified in the plan, Papoutsis, aware o f  the unwillingness o f  some member 
states to increase the budget o f the Union, did not make a proposal for more staff and 
resources. His policy proposals were based on the same magnitude o f human and 
financial resources, but with different content. He never proposed a budget o f  more 
than 16  Million ECU per year for "philoxenia”, which was the average annual budget 
o f the European tourism year and the Action Plan 1993-5. In the course o f  his 
administration, the number o f  staff employed increased marginally. The average 
number was 16, but he changed its composition in favor o f  more permanent and less 
auxiliary staff: more specifically, 11 out o f  16 were "A” grade level, and the ratio o f 
permanent staff relative to total staff started at 5:17 at the beginning o f  the plan and
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shifted to 11:17 under his administration. 123
With his bureau-shaping strategy he tried to change the competence of the unit keeping 
the role o f policy coordinator and project manager and reducing the administrative 
load o f the operations. In 1996, responding to the findings o f the external experts on 
the functioning o f tourism unit, the Commission claimed that a new organizational 
structure was needed which would review the administrative process in such a way 
that: "It will enable desk officers to devote more time to direct project 
management".(COM(96)166: 9). To achieve this, the Commissioner tries to allocate 
the burdensome tasks o f financial administration and legal and contract affairs to other 
administration units exclusively set up for these tasks.123 24 The outcome o f this process 
was a unit with a more executive type o f administration for tourism.
The Commissioner wanted for the new unit the role of privileged interlocutor between 
the various decision-makers dealing with tourism in the private and public sectors and 
with the rest o f  the departments o f  the Community which affect tourism through their 
policies. In this way, the unit and the Commissioner would gain more policy leverage 
by exclusively presenting the policy requests o f tourism interests to the rest o f  the 
Community. As we have already discussed in the section on the position and strategies 
followed by the various tourism interests, there was no strong connection between the 
latter and the unit for tourism. Indeed, the majority o f  interests appeared to be unaware
123 The figures are taken from COM(96)166 final: 14 and checked for their validity in 1999, through
the interview with L.Itzipeoglou, Brussels May 1999.
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of the existence of the unit. It was through the consultation process for the green paper 
that the Commission was able, in a systematic way, to invite tourism interests to 
discuss the potential role o f the Union and the Commission in a common and 
European-wide agenda. In this process, as I outlined in the section on the role o f the 
Commission, the Commission expressed its willingness to play the role o f interlocutor:
"Could the Community play the part of information disseminator and act as an 
interface between the Union and the various parties concerned (member states, 
professionals, major organizations active in the sector, consumers, third 
countries and international organizations), thus allowing the member states to 
consult each other in liaison with the Commission and, where necessary, to 
coordinate their actions with a view to balancing the diverse interests at play in 
the field of tourism? If it could indeed play such a part, the Commission could 
also take any initiative it considered useful in promoting this coordination." 
(COM(95)97 final: 22).
The industiy's representatives responded positively to this and bought this proposal, 
asking the Commission to take this direction irrespective o f whether the member states 
decided to include the specific title for tourism in the revised Treaty o f the Union in 
Amsterdam or adopt a coherent policy for tourism on the existing legal basis:
"We know there is no Union tourism policy [...] Also and even if there is no 
legal basis for tourism in the Treaty, we believe that the European Commission 
and the DGXXIII in particular, could do a lot more even at this stage to develop 
more effective, more regular, more in-depth consultation with the tourism 
industry. DGXXIII should be our point of coordination, it should ensure that we 
avoid duplication of work and get involved when difficulties are created for the 
industry [...]. The function of the tourism unit in DGXXIII is essential here, 
primarily in order to coordinate and play an influencing role with the other 
Directorate-Generals, to get them to consider tourism in all actions." 
(Commission of the European Communities/DGXXIII/Tourism Unit 1995: 4, 7).
124 Ibid.
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Having the backing o f the various tourism interests, which had been sensibilized by 
him. Papoutsis tried to promote the restructuring of the unit on tourism, which had 
fallen in disrepute, and to turn it into a respectable unit with a prominent and influential 
role close to the policy-making centers whose decisions may have an impact on 
European tourism. His proposal to the college o f  the Commissioners in January' 1996 
was to upgrade the unit to a directorate. However, despite the support given by 
President Santer, he could not overcome the problem o f  the unit's bad reputation. 
President Santer convinced Papoutsis that timing was not right for such a movement, 
since the Belgian police and justice were in the middle o f  their investigations into fraud 
in the existing unit.125 However, they found a compromise: the Commission decided to 
change the structure and the name o f  Direction C, in which up to this time, the unit for 
tourism had been located, and to incorporate “tourism” in its new title under a rather 
vague title. The new title o f the directorate was "Concerted action under enterprise 
and tourism policy". In this way tourism gained the status o f a directorate without 
provoking Europe's public opinion as some various Parliamentarians and other parties 
in Brussels had predicted.126 The structure o f the directorate contained a new unit 
called "concerted action, coordination with relevant Community policies and better 
access to support programs". It had the task of getting involved in all the interservice 
consultations o f  the Commission which discussed policy measures with a possible 
impact on tourism and o f  raising the awareness o f  the decision makers by presenting
125 1 obtained the information on the atmosphere in the College by interviewing the chief of Papoutsis* 
Cabinet, in Brussels in March 1996.
126 These are the same figures that later caused the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 
after their accusations of mismanagement, fraud and nepotism in the Commission.
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the position o f tourism interests. Another new unit, with the title ’’Concerted action 
and facilitating better access to sources o f funding", was set up to provide a help-desk 
for the tourism industry in searching for Community financing for its investment 
projects. By means o f these new units next, along with the original unit in charge o f the 
Action Plan, the administration attempted to earn its role as privileged interlocutor 
between tourism interests and the other departments o f the Commission.
At the end o f  his administration, Papoutsis introduced a further restructuring o f the 
directorate with regard to tourism. In the five years o f  his administration, Papoutsis 
managed to raise the prestige and the political recognition o f  tourism as a policy o f 
increased importance for the Union. Despite the fact that this recognition was not 
1 enough to convince all the member states to adopt a higher profile policy to assist 
tourism in the Union, the policy-making with regard to tourism sector has developed a 
strong and visible Union dimension. The Directorate for tourism has developed a 
regular communication and consultation role with the various private and public parties 
involved in tourism affairs. Following his piecemeal strategy for policy innovation, 
Papoutsis tried to capitalize on these changes on the level o f  the underlying factors and 
to further increase the profile of tourism within the Commission’s administration. He 
proposed a new Directorate within DGXXIII exclusively dedicated and clearly stated 
to tourism named: "Directorate D: Coordination o f  Community measures, and 
concerted actions, in relation to tourism”. Under the new favorable conditions, this 
was accepted by the college o f  the Commissioners. The title and the structure o f  the 
Direction reinforce the idea that there is coherent Community policy for tourism. Each 
unit corresponds to a specific policy objective o f such a policy:
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Unit 1 : Development of tourism policy and relations with the industry, third countries 
and international organizations.
Unit 2: Stimulation o f competitiveness in tourism.
Unit 3: Promotion o f tourist-consumer-interest and quality o f  tourism services.
Apart from the symbolic content o f  the titles, this structure constitutes administration 
units that have a clear task to promote these three clearly stated policy objectives 
through concerted actions. In this way, Papoutsis hoped to provide the future 
Commission with an administration that clearly signals that it exists to promote tourism 
interests at the Community level. At the same time, this administration, having a clear 
definition o f its task in the structure o f the Commission and a dedicated staff o f 
executive level could act for its own bureaucratic interest and promote the further 
shaping o f its competence pursuing a higher profile, Union policy for tourism.
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From the above analysis, we see that the bureau-shaping strategy is not an outcome o f 
the preferences o f the top-officials o f  the unit, but a strategy designed at the cabinet 
level. It was Papoutsis and his staffers who had the vision for a Union policy for 
tourism. The tourism administrative division, set up just five years before Papoutsis 
embarked upon his intense effort for policy innovation in the field, with its few top- 
officials allegedly involved in fraud, and with no connections with their potential policy 
clients, could never have made a contribution to the dynamics o f the process for the 
redefinition o f  the role o f  the Union in the field o f tourism. However, the striking 
finding here is that the Commissioner, in order to promote his effort and to safeguard 
its continuity after his administration, tried to develop such a politicized and high 
profile administration for tourism, which may continue, on a permanent basis, this
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innovative policy activity.
The cabinet is engaged in a strategy to re-define the Union’s tourism policy and to 
enhance the competence of the administrative division in charge o f this policy. Since 
tourism is influenced by a large number o f policy measures undertaken by other 
Directorate-Generals, the tourism direction has to compete with these in order to 
establish its role. However, tourism interests represent a small fraction o f the policy 
clients o f  directions such as those dealing with environment, consumer issues, the 
structural funds etc. As a result, they do not feel threatened that they may lose 
important parts o f  their competence to the tourism direction. This may explain why, at 
the outset, most o f  the other Commissioners did not seek to block Papoutsis' proposals 
at the college level. There were only few voices raised against the first proposal made 
by Papoutsis for the restructuring and the upgrade o f the administration, using the 
argument, outlined above, that it was not the right timing. Therefore, in the case o f 
tourism, the various departments do not experience competition over the definition and 
monopolization o f  the tourism policy domain. Tourism does not, it appears, have the 
appeal to make other DGs become involved in such a competition, and the existing 
administration does not have the structure, the strength or the political and interests 
backing to raise its voice in the course o f  interservice consultation. The Papoutsis 
administration, however, tried to create all these conditions in order to kick-start a 
dynamic process, where the restructured Direction for Tourism would compete, as I 
expect according to my theoretical hypotheses for the strategies followed by the 
Commission's top-officials, with other departments, and will try to have a say and 
incorporate a tourism dimension in other Union policies which may have an impact on
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tourism.
The internal restructuring and the upgrade of the Direction for tourism would also 
seem to be in accord with the relative hypotheses o f my theoretical framework. The 
Direction wants to become the privileged mediator involved in the coordination o f 
prestigious mediations and project management activities. The policy output pursued is 
the same as in the case o f maritime industries and in keeping with the arguments o f  my 
theoretical framework The role pursued for the Direction o f  tourism is o f an executive 
type with a minimal administrative burden, rather than a labor-intensive classic 
bureaucracy. It was for this reason, as we have seen in the proposed and adopted 
restructuring o f  the Direction for tourism, that Papoutsis proposed the transfer o f  all 
the burdensome financial and legal administrative duties to other units. We have seen 
that they do not search for more staff and an increased budget, but rather for more 
executive type o f  staff. We notice also the pro-active role o f  the cabinet, which tries to 
shape the policy preferences o f tourism interests, using various methods such as the 
channeling o f information and the dissemination o f  the opinion o f experts favorable to 
its proposals by means o f case studies and workshops. Through its units, the Direction 
is designed to become the privileged mediator between the various tourism interests 
and the rest o f  the Community services, and to be involved in the coordination o f 
prestigious mediations and project management activities.
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Conclusions
The puzzle I tried to solve using the proposed analytical framework was how and why 
Commissioner Papoutsis, in charge o f  tourism affairs for the Union, with no strong 
industrial interests behind him, with most o f  the member states indifferent if not against 
his initiative, and with an administration with a seriously damaged image, embarked 
upon a process o f  policy innovation which seemed, from the beginning, doomed to fail. 
It is on this policy initiative that I concentrated my research with this case study. 1 
examined the way a policy innovation process "behaves” when there is not strong 
interest support and it is not backed by an administration with a long history and a 
well-established position among the various players involved, as it was in the case o f 
maritime industries. In this second case study, the driving force o f policy innovation 
appears to be solely the Commissioner and his cabinet staff
Following my theoretical framework, I examined the position o f  what this framework 
regarded as independent variable that is the pattern o f interaction between the various 
involved administrative departments and their policy clients and external suppliers. In 
the case o f  tourism, this structure consists o f various societal actors operating in both 
the domestic and the Community arena, namely tourism industry interests, tourist- 
consumer interests, environmental and cultural heritage interests, and the Commission's 
top-officials involved in tourism matters.
I examined the policy positions of the member states together with the policy 
preferences o f their various public authorities which appear to a have a say on tourism
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affairs, as they are produced through the above described structure o f interaction in the 
domestic arena. In this way I examine the theoretical argument for the level of salience 
o f tourism in the domestic arena is corroborated. I see whether there was a policy 
failure at the domestic level which could work as a challenge for new policies at the 
Community level.
I identified Commissioner Papoutsis and his cabinet as the policy innovator, and I 
examined. More specifically, I examined the arguments for the motivation o f  the 
initiators and the policy output pursued and achieved by them. In order to understand 
the dynamics o f this innovative policy involvement, I tested my theoretical hypotheses 
for the strategies followed towards the players involved by the Commission's top- 
officials and the likelihood o f success under the relatively underdeveloped structure o f 
interaction which acts as the explanatory variable.
Regarding the motivation o f Papoutsis and his cabinet, I see that the theoretical 
arguments for the profile o f the Commission’s top-officials who act as policy 
innovators appear to hold. According to these arguments, the motivation o f the 
Commissioners to embark upon policy innovation is directly linked to their personal 
career ambitions as politicians, their ideological and political beliefs in the role o f 
public authorities (more or less interventionists), and is also influenced by the policy 
priorities o f their national domestic agenda.
Commissioner Papoutsis is an active politician, a member o f  the European Parliament
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for 8 years, and a prominent member o f PASOK, the Greek socialist party which has 
held office since 1981. He is a young, very ambitious politician who saw his post in the 
Commission as a step to provide him with a higher international profile, a necessary 
element for his ambitions to become a challenger for the leadership o f his party. After 
his session in the Commission he went back to the domestic politics in Greece and 
elected member o f the Greek Parliament and appointed as minister for first time in his 
career. His profile made him, as a Commissioner, keen to pursue policy innovations 
which would g i\e  him both prestige and a reputation as an effective and innovative 
policy-maker. He also wanted to pursue new policies which would help his country, 
for the obvious reason that he wanted to go back to domestic politics. As already 
noted, tourism is a sector o f central importance to the Greek economy in terms o f 
balance o f payment, volume o f  returns and employment. At the same time, as a 
socialist, Papoutsis is more sympathetic to redistributional policies and regards tourism 
as an excellent instrument for reducing regional disparities and increasing the economic 
and social cohesion o f the Community. Considering this evidence, it is easy to 
understand why Commissioner Papoutsis proved so motivated and active in pursuing a 
European driven policy for tourism.
Tourism was never a high profile policy within the national arenas, and in most 
countries there is not a specific ministry in charge o f tourism affairs. Tourism is dealt 
with at the lower levels o f governance. According to my theoretical framework, the 
fact that public opinion in the member states is not sensibilized to matters o f tourism, 
may provide scope for invisible-bureaucratic politics on the part o f the various 
administrations involved. Within this environment, the Commission seems to have the
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degree o f freedom and the space to act as broker o f best policy practices and as policy 
innovator with an increased possibility o f success. This theoretical argument has been 
made robust by the observed continuous and intensive attempt of the Commission to 
establish, at the Community level, such a role, founded upon an upgraded 
administrative direction for tourism, sufficiently empowered to fulfill its new task.
The analysis on the position o f  the member states in the course o f the efforts made by 
Papoutsis to promote innovations in tourism policy at the European level, revealed the 
level o f complexity underlying the position o f the member states. This position is the 
equilibrium point o f the policy preferences o f a number o f  actors operating within the 
state arena. Initially, the member states appeared polarized on tourism matters, and the 
game at the Community level resembled the proposed theoretical structure o f  a chicken 
game. In this structure, it is argued that, since the leaders o f the states are not 
constrained by their public opinion, through invisible politics the Commission may 
promote a policy compromise, which constitutes a policy innovation in the field. In 
order to do this, the Commission tries to make the initial positions o f the member 
states converge by channeling relevant information on the positive effects of such a 
decision, by promoting issue linkage, and by making strategic use of the management 
o f the negotiations in order to achieve a more favorable timing for the initiative. It has 
been demonstrated that the above argument holds. Throughout the process, the 
Commission regarded the position o f the member states on tourism matters not as 
fixed but as open to change. It was the belief that the initial constraints were flexible 
and may be relaxed which led Papoutsis to try his piecemeal policy strategy, despite 
the very negative starting point.
The outcome o f the analysis concerning the relationship between the Commission and 
its potential policy clients and the strategy Papoutsis followed is that the Commission 
had a pro-active role and tried to shape more and less to accommodate the policy 
preferences o f  its policy clients. The Commission mobilized resources such as 
demonstration projects—pilot projects for green, rural, cultural tourism etc.—organized 
workshops and forums, and sets up prizes, such as the Green Prize to motivate 
industry towards this direction. It also formed prestigious high-level consulting groups, 
ordered studies from external, independent experts in order to show the need for, and 
the legitimacy of, its proposals for policy innovation in the field and the role which the 
Commission could play in the revised tourism policy-making.
The underlying factors which were recognized by Commissioner Papoutsis as windows 
o f opportunity to pursue policy innovations for tourism at the Community level were 
twofold. First, there were a number o f  reasons which can be attributed to structural 
changes in the demand and supply side o f  the tourism industry. The adjustment to 
these change which industry was required to make could also be supported by a 
Community-driven policy which would be complementary to national policies, which 
also had to be reorganized and to carry a part o f the burden. The second set o f reasons 
for which a Union-driven policy could be established was related, not to policy failures 
due to structural changes in the tourism industry, but to the possible use o f tourism by 
the Union as an efficient instrument to promote broader common objectives, such as 
environmental protection or the creation o f  a European identity for the citizens o f  the 
Union, set exclusively with the revised Treaty o f  the Union in Maastricht in 1992. The
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later set of arguments justified a more interventionist role to the Commission than the 
former one. I observe that my argument stated at the macro-level, that a policy failure 
at the state level constitutes a window of opportunity for the Commission to embark 
upon policy innovation in the field holds as a necessary condition. However, I could 
argue that in the case of tourism, Commissioner Papoutsis, in order to promote policy 
changes in the field, expanded the definition of policy challenge beyond the borders o f 
the failure o f existing national and Community policies to tackle structural changes in 
the specific policy domain. He incorporated a positive dimension in the concept of 
policy challenge, namely, that policy change is needed to serve new policy objectives 
set by the states.
It should be noted that what are defined by the Commission as challenges for policy 
innovation at the Community level are not necessarily seen as such by the other parties 
involved in the politics o f tourism. As we have seen, the Commission embarked upon a 
piecemeal, top-down policy strategy to convince the member states, the industry and 
the other parties interested in tourism affairs, that the above reasons constituted a 
justification for a Community-driven policy.
Papoutsis opened the widest possible discussion and consultation procedure, asking all 
the private and public, national and supranational, players in the field o f  tourism, to 
take a position on which type o f policy was needed at the Community level. This 
process was used both to shape the preference o f  the players towards a Community 
driven policy, and, at the same time, to enable the Commission to measure the policy 
cost o f this top-down innovative policy enterprise.
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The guide to this policy innovation strategy was the level o f hostility expressed by the 
member states, since the industry and the other institutions o f the Union were in favor. 
In the case that the cost for the maximum target was prohibitive, due to high hostility, 
then elements o f a comprehensive policy to assist tourism would survive within a 
multi-annual minimum policy program, since there would be less hostility to such a low 
profile proposal.
It has been shown that the Commission pursues the maximum scenario, but not, 
however, at any cost. It introduced the alternatives in the consultation procedure, 
while trying to create a focal point around the maximum scenario, which involved a 
commitment to a comprehensive policy program with a higher to the existing profile. 
Its piecemeal strategy was, from this point on, to help the other parties to arrive at this 
focal point. However, the Commission was ready, counting the cost, to modify its 
policy proposal in such a way as to finally achieve at least a minimum European policy 
for tourism. Its aim was to maintain the communication channel among the players, 
and to prepare the ground for future policy innovation in the field when the policy 
environment became more favorable, thus reducing the cost o f  carrying out the policy.
The above findings are in accord with the type o f  nested games described in my 
theoretical framework, where the institutional players involved have strategies on hand 
to both shape and also to accommodate the policy preference o f their policy clients. 
According to the theoretical framework the strategy followed depends on the cost o f
the preference shaping strategy. This cost depends on the extent that the policy clients
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are determined to pursue a pre-established policy request, on the cost o f opportunity 
that the “policy entrepreneur” has to follow alternative innovations in other policy 
domains, and on the resources -b o th  human and financial— that are available and that 
the player is willing to devote to achieve the policy innovation. This theoretical 
framework fits perfectly with the observed piecemeal strategy by which Papoutsis cats 
pro-actively, pursued policy innovation and tried to shape the preferences o f  his policy 
clients around his proposals. These proposals may rank from a minimalist to a 
maximalist version of innovation depending on the reaction o f the member states 
throughout the process, since it is the member states who are the decision-makers at 
the upper level o f the game’s nested structure, where intergovernmental bargaining 
under unanimity occurs.
In this effort to promote policy innovations in the field o f  tourism, the Commission 
pursued for itself the roles o f policy coordinator o f  all national and other Community 
policies which may affect tourism, o f the broker o f the best practices in the field and o f 
the privileged interlocutor with all the parties involved in policy-making. It aimed to 
channel the policy demands to the right level o f  governance, and to fine tune the 
conflictual policy preferences, such as consumer, natural and cultural heritage 
protection vs. growth and employment interests, through the concept o f sustainable 
development. These findings make corroborate the arguement that the target o f the 
"eurocrats” is to become mediators, and brokers and to move closer to the centers o f 
political power where decisions are taken.
It is noted that, in the case o f  tourism, the dominant strategy deployed amongst the
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various departments was not competition over the definition and monopolization o f  the 
tourism policy domain. Tourism apparently did not have the appeal to make other DGs 
to get involved in such competition, while the administration as it existed then, did not 
have the structure, strength and interests backing to make itself heard in interservice 
consultation. However. Papoutsis’ administration tried to create all the conditions 
necessary to kick-start the dynamic process. The restructured direction for tourism 
could then compete, expected from my theoretical hypotheses for the strategies 
followed by the Commission's top-officials, with other departments and seeks not only 
to have a say in, but also to incorporate a tourism dimension in other policies o f the 
Union which might have an impact on tourism.
The internal restructuring and upgrading o f the direction for tourism appears to be in 
keeping with the relative hypotheses o f my theoretical framework for the strategies 
followed. The tourism direction wants to become the privileged mediator involved in 
the coordination o f  prestigious mediations and project management activities. The 
pursued policy output is the same as in the case o f  maritime industries, and, again, in 
keeping with the arguments o f  my theoretical framework. The role pursued by the 
direction o f  tourism is o f an executive type with the minimum administrative burden 
rather than that o f  a labor-intensive classic bureaucracy. It was for this reason, that 
Papoutsis, in the proposed and adopted restructuring o f  the direction for tourism, 
advocated the transfer to other units o f  all the burdensome financial and legal 
administrative duties. We saw that, the direction did not seek more staff or an 
increased budget, but argued instead for more executive staff. The direction is 
designed, through its units, to become the privileged mediator between the various
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tourism interests and the rest of the Community’s services, and to be involved in the 
coordination o f  prestigious mediations and project management activities. This is the 
preferred policy output for the Commission's top-officials since it provides them with 
prestigious and influential positions closer to the decision-making centers.
We also noted the pro-active strategy o f the cabinet, which tried to shape the policy 
preferences o f  the interests involved, using various methods such as the channeling o f 
information and the dissemination o f  the opinion o f  experts favorable to its proposals 
obtained through case studies and workshops. These studies such as the assessment o f 
the action plan 1993-5 were ordered by the Commission from external experts, in 
order to strengthen the objectivity o f  political decisions which had already been taken. 
The use of experts is selective and depends on the needs o f the Commission’s 
innovation strategy. Thus, all the studies and workshops, the high level group for 
tourism and employment, and other high profile groups organized by the Commission 
for the discussion of the role of the Union and of the Commission in particular, were in 
favor o f an active role in tourism, close to the maximum scenario. The timing o f the 
issuing and dissemination o f these studies and discussions was decided by the 
Commission in order to help create o f a favorable atmosphere for the Commission’s 
proposed innovatioa This finding is in accord with the hypothesis o f the theoretical 
framework that the Commission’s top-officials try to maximize the inputs from the side 
of experts to the extent that they support a decision which has already been taken or 
specify it within a set o f pre-defined general policy guidelines.
The foregoing failure of the Commission to convince^the Council to adopt a coherent
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policy framework for tourism showed, once again, the interactive nature o f EU policy 
making. In this environment, the fact that a player, in our case Commissioner 
Papoutsis, acted as a preference shaper, did not guarantee the success o f the effort. It 
is clear that Papoutsis played a pro-active role, using various methods to promote 
policy innovation in tourism. He tried to shape the policy environment and to lead it to 
accept his policy proposals. He tried to mobilize policy resources such as industrial 
interests, and experts, and to create a strong European policy identity for tourism. His 
strategy, although it did not lead to a new European policy for tourism, however, did 
have a strong institutional impact. In almost five years o f intensive effort, the 
Commissioner managed to create a European policy community for tourism, which 
identified itself as such and which has its own regular meetings and a common policy 
agenda. There is an upgraded administrative division at the level o f directorate in the 
Commission with a clear job-description and the organizational design to pursue 
concerted policy actions in favor o f tourism at the Community level. It is clear that the 
European tourism community, formed top-down, now has a solid grounding and clear 
policy objectives to pursue in EU policy making.
According to the theoretical framework tested with this case study, a condition which 
may lead to a policy change is that the majority of the clients o f  the policy challenge its 
definition and start calling for a new one. If the structure o f  interaction between the 
Commission and policy clients and suppliers is well developed, then the likelihood o f 
the adoption o f the new policy is high. The poor result o f  Papoutsis’ innovative 
strategy may be explained with the help o f  the above hypothesis. Despite the efforts 
made by the Commissioner to develop this supportive structure where tourism related
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interests could converge and back his attempt to challenge the status quo to this extent 
that would have allowed the Commission to introduce its proposed policy scenarios. 
However, this is a dynamic process, and the nested game played in another, more 
favorable policy context, supported by the strengthening o f the awareness of tourism 
interests and the dynamics o f their upgraded institutional organization, may allow the 
member states to produce the new policy for tourism that they seek at the Community 
level.
Consequently, as far as the theoretical framework is concerned, its explanatory power 
seems to be high, since it manages to provide a good understanding o f  all the elements 
in the dynamics o f the institutional involvement o f  the Commission in pursuing policy 
innovations in tourism affairs.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the concluding part o f this thesis, I present the outcome of the comparative 
examination o f  the empirical findings with regard to the proposed theoretical 
explanadum o f  the dynamics of the Commission’s involvement in policy innovation 
activities. The tested hypotheses concern the structure o f interaction between 
administrative and societal interests, how this influences the strategies followed—top 
down or bottom up—by the policy innovators, the possibilities o f success o f  the 
undertaken innovative initiatives. We also examine whether the main theoretical 
arguments conceriiing the motivations of administrative interests, the necessary 
conditions for the Commission to embark upon policy innovation through bureaucratic 
politics, and the policy outputs pursued by the innovators are corroborated by the 
empirical findings.
This research was structured in case studies which not only move from the general to 
more specific—the cases o f  DGIII industrial policy and, more specifically, its policy for 
maritime industries—but also allow for variations in the dependent and independent 
variables-the cases o f maritime industries and tourism. Through this variation in the 
structure o f policy preferences o f  societal actors and administration's top-officials, I 
examined and refined the validity o f  the proposed theoretical arguments for the 
involvement o f  the Commission in the Community policy-making. This choice was 
necessary in order to examine how the theoretical framework behaves under different 
conditions and in order to obtain a high level of confidence for the generalization o f the 
results of this test.
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According to the theoretical framework tested with this thesis, the possibility for a 
proposed policy change to take place is very high, when the policy clients o f a public 
policy provider recognize a policy failure at the domestic or Community level. 
Examining the empirical findings in the cases—maritime industries and tourism—the 
above condition appears to hold. However, it has been shown that this does not 
constitute a pre-condition for the Commission to start acting as a policy innovator. In 
both cases, the policy innovators were pro-active in mobilizing resources and following 
specific strategies to demonstrate the policy failure and sensibilize their policy clients 
to it. Moreover, in the case o f  tourism, in order to  create the conditions o f a policy 
challenge, Commissioner Papoutsis expanded the definition o f  policy failure beyond 
the borders o f  the effectiveness o f running policies to incorporate structural changes in 
the policy domain. He incorporated new policy objectives indirectly related to tourism, 
such as the creation o f a European identity for the citizens o f the Union, which could 
be served by new policies in the field o f tourism. In any case, it has been shown that 
the awareness o f the actors involved that there is a policy failure is not a given pre­
condition, but part o f the conditions which the policy innovator has to create in order 
to achieve his/her target o f bringing about a new policy in the field.
It has been shown that, when a policy issue is o f low salience in the domestic arena and 
a department o f  the Commission expresses a high interest in embarking upon policy 
innovation in the related field, then the policy-making which occurs resembles 
bureaucratic politics as it is defined in this dissertation. The policy target o f  the 
Commission's top-officials is to re-shape the competence o f their portfolio in order to
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maximize their utility derived from their participation in the policy-making process. I 
showed that the top-officials o f Commission —Commissioners and executives— are 
motivated to, but also constrained in pursuing policy innovations in the field by their 
own public policy system o f  values (more or less interventionists etc.), and the policy 
preferences o f  the bureau's external environment. They follow strategies to both shape 
and accommodate the preferences o f their policy clients. I demonstrated that policy 
innovators decide the extent to which they will follow preference-shaping strategies by 
taking into account the cost of advocating their proposals for policy innovation. They 
change these proposals according to the cost, as demonstrated by the cases of official 
and unofficial consultation with maritime industries, the maritime task force on R&D, 
and o f piecemeal strategies in tourism.
As for the strategies o f top-officials, which constitute one o f the elements o f  the 
project’s dependent variable, I observed that, when the structure o f interaction 
between the various involved administrative departments and their policy clients and 
external suppliers the administration, the independent variable, is well developed and it 
has a long history, as in the case o f DGIII (industry), the dominant strategy of the top- 
officials towards their colleagues o f  the other involved administrative units is the 
proposed oligopolistic competition amongst potential challengers and incumbents in 
order to reshape their competence and maximize their own utility fiinction. The 
battleground is the area o f  interservice consultation, as we see in the case o f  the 
definition of the terms o f  reference for the maritime task force, the OECD negotiations 
for shipbuilding etc.
In the case o f  weak organization, as demonstrated in the case o f  tourism, the 
participation o f  the tourism unit in interservice consultation and the competition with 
other administrative uiiits over the definition o f tourism related policies is the sought- 
after element. The Commissioner for tourism, acting as policy innovator in the field, 
recognizes this element as essential in promoting his policy proposals for new 
Community policies in tourism. For this reason, he tries to develop, within the 
Commission, an administration dedicated to tourism and enabled to compete in 
interservice consultation and to earn its role as the leading administrative department in 
defining and carrying out the tourism-related Community policies. Overall, it could be 
argued that, even in the cases where oligopolistic competition over the definition o f  a 
policy issue does not occur, this element is required in order to promote the innovative 
activity those who initiate such a policy. As we saw in the case o f maritime industries 
that, when top-officials participate actively and compete with their colleagues from 
other DGs in the interservice consultation, the possibility o f  a policy change occurring 
is higher than when such a policy-making element is absent, as was the case for 
tourism.
As far the strategies o f the policy innovators- bureaucrats towards their policy clients 
socio-economic interests concern, the comparison between the case o f  tourism and 
maritime industries shows that interests participate in the drafting o f the policy agenda 
according to their level of organization, but they do not determine it. Clearly, top- 
officials both accommodate and shape the policy preference o f  their clients. When 
there are vested interests with high policy leverage in the domestic arenas—shipbuilders 
and shippers for example--and they back a proposal for policy innovation, then the
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likelihood of this proposal being adopted is higher than in the case, such as tourism, 
where such a structure is absent. However the coordination of such lobbing across the 
member states and the Community institutions to promote innovative proposals proved 
to be difficult to organized. The Commissioners and the executives o f the Commission 
appear to take on this role of moderator in the process. They tiy to mobilize these 
institutions—through the maritime forum, the tourism forum and the high level panel, 
for example—and to create a policy momentum for change.
In both cases, with regard to the strategies followed towards their potential external 
policy suppliers, the policy innovators selectively used external experts, such that the 
proposals o f the latter fitted the policy targets o f the former to reshape their own 
portfolio and to maximize their utility. In none o f the cases did experts produce reports 
or studies which challenged the policy guidance already issued by the Commissions' 
top-officials.
With regard to the type o f policy output pursued, I conclude that budgetary 
instruments were not popular outputs in either o f  the cases. These policy instruments 
faced massive hostility from the state policy-makers. These policies requested transfer 
of financial resources, and therefore power, from state-managed to Community- 
managed budgets (consider the case o f  the Council blocking the proposed multi-annual 
"philoxenia" program). The pursued outputs by the Commission's top-officials are, at 
most, policy instruments which increase their role in planning, policy guidance (such as 
the maritime forum, the maritime task force in R&D, and the "philoxenia" multi annual 
tourism program) and project management (such as maritime R&D). They pursue
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policies which give them the role o f  mediator and broker, as was the case o f the OECD 
shipbuilding negotiations. They also pursue regulatory policies in the field o f  market 
externalities, such as the violation o f competition law in the field o f  shipbuilding by 
state aid, environmental regulations in the field o f maritime and tourism industries, 
consumer protection and so on. In this way, top-officials locate themselves closer to 
the centers o f  power in order to obtain higher profile roles and maximize their utility, 
as predicted by the proposed theoretical framework. From above findings I can expand 
the speculations over future types o f policy instruments at the Union level. I could 
include the types o f policies discussed above with the regulatory activity o f the Union 
predicted by many scholars.
Overall, I could argue that the proposed theoretical framework appears to hold and 
sheds more light in the dynamics o f the involvement o f  the Commission in the 
Community policy-making. In order to obtain a clear and consistent typology, I tried 
to gain from the good properties o f game theory in presenting with clarity patterns o f 
strategic interaction amongst purposeful actors. For this reason, I organized the theory 
review on a game theory approach. I followed a game theory approach to present the 
structure o f policy-making o f  the Union. This structure is presented as a two-level 
game played simultaneously in nested policy arenas, the domestic and the Community 
arena. The use o f simultaneous games played in nested arenas, appears to have 
provided a powerful tool o f understanding the role o f  the Commission in the process at 
the macro-level. The decision to revisit the bureaucratic model of policy-making 
popularized in the 60s by Graham Allison and Anthony Downs and to incorporate 
elements from the model of bureau-shaping bureaucratic politics proposed by Patrick
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Dunleavy, and elements o f  micro-economics, such as the concept o f oligopolistic 
competition for explaining the function o f top-officials within their administration, 
appears to work. This project demonstrates that this approach provides a workable 
micro-founded theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics o f the 
Commission's involvement in Union policy-making. When tested against empirical 
material, the framework shows high power in elucidating processes and policy outputs 
observed at the macro-level, processes and outputs which cannot be understood 
through theories o f liberal inter-govemmentalism or which can only be partially 
explained through theories o f  neo-functionalism and neo- institutionalism.
Finally, I would like to locate this dissertation among the efforts made by many 
political scientists to provide falsifiable micro-founded, actor-centered, partial theories 
to explain specific puzzling policy outcomes at the macro-level It can be seen as an 
exercise which aims at linking the micro and macro levels o f  analysis and providing a 
sound explanadum for the policy-making observed at both levels. In this way, we can 
provide a theory o f interaction o f  purposeful actor (individual, corporate and 
institutional actors) involved in public policy-making. This parsimonious theory is a 
powerful means to make the examined public policy-outcomes more predictable, and 
may also allow the involved public institutions to set up more effective strategies in 
pursuing their policy goals.
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